Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1969). · Go Syfert
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Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1969). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the adoption of another statute by specific reference takes the second statute as it then exists, unaffected by any subsequent amendment or repeal unless a contrary intent clearly appears.”
33 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY v. WILLIAM J. GOGAN, M.D. (fladistctapp, 2018-03-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1969 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1969 1997 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY v. WILLIAM J. GOGAN, M.D.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the adoption of another statute by specific reference takes the second statute as it then exists, unaffected by any subsequent amendment or repeal unless a contrary intent clearly appears.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE OF FLORIDA v. DACOBY RESHARD WOOTEN AND THE PALM BEACH POST
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
See also Coral Cadillac, Inc. v. Stephens, 867 So. 2d 556 , 558– 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“[W]hen a law expressly describes a situation where something should apply, an inference must be drawn that what is not included by specific reference was intended to be omitted or 10 excluded.”); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So. 2d 197, 198 (Fla. 1969) (stating that a statute adopts another statute by specifically referring to the first statute).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) fla 2014
Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
Dade Cnty., 394 So. 2d 981, 988 (Fla. 1981) (“Given that an interpretation upholding the constitutionality of the act is available to this Court, it must adopt that construction.”); Corn v. State, 332 So. 2d 4, 8 (Fla. 1976) (holding that the Court has a duty “to adopt a reasonable interpretation of a statute which removes it farthest from constitutional infirmity”); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 1969) (citing Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Mason, 177 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 1965)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) License Acquisitions, LLC v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC
Fla. · 2014 · confidence medium
Dade Cnty., 394 So.2d 981, 988 (Fla.1981) (“Given that an interpretation upholding the constitutionality of the act is available to this Court, it must adopt that construction.”); Corn v. State, 332 So.2d 4, 8 (Fla.1976) (holding that the Court has a duty “to adopt a reasonable interpretation of a statute which removes it farthest from constitutional infirmity”); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla.1969) (citing Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Mason, 177 *1147 So.2d 465, 467 (Fla.1965)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Integrated Health Care Serv., Inc. v. Lang-Redway
Fla. · 2002 · confidence medium
Instead, this Court must look to the language of section 768.50(2)(b) at the time that the specific cross-reference was enacted. [6] See Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d 197, 198 (Fla.1969) ("It is proper for a statute to adopt all or a part of another *979 statute by specific and descriptive reference thereto.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Avila South Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Kappa Corp.
Fla. · 1977 · confidence medium
Division of Beverage v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 330 So.2d 143, 145 (Fla. 1976); Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1973); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla. 1969).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Florida Nat. Properties, Inc.
Fla. · 1976 · confidence medium
For reasons it does not articulate, the Court chooses not to "adhere to the settled principle of constitutional law that courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds." Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1975); Peoples v. State, 287 So.2d 63 (Fla. 1973); Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1973); Walsingham v. State, 250 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1971); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla. 1969).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Connors
Fla. · 1976 · confidence medium
Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1975); Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1973); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla. 1969).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wooten v. State
Fla. · 1976 · confidence medium
Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1973) ("It is a fundamental principle that Courts will not pass upon the validity of a statute where the case ... may be disposed of upon any other ground." At 261.); Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla. 1969).
cited Cited "see" Silva v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc.
Fla. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1969); Hecht v. Shaw, 112 Fla. 762 , 151 So. 333 (1933); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792 , 78 So. 693 (1918); and State ex rel.
cited Cited "see" Moore v. State, Department of Revenue
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d 197 (Fla.1969).
cited Cited "see" State v. Rodriquez
Fla. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Overstreet v. Blum, 227 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1969); Williams v. State ex rel.
R.K. OVERSTREET, As Tax Collector of Dade County, et al., Appellants,
v.
Robert L. BLUM, Etc., et al., Appellees.
37888.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sep 10, 1969.
227 So. 2d 197
Culver Smith.
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., T.T. Turnbull and Arthur C. Canaday, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Bennett G. Feldman of Schonfeld & Feldman, Miami, for appellees.

[*198] CULVER SMITH, Circuit Judge.

We have for review on direct appeal a decision of the trial Court holding invalid Section 205.251, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., on the grounds that it constitutes an improper delegation of legislative authority and that it constitutes an unequal application of tax. This action was brought by Appellees, Plaintiffs below, as a class action to enjoin Appellants from collecting occupational license taxes under Section 205.251. Trial resulted in the holding set forth above. In addition, the trial Court held that the statute does not constitute double taxation. This portion of its holding is not questioned in this appeal.

Section 205.251, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., reads as follows:

(1) Every person engaged in the business of renting accommodations, as defined in chapter 509, * * * shall pay for each place of business an amount of seventy-five cents (75¢) for each room; provided, however, that no such establishment shall pay less than seven dollars and fifty cents ($7.50) for said license. The room count to be used in this section shall be the same as used by the hotel and restaurant commission in section 509.251, Florida Statutes.
(2) No municipality or county shall originally issue an occupational license to any business coming under the provisions of this section until a license has been procured for such business from the hotel and restaurant commission.

The lower Court held this statute invalid stating it constituted an improper delegation of legislative authority in that the room count to be used shall be the same as that used by the Hotel and Restaurant Commission in Section 509.251, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., thereby providing that the assessment of the tax shall rest within the arbitrary discretion of the commission. The trial Court did not question the validity of Section 509.251 and this is not in issue.

It is proper for a statute to adopt all or a part of another statute by specific and descriptive reference thereto. When this is done the adoption takes the statute as it exists at that time. Hecht et al. v. Shaw, 112 Fla. 762, 151 So. 333. Further, the adoption of another statute by specific reference takes the second statute as it then exists, unaffected by any subsequent amendment or repeal unless a contrary intent clearly appears. Williams et al. v. State ex rel. Newberger, 100 Fla. 1567, 125 So. 358. Section 205.251 refers specifically to both Section 509.251 and to the room count of the Hotel and Restaurant Commission. It follows that subsequent administrative interpretation cannot be considered. Those used would be the ones in existence on the effective date of Section 205.251 which makes no reference to anything in the future. We have examined the authorities cited by Appellees and are of the opinion that the statutes involved in each were worded in such general language that the holdings do not apply to the instant case.

The trial Court also found Section 205.251, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., to be invalid because it constitutes an unequal application of tax. Section 509.241(1) (b) provides as follows:

(b) The following are exempted from the provisions of paragraph (a) hereof:
(1) All individually or collectively owned one, two, or three family dwelling houses or dwelling units and all of such houses or units which are not operated as a group, unless they are regularly rented to transients or held out to, or advertised to the public as places regularly rented to transients. For the purpose of this chapter transients are persons who are not legal residents of the community and who rent for periods of six months or less.
(2) Dormitories and other living or sleeping facilities maintained by public or private schools, colleges, or universities primarily for the use of students, faculty or visitors.
[*199] (3) All hospitals, nursing homes, sanitariums, and other similar places.
(4) All places renting three rooms or less, unless they are advertised or held out to the public to be places that are regularly rented to transients.

The trial Court concluded that the exemptions set out above might be proper for application of Section 509, but that they are improper in the application of the tax levied under Section 205.251. We cannot see why there would be a distinction. In Greater Miami Financial Corporation v. Dickinson, Fla., 214 So.2d 874 this Court stated:

"The organic law does not prohibit reasonable classification of subjects of legislation as long as there is no discrimination within the class. A classification will be sustained if there is a reasonable relationship between the class affected and the subject matter of the legislation."

Appellees argue that under the exemptions provided in Section 509 one building of 1,000 units, each being three rooms or less would be exempt from payment of an occupational license tax. We fail to follow this reasoning. Section 509 exempts "three family" dwelling units, not three room dwelling units. The classification, in our opinion, is reasonable. A statute should be construed to comport with the constitution if it is susceptible of more than one construction. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Mason, Fla., 177 So.2d 465. This rule applies to both findings of invalidity made by the trial Court. The Judgment of the Court below must be reversed.

There is a contention by Appellants that the Appellees in paying the taxes in question, did not do so under protest. This need not be considered in view of our holding.

Reversed.

ERVIN, C.J., and DREW, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.