Goldstein v. Goldstein, 414 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. 1992). · Go Syfert
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Goldstein v. Goldstein, 414 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
55 citation events (21 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Gloria Alfaro v. Johnny Alfaro (gactapp, 2018-05-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Gloria Alfaro v. Johnny Alfaro (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
“Division of property in a divorce action is a two step process.” Goldstein v. Goldstein, 262 Ga. 136, 136 (1) ( 414 SE2d 474 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alfaro v. Alfaro (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
The first step is a question of law; the second step is a matter held in the trial court's discretion." Goldstein , 262 Ga. at 136 (1), 414 S.E.2d 474 (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weinberg v. Dickson-Weinberg
Haw. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
In Goldstein v. Goldstein, 262 Ga. 136 , 414 S.E.2d 474, 475-76 (1992), for example, the court concluded: We agree with husband that contingent fee agreements are not marital assets.... [I]t is impossible to know in advance whether any specific contingent fee ease will ultimately yield a fee—or, if it does, how much the fee will be.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stageberg v. Stageberg
Minn. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Roberts, 689 So.2d at 381 (holding that contingency fees for cases pending at the time of distribution are not marital property because the "value of those cases is highly speculative until the occurrence of the contingency vesting the right to compensation under the contract”); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 262 Ga. 136 , 414 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1992) (refusing to characterize contingent-fee agreement as marital assets because it is "nearly impossible” to gauge the amount of work necessary following the divorce to collect the fee). 5 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re the Marriage of Estes
Wash. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court of Georgia held contingent fee agreements are not marital assets, reasoning that the difficulty in ascertaining their value at the time of the divorce action rendered them "too remote, speculative and uncertain . . . .” Goldstein v. Goldstein, 262 Ga. 136 , 414 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Metzner v. Metzner (2×)
W. Va. · 1994 · confidence medium
For example, in Goldstein v. Goldstein, 262 Ga. 136 , 414 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1992), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that contingent fee agreements were “too remote, speculative and uncertain to be considered marital assets in making an equitable division of property.” However, in a dissenting opinion in Gold-stein, one justice noted that “[pjractically all jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have determined that contingent fee contracts constitute marital property.” Id. 414 S.E.2d at 476 .
discussed Cited "see" Apple Investment Properties, Inc. v. Watts (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
OCGA § 9-11-26 (c); see Goldstein v. Goldstein, 262 Ga. 136, 137-138 ( 414 SE2d 474 ) (1992) (Hunt, J., dissenting).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bass v. Bass (2×)
Ga. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Goldstein v. Goldstein, supra (holding that, as a matter of law, one spouse's contingent fee agreements are too remote, speculative and uncertain to be considered marital assets subject to equitable division); Campbell v. Campbell, 255 Ga. 461 ( 339 SE2d 591 ) (1986) (holding that, as a matter of law, settlement of one spouse's personal injury claim is a marital asset subject to equitable division only to the extent of compensation for medical expenses and lost wages during the marriage).
Goldstein
v.
Goldstein
S91A1385.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Mar 19, 1992.
414 S.E.2d 474
J. Stephen Clifford, for appellant., Altman, Kritzer & Levick, Nancy F. Lawler, Eleanor R. Miller, for appellee.
Clarke, Benham, Fletcher, Weltner, Bell, Hunt, Sears-Collins.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

Clarke, Chief Justice.

In this divorce action wife requested discovery from husband regarding the assets of his law practice, including information about pending cases. Husband refused to comply with certain requests. Specifically, he would not reveal retainer agreements for pending cases and client ledgers. He also refused to respond to the request that he reveal settlement offers in pending contingent fee cases, and refused to estimate the value of pending contingent fee cases. He did, however, reveal that he had incurred $70,942.60 in expenses related to pending contingent fee cases. Wife filed a motion to compel discovery.

In resisting wife’s motion to compel, husband did not argue that she is not entitled to equitable division of the assets of the law firm. Rather, he asserted that the value of contingent fee cases is too speculative to be included as an asset, and that revealing information about these cases would violate attorney-client privilege. The trial judge granted the motion to compel. We reverse.

1. Division of property in a divorce action is a two-step process. First the property must be classified as either marital or non-marital. Second, the marital property must be divided, not necessarily equally, but equitably. Thomas v. Thomas, 259 Ga. 73, 75 (377 SE2d 666) (1989). The first step is a question of law; the second step is a matter held in the trial court’s discretion. Id. Any particular asset may have both marital and non-marital portions. Id. Marital property is defined as assets acquired from the labor and investments of the parties during the marriage. White v. White, 253 Ga. 267 (319 SE2d 447) (1984); Halpern v. Halpern, 256 Ga. 639 (352 SE2d 753) (1987).

We agree with husband that contingent fee agreements are not marital assets. Although we held in Courtney v. Courtney, 256 Ga. 97 (344 SE2d 421) (1986) that an unvested pension plan represents important contractual rights that may be considered in making an equitable division of property, we have not held that all unvested rights are subject to equitable division. Courtney involved an unvested pension plan that would vest during the normal course of the husband’s employment over the next few years. We found that the pension was[*137] far less speculative in nature than the possibility of an inheritance. Id. at 98-99, comparing Meeks v. Kirkland, 228 Ga. 607 (187 SE2d 296) (1972). It was clear that the pension would vest two years after the divorce and would yield a certain benefit. In contrast, it is impossible to know in advance whether any specific contingent fee case will ultimately yield a fee — or, if it does, how much the fee will be. It is also nearly impossible to gauge how much work and expense will be required after the date of the divorce to become entitled to collect a contingent fee. These qualities of contingent fee agreements make them too remote, speculative and uncertain to be considered marital assets in making an equitable division of property. Accord In re Marriage of Zells, 554 NE2d 289 (197 Ill.App.3d 232) (1990).

2. Because of our holding in Division 1, we need not address husband’s other enumerations of error.

Judgment reversed.

Clarke, C. J., Benham and Fletcher, JJ., concur; Chief Judge John W. Sognier concurs specially; Weltner, P. J., Bell and Hunt, JJ., dissent; Sears-Collins, J., not participating.

Dissent

Hunt, Justice,

dissenting.

Practically all jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have determined that contingent fee contracts constitute marital property. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Vogt, 773 P2d 631 (Colo. 1989); Lyons v. Lyons, 526 NE2d 1063 (Mass. 1988); Weiss v. Weiss, 365 NW2d 608 (Wis. 1985); Frink v. Frink, 494 NYS2d 271 (SC 1985). See generally White v. White, 253 Ga. 267, 269 (319 SE2d 447) (1984). Still, because of the speculative nature of these contracts, I do not disagree with the majority that contingent fee contracts, in and of themselves, should not be treated as marital property subject to equitable division.

However, it does not follow that these contracts should not be considered as providing relevant evidence regarding the merits of a claim for equitable division of property, or for alimony. See Weiss v. Weiss, supra at 612; Stokes v. Stokes, 246 Ga. 765, 772 (273 SE2d 169) (1980); OCGA § 19-6-5 (a) (7). Thus, in my view, under the broad rules governing discovery, see OCGA § 9-11-26 (b) (1), the wife should be able to obtain the information sought. Specifically, she should be able to discover the existence of any contingent contracts entered into before the filing for divorce, the extent of any work performed on those contracts, and evidence regarding the reasonable value of work performed on those contracts.

I agree with the husband that there are serious problems regarding the potential violation of the attorney-client privilege which could result from his compliance with the wife’s discovery requests. Accordingly, I would fashion a rule for cases such as that presented here, as[*138] follows: all discovery would be produced pursuant to strict protective order by the trial court designed to ensure that no confidential information is disseminated (including, where necessary, the redaction of the names, addresses, civil action numbers, and other identifying information of clients in any documents). In addition, the trial court, on in camera review of any information produced in discovery, or other evidence, including expert evidence, submitted by the parties, would determine, as a matter of law, whether a particular contingent contract has sufficient indicia of earning potential to be considered as evidence relevant to alimony or property division, or should not be considered at all. In making this determination, the trial court should consider whether it is possible to assess reasonably the value of any particular contract, and whether consideration of the contract by the factfinder would adversely affect the client who is the subject of the contingent contract. Of course, the trial court’s determination in this regard would be subject to discretionary interlocutory review by this court.

Decided March 19, 1992 Reconsideration denied April 2, 1992. J. Stephen Clifford, for appellant. Altman, Kritzer & Levick, Nancy F. Lawler, Eleanor R. Miller, for appellee.

I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Weltner and Justice Bell join in this dissent.