Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. 1981). · Go Syfert
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Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
96 citation events across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Middleton v. State (gactapp, 1990-03-12)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Middleton v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Defendant argues the trial court erred in ruling the victim was competent to testify. “[T]he standard of intelligence required to qualify a child as a witness is not that he be able to define the meaning of an oath, nor that he understand the process under which the oath is administered, but rather that he know and appreciate the fact that as a witness he assumes a solemn and binding obligation to tell the truth relative to the case and concerning such matters as he may be interrogated on, and that if he violates the obligation he is subject to be punished by the court.” Smith v. State, 24…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frazier v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
She was found to be “qualified.” “ ‘In Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511, 511-12 ( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981), the Supreme Court defined the standard of competency of a child to be a witness as being “not that he be able to define the meaning of an oath, nor that he understand the process under which the oath is administered, but rather that he know and appreciate the fact that as a witness he assumes a solemn and binding obligation to tell the truth relative to the case and concerning such matters as he may be interrogated on, and that if he violates the obligation he is subject to be punished …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Conaway v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
“Under these circumstances, we find the requisites of Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511, 512 [( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981)] satisfied and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the victim competent to testify. [Cits.]” West-brook v. State, 186 Ga. App. 493, 494 (1) ( 368 SE2d 131 ) (1988).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Westbrook v. State (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
"OCGA § 24-9-5 (formerly Code Ann. § 38-1607) provides: `Persons who do not have the use of reason, such as idiots, lunatics during lunacy, and children who do not understand the nature of an oath, shall be incompetent witnesses.' In Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511, 511-12 ( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981), the Supreme Court defined the standard of competency of a child to be a witness as being `not that he be able to define the meaning of an oath, nor that he understand the process under which the oath is administered, but rather that he know and appreciate the fact that as a witness he assumes a solemn a…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grier v. State
Ga. · 1987 · confidence medium
A child is competent to testify if the court is *540 satisfied that the child knows and appreciates the fact that “as a witness he assumes a solemn and binding obligation to tell the truth relative to the case and concerning such matters as he may be interrogated on, and that if he violates the obligation, he is subject to be punished by the court.” Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511, 511-512 ( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511, 512 ( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981); Hill v. State, 251 Ga. 430 ( 306 SE2d 653 ) (1983); Lashley v. State, 132 Ga. App. 427 ( 208 SE2d 200 ) (1974); Pope v. State, 167 Ga. App. 328 (1) ( 306 SE2d 326 ) (1983). 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alvin v. State
Ga. · 1985 · confidence medium
This court has interpreted this statutory requirement to mean that a child ‘know and appreciate the fact that as a witness he assumes a solemn and binding obligation to tell the truth relative to the case and concerning such matters as he may be interrogated on, and that if he violates the obligation, he is subject to be punished by the court.’ Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511, 512 ( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981); Jones v. State, 219 Ga. 245, 246 ( 132 SE2d 648 ) (1963).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hill v. State
Ga. · 1983 · confidence medium
This court has interpreted this statutory requirement to mean that a child “know and appreciate the fact that as a witness he assumes a solemn and binding obligation to tell the truth relative to the case and concerning such matters as he may be interrogated on, and that if he violates the obligation, he is subject to be punished by the court.” Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511, 512 ( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981); Jones v. State, 219 Ga. 245, 246 ( 132 SE2d 648 ) (1963).
discussed Cited "see" Hilson v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511, 512 ( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981): “[T]he standard of intelligence required to qualify a child as a witness is not that he be able to define the meaning of an oath, nor that he understand the process under which the oath is administered, but rather that he know and appreciate the fact that as a witness he assumes a solemn and binding obligation to tell the truth relative to the case and concerning such matters as he may be interrogated on, and that if he violates the obligation he is subject to be punished by the court. [Cit.]” If so, the child must be sworn.
discussed Cited "see" Hunnicutt v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511 ( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981).
discussed Cited "see" Sosebee v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511 ( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981).
discussed Cited "see" Maynard v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511 ( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981).
discussed Cited "see" Early v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: accord · confidence high
The appellant contends that his eight-year-old daughter was incompetent to testify at the trial. “[T]he standard of intelligence required to qualify a child as a witness is not that he be able to define the meaning of an oath, nor that he understand the process under which the oath is administered, but rather that he know and appreciate the fact that as a witness he assumes a solemn and binding obligation to tell the truth relative to the case and concerning such matters as he may be interrogated on, and that if he violates the obligation he is subject to be punished by the court.” Jones v…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Busby v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511 ( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981); Hutter v. State, 166 Ga. App. 608 ( 305 SE2d 124 ) (1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Thomas v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Bearden v. State, 159 Ga. App. 892 (1) ( 285 SE2d 606 ) and Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511 ( 277 SE2d 53 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Arnold v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511 ( 277 SE2d 53 ) (1981); Mackler v. State, 164 Ga. App. 874 ( 298 SE2d 589 ) (1982).
Smith
v.
the State
37298.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Apr 21, 1981.
277 S.E.2d 53
Groover & Childs, Denmark Groover, Jr., Frank H. Childs, Jr., for appellant., Joseph H. Briley, District Attorney, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, for appellee.
Marshall.
Cited by 45 opinions  |  Published
Marshall, Justice.

The appellant was convicted of murdering his wife, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, his sole argument is that the trial judge abused his discretion in ruling that the appellant’s two stepdaughters, ages eight and nine at the time of trial, were competent to testify.

The test for determining the competency of a child to testify as a witness is enunciated in Jones v. State, 219 Ga. 245, 246 (132 SE2d 648) (1963): “The statutory test, Code § 38-1607, of the competency of a child to testify as a witness in a court of justice is that he understand the nature of an oath. The rule has been frequently applied. Moore v. State, 79 Ga. 498 (3) (5 SE 51); Minton v. State, 99 Ga. 254 (1) (25 SE 626). As demonstrated by the opinions of this court, the standard of intelligence required to qualify a child as a witness is not that he be able to define the meaning of an oath, nor that he understand the process under which the oath is administered, but rather that he know and appreciate the fact that as a witness he assumes a solemn and binding obligation to tell the truth relative to the case and concerning such matters as he may be interrogated on,[*512] and that if he violates the obligation he is subject to be punished by the court. Reece v. State, 155 Ga. 350 (116 SE 631); Style v. State, 175 Ga. 95 (165 SE 7). It is not even essential to the witness’s competency, although desirable, that he believe in a supreme being, Gantz v. State, 18 Ga. App. 154, 156 (2) (88 SE 993), or that he be aware of God’s existence, Bell v. State, 164 Ga. 292 (138 SE 238). Such lack of faith or knowledge is merely a matter to be considered in passing upon his credibility. Code § 38-1602.”

Decided April 21, 1981. Groover & Childs, Denmark Groover, Jr., Frank H. Childs, Jr., for appellant. Joseph H. Briley, District Attorney, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, for appellee.

From our review of the trial transcript, we hold that the trial judge was authorized in finding that the two child witnesses were competent to testify.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.