Shields v. BellSouth Advert., 228 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2000). · Go Syfert
Search
Shields v. BellSouth Advert., 228 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
30 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Wendell Dwayne O'Neil v. USA (ca11, 2020-09-04)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wendell Dwayne O'Neil v. USA
11th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
We review de novo a district court’s order on a motion to dismiss, Shields v. Bellsouth Advert. & Publ’g Co., 228 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 2000), and for summary judgment, Buckner v. Fla. Habilitation Network, Inc., 489 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2007). 4 Case: 19-13094 Date Filed: 09/04/2020 Page: 5 of 9 DISCUSSION The government argues that O’Neal’s case is moot because it discharged the student loan debt.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Thurmond (2×)
S.D. Ga. · 2010 · confidence medium
Co., 456 U.S. 461, 482 , 102 S.Ct. 1883 , 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); Shields v. BellSouth Adver. and Publ’g Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir.2000).
cited Cited as authority (rule) ANDELA v. University of Miami
S.D. Fla. · 2010 · confidence medium
Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 1284, 1289 (11th Cir.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Price v. Owens
N.D. Ga. · 2009 · confidence medium
Collateral Estoppel The Eleventh Circuit gives preclusive effect to the judgment of a state court where: (1) “the courts of the state from which the judgment emerged would do so themselves”; (2) “the litigants had a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate their claims”; and (3) “the prior state proceedings otherwise satisfied ‘the applicable requirements of due process.’ ” Shields v. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Co., 228 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carolyn Brown v. One Beacon Insurance Co.
11th Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
In a diversity case, federal courts will “give preclusive effect to the judgment of a state court provided that two conditions are met: first, that the courts of the state from which the judgment emerged would do so themselves; and second, that the litigants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims and the prior state proceedings otherwise satisfied the applicable requirements of due process.” Shields v. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Stephens v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
11th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Mark Brown v. Comcast Cablevision
11th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
A federal court “give[s] preclusive effect to the judgment of a state court provided that two conditions are met: first, that the courts of the state from which the judgment emerged would do so themselves; and second, that the litigants had a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate their claims and the prior state proceedings otherwise satisfied ‘the applicable requirements of due process.’ ” Shields, 228 F.3d at 1288.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael Urfirer v. Robert Cornfeld
11th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
In this Circuit, it is “well established law that a federal court cannot give preclusive effect to a state court order, in subsequent litigation, without determining whether the state from which the order was rendered would give that order preclusive effect through the operation of the rendering state’s law of res judicata and collateral estoppel.” Blanchard v. De-Loache-Powers, 286 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir.2002) (citing Shields v. BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Co., 228 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir.2000)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (“Such Acts, records and judicial proceed *718 ings ... s…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hall v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. (2×)
M.D. Ala. · 2005 · confidence medium
Collateral Estoppel The court, in general, gives preclusive effect to the judgment of a state court if two conditions are met: “first, that the courts of the state from which the judgment emerged would do so themselves; and second, that the litigants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims and the prior state proceedings otherwise satisfied the applicable requirements of due process.” Shields v. BellSouth Advertising & Publ’g Co., 228 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Gorin v. Osborne, 756 F.2d 834, 836 (11th Cir.1985)); see also Migr…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mary Quinn v. Monroe County, James L. Roberts, County Administrator, Monroe County, individually and in his official capacity
11th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Shields v. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir.2000).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Blanchard Ex Rel. DeLoache v. DeLoache-Powers
11th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
Co., 228 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir.2000).
discussed Cited "see" Elias Makere v. Allstate Insurance Company
11th Cir. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Shields v. Bellsouth Advert. & Publ’g Co., 228 F.3d 1284 , 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Club Ma- donna, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 924 F.3d 1370, 1379 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that similar administrative procedures satisfied due process when the party had a right to seek judicial review of the administrative decision in a Florida court that had “the power to remedy any procedural deficiencies and cure violations of due pro- cess”).
cited Cited "see" Charles S. Wingard v. Emerald Venture Florida
11th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Shields v. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Co., 228 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir.2000).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Marion Promise, A/K/A Mario,defendant-Appellant
4th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Sivatzie, 228 F.3d at 1284 (declining to notice plain Apprendi error even though specific threshold drug quantity was not alleged in indictment because defendant did not assert that-lack of notice precluded him from disputing drug quantity).
Shields
v.
BellSouth Advertising
99-8307.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Sep 29, 2000.
228 F.3d 1284
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
Paul SHIELDS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
BELLSOUTH ADVERTISING AND PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99-8307.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.

June 19, 2001.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (No. 97-03581-1-CV-ODE); Orinda D. Evans, Chief Judge. Before CARNES, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, Plaintiff Paul Shields challenges the dismissal of his wrongful termination suit against Defendant BellSouth Advertising and Publishing Corp. ("BAPCO") pursuant to Georgia's doctrine of collateral estoppel. As we explained in our earlier opinion in this case, 228 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir.2000), prior

to bringing suit in federal court, Shields sought unemployment benefits through the Georgia state courts. During those state proceedings, a Georgia Superior Court found that there was no record evidence that Shields was fired because of his protected status as an HIV-positive male. Based on this state court finding, the

federal district court dismissed the lawsuit, which alleges wrongful termination on the basis of disability in violation of Title I of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. The district court concluded that the gravamen of Shields's suit—his allegation that he was terminated because of his

HIV-positive status—already was litigated in his state unemployment benefits proceedings, and that those proceedings offered him a full and fair opportunity for hearing in compliance with federal due process standards.

In our earlier opinion, we agreed with the district court that Georgia's unemployment benefits

proceedings, on the face of this record, comport with the procedural rigors of federal due process. We left open, however, whether as a matter of Georgia law Shields's claim would be barred by collateral estoppel.

Specifically, we certified that dispositive issue to the Georgia Supreme Court, seeking the answer to the following question: Under the circumstances of this case, would a Superior Court's finding in an unemployment compensation appeal that there is no evidence the decisionmaker who terminated the employee knew of his protected status and no evidence that his protected status motivated his discharge, collaterally

estop the employee as a matter of Georgia law from establishing in a subsequent wrongful termination lawsuit in state court that he was terminated because of his protected status? The Georgia Supreme Court has now answered that question in the affirmative, ruling that "collateral estoppel bars revisiting the alleged reasons behind Shields's dismissal." 545 S.E.2d 898 (Ga.2001). In light of that answer, we conclude that Shields's ADA claim is barred by collateral estoppel, and accordingly affirm the district court in full. AFFIRMED.