Stephenson v. Wildwood Farms, Inc., 391 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · Go Syfert
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Stephenson v. Wildwood Farms, Inc., 391 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
24 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: TERRANCE KYLE ALEXANDER v. KHORI FRANCIS (gactapp, 2023-10-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TERRANCE KYLE ALEXANDER v. KHORI FRANCIS
Ga. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Co., 353 Ga. App. 221 , 221 ( 836 SE2d 215 ) (2019) (explaining that defendants, whose answer was struck as a discovery sanction, filed a “Pleading Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-55 (a)” following the court’s finding of them in default as a sanction); cf. Stephenson v. Wildwood Farms, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 728, 729 (2) ( 391 SE2d 706 ) (1990) (holding that appellant never made a demand for jury trial on the issue of damages because an “[e]xamination of the record in its totality reveals that appellant included a demand for trial by jury as to the entire proceedings in his belated answer, and th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Diaz v. Wills
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
In Stephenson v. Wildwood Farms, 194 Ga. App. 728, 729 (2) ( 391 SE2d 706 ) (1990) we held that OCGA § 9-11-55 (a) requires a “specific” demand for a jury trial “as to damages.” A verbal demand is insufficient, and a request for a jury trial on the entire case in a stricken answer is also insufficient.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Floyd v. Springfield Plantation Property Owners' Ass'n
Ga. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Young, Colin A. McRae, for appellee. 1 The Declaration defines “Association” as Springfield Plantation Homeowners’ Association, its successors, and assigns. 2 Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to this Court for the reason that an appeal from an order clarifying a judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) does not lie within the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction. 3 Rucker v. Williams, 129 Ga. 828 , hn. 2 ( 60 SE 155 ) (1907). 4 Stephenson v. Wildwood Farms, 194 Ga. App. 728, 729 (2) ( 391 SE2d 706 ) (1990). 5 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Burns v…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shilliday v. Dunaway
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
“One cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct aided in causing.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stephenson v. Wildwood Farms, 194 Ga. App. 728, 729 ( 391 SE2d 706 ) (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cobb County v. Princeton Associates
Ga. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
See generally OCGA §§ 32-3-16 (b) (2); 22-2-109 (c); 22-2-137 (c). “ ‘One cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct aided in causing.’ [Cits.]” Stephenson v. Wildwood Farms, 194 Ga. App. 728, 729 (2) ( 391 SE2d 706 ) (1990).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Morris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Ga. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
West v. Nodvin, supra at 829 (3e); Stephenson v. Wildwood Farms, 194 Ga. App. 728, 729 (2) ( 391 SE2d 706 ). 8.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Floyd v. First Union National Bank (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Stephenson *793 v. Wildwood Farms, 194 Ga. App. 728, 729 (2) ( 391 SE2d 706 ); accord West v. Nodvin, supra at 829 (3e).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hornsby v. Odum
Ga. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
“Thus, at every turn of these proceedings [appellants’] own procedures contributed to the [rulings] of which [they now complain]. ‘One cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct aided in causing.’ [Cit.]” Stephenson v. Wild-wood Farms, 194 Ga. App. 728, 729 ( 391 SE2d 706 ) (1990). 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Horan v. Pirkle
Ga. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Moreover, after the trial judge announced his preliminary interpretation of the evidence in question, appellant failed to pose a specific objection to the testimony, did not assert that the evidence failed to qualify as a declaration against interest, and in essence acquiesced by silence in the trial court’s evaluation of the nature of the evidence received. “ ‘One cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct aided in causing.’ ” Stephenson v. Wildwood Farms, 194 Ga. App. 728, 729 (2) ( 391 SE2d 706 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Capital Floors, LLC v. Jeremy Furman (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Stephenson v. Wildwood Farms, 194 Ga. App. 728, 729 (2) ( 391 SE2d 706 ) (1990) (where a jury trial is required if demanded on an issue, a party cannot “merely inform[ ]” the trial court of its right to a jury trial on that issue, but must go further and make a “specific demand” for the trial court to submit the issue to a jury) (emphasis omitted).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Capital Floors, LLC v. Furman (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Stephenson v. Wildwood Farms , 194 Ga. App. 728 , 729 (2), 391 S.E.2d 706 (1990) (where a jury trial is required if demanded on an issue, a party cannot "merely inform[ ]" the trial court of its right to a jury trial on that issue, but must go further and make a "specific demand" for the trial court to submit the issue to a jury) (emphasis omitted).
Stephenson
v.
Wildwood Farms, Inc.
A90A0088.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Mar 6, 1990.
391 S.E.2d 706
Brace W. Luquire, for appellant., Virgil L. Brown, Bentley C. Adams III, for appellee.
Birdsong, Banke, Cooper.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
Birdsong, Judge.

Appellant, George Stephenson, appeals from the default judgment denying his motion to open default and further denying his motion for trial by jury.

Suit was brought against appellant and co-defendant, Ronnie Owens, for deliberately killing appellee’s full blooded Chianina bull; said act being done by defendant Owens by using a firearm belonging to appellant in appellant’s presence and under his direction. Following entry of default judgment against appellant, appellee voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice, this action in regard to defendant Owens.

Appellant’s sole enumeration of error is that the trial court erred in denying his right to a jury trial under OCGA § 9-11-55 (a). Held:

1. Appellee’s motion to dismiss appeal is denied.

2. OCGA § 9-11-55 (a) pertinently provides that if the case remains in default after the fifteen-day grace period and if the action is one ex delicto or involves unliquidated damages, “the plaintiff shall be required to introduce evidence and establish the amount of damages before the court without a jury . . . provided, however, in the event a defendant, though in default, has placed damages in issue by filing a pleading raising such issue, either party shall be entitled, upon demand, to a jury trial of the issue as to damages.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Pretermitting the question whether appellant was denied his right to trial by jury under OCGA § 9-11-55 (a) is the question of whether appellant tendered a legitimate demand for a jury trial of the issue as to damages. We find he did not.

[*729] Examination of the record in its totality reveals that appellant included a demand for trial by jury as to the entire proceedings in his belated answer, and that he used this demand, during the subsequent hearing, in support of his motion for opening of default. Incidentally, we note, however, that since the trial judge denied appellant’s motion to open default and to file answer, as therein prayed, the purported filing of the answer by the clerk of courts was a nullity.

At the hearing, appellant’s counsel, stated: “We have requested a trial by jury. . . . There is a codefendant in this case. . . . This case would have to go to a trial anyway. . . . This is also an unliquidated damages case. Case law is clear that in unliquidated damages case that the [defendant, even in default, has a right to a jury trial on the issue of damages. . . . [W]e . . . contend that we would be going into court, if the default were not opened, with one [defendant who would be arguing the issue that he was not liable and the other [defendant . . . unable to argue that he was not liable because of the default and would be arguing the issue of damages. Therefore, there would be a trial necessary in this case in any event.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Examining the record in its entirety, we find that appellant merely; informed the trial court of its right to a jury trial on the issue of damages, and did not at any time make a specific demand, within the meaning of OCGA § 9-11-55 (a), for a jury trial of the issue as to damages. Since a demand for jury trial of the issue as to damages was never made an issue before the trial court, no question is presented for appellate review. See Dairyland Ins. Co. v. McIntosh, 171 Ga. App. 782, 783-784 (321 SE2d 110).

Assuming arguendo, such a demand could be construed from an examination of the trial record in toto, appellant still is not entitled to relief. The record reflects that at the time of the trial court’s ruling, denying the motion to open default, appellant failed to comply with the minimum requirements of OCGA § 9-11-46 (a). “As defendant failed to make any objection when the judge made the . . . rulings . . . this ground will not be considered. [Cits.] [OCGA § 9-11-46 (a)] does not exempt a party from voicing some objection to remarks of this kind when the party has an opportunity to object.” Sancken Assoc. v. Stokes, 119 Ga. App. 282 (2) (166 SE2d 924). Thus, at every turn of these proceedings appellant’s own procedures contributed to the ultimate ruling of which he complains. “One cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct aided in causing.” Rush v. Southern Property Mgmt., 121 Ga. App. 360 (2) (a) (173 SE2d 744).

For each of the aforesaid reasons we find appellant’s enumeration of error to be without merit.

Judgment affirmed.

Banke, P. J., and Cooper, J., concur. [*730] Decided March 6, 1990. Brace W. Luquire, for appellant. Virgil L. Brown, Bentley C. Adams III, for appellee.