Scocca v. Wilt, 252 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. 1979). · Go Syfert
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Scocca v. Wilt, 252 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Coultas v. Dunbar (gactapp, 1996-02-01)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Coultas v. Dunbar
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Scocca v. Wilt, 243 Ga. 2, 3 ( 252 SE2d 401 ). “ ‘The record in the present case is utterly devoid of any conduct by ([defendants David H.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pirkle v. Hawley
Ga. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Atlanta Newspapers v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 74, 79 (5) ( 114 SE2d 421 ) (1960); Scocca v. Wilt, 243 Ga. 2, 3 ( 252 SE2d 401 ) (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Williams
Ga. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
A trial court has broad discretion in regulating and prescribing the manner in which the business of the court will be conducted, see Scocca v. Wilt, 243 Ga. 2, 3 ( 252 SE2d 401 ) (1979), and we find no abuse of that discretion in the trial court’s actions here.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Stevens v. Way
Ga. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
Scocca v. Wilt, 243 Ga. 2, 3 ( 252 SE2d 401 ) (1979). *690 Appellant has made no showing that the trial court abused its discretion.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Neesmith v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
It has been held consistently by our appellate courts that “[t]he judge has a discretion in regulating and controlling the business of the court, and the appellate court should never interfere with the exercise of this discretion, unless it is plainly apparent that wrong has resulted from its abuse.” Banister v. Hubbard, 82 Ga. App. 813, 816 (1) ( 62 SE2d 761 ) (1950); Wheeless v. State, 135 Ga. App. 406, 408 (7) ( 218 SE2d 88 ) (1975); Clark v. Board of Dental Examiners, 240 Ga. 289, 292 ( 240 SE2d 250 ) (1977); Scocca v. Wilt, 243 Ga. 2, 3 ( 252 SE2d 401 ) (1979). “ ‘Closely correlat…
Scocca
v.
Wilt
34221.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jan 4, 1979.
252 S.E.2d 401
John D. Varnell, for appellant., Billy J. Smith, for appellee.
Marshall.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
Marshall, Justice.

In Scocca v. Wilt, 241 Ga. 334 (245 SE2d 295) (1978), this court held as follows: "This is an appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing the appellant’s appeal for delay in payment of costs in an action seeking to hold the husband-appellee in contempt for failure to pay alimony and child support.

"The record fails to show that the appellant was given notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to the[*3] order of the court granting the appellee’s motion to dismiss. As we read Code Ann. § 6-809 (b) [Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 29, as amended] the appellant was entitled to an opportunity for a hearing on the appellee’s motion to dismiss for delay in payment of costs. The case is therefore remanded to the trial court to conduct a hearing on the motion to dismiss after notice to the appellant.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Upon remand, the trial court judge entered the following order: "By consent of counsel, this court’s order of November 16, 1977 [the order previously appealed from] was entered after consideration of the briefs submitted, rather than conducting a hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs appeal. Therefore, the plaintiffs appeal stands dismissed as originally ordered.” The plaintiff appeals from this order. Held:

In the prior appeal in this case, we held that the appellant was entitled to an opportunity for a hearing, not that there must be a hearing. The appellant can waive such a hearing. Code § 102-106. The basis of this appeal, as expressed in the appellant’s brief, is that "[n]owhere in the record does it appear that counsel agreed to submit this case to the trial court on briefs.” This is not the equivalent of, nor do we treat it as, a denial that there was such an agreement. Such an agreement is not required to be reduced to writing. The trial judge stated in his order that the action he took was "by consent of counsel.”

" 'The judge has a discretion in regulating and controlling the business of the court, and the appellate court should never interfere with the exercise of this discretion, unless it is plainly apparent that wrong has resulted from its abuse.’ Banister v. Hubbard, 82 Ga. App. 813, 816 (62 SE2d 761) and cit.; Code § 24-104; Checker Cab Co. v. Fedor, 134 Ga. App. 28 (2) (213 SE2d 485) and cits. Closely correlated to this is 'the prima facie presumption in favor of the good faith of the (public) officer, and that he has done his duty.’ Gormley v. Eison, 189 Ga. 259, 264 (5 SE2d 643) and cits.” Wheeless v. State, 135 Ga. App. 406, 408 (7) (218 SE2d 88) (1975); Clark v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 240 Ga. 289, 292 (2) (240 SE 2d 250) (1977). Absent any contention that no such[*4] agreement existed, we will assume that it did, as the trial judge found. Since this agreement did not appear in the record of the previous appeal, our remanding of the case for the purpose of conducting a hearing is not construed so as to require such a hearing in the face of the agreement to waive it, which appears in the present record.

Submitted November 3, 1978 Decided January 4, 1979 Rehearing denied January 23, 1979. John D. Varnell, for appellant. Billy J. Smith, for appellee.

The order appealed from is therefore affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.