Bodge v. Salesworld, Inc., 267 S.E.2d 505 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). · Go Syfert
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Bodge v. Salesworld, Inc., 267 S.E.2d 505 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
34 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Nationsbank, N.A. v. Southtrust Bank of Georgia, N.A. (gactapp, 1997-06-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nationsbank, N.A. v. Southtrust Bank of Georgia, N.A.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Consultants, 215 Ga. App. 444, 447 ( 451 SE2d 87 ) (1994); Renden, Inc. v. Liberty Real Estate &c., 213 Ga. App. 333, 334 ( 444 SE2d 814 ) (1994); Green v. Johnston Realty, 212 Ga. App. 656, 659-660 ( 442 SE2d 843 ) (1994); Artford v. Blalock, 199 Ga. App. 434, 440 (13) ( 405 SE2d 698 ) (1991); Bodge v. Salesworld, 154 Ga. App. 65, 66 ( 267 SE2d 505 ) (1980); Dale v. City Plumbing &c.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Padgett
Ga. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
If the actor does not have this intent, his conduct does not subject him to liability under this rule even if it has the unintended effect of deterring the third person from dealing with the other.’ [Cit.]” Bodge v. Salesworld, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 65, 66 ( 267 SE2d 505 ) (1980).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Spivey v. Rogers
Ga. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
Bodge v. Salesworld, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 65, 66 ( 267 SE2d 505 ) (1980). 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Willis v. Georgia Northern Railway Company
Ga. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
Although malicious, harmful interference with the business of another may give rise to a cause of action, Bodge v. Salesworld, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 65, 66 ( 267 SE2d 505 ) (1980), the alleged negligence here resulted in direct injury only to Swift.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wise v. State Board for Examination, Qualification & Registration of Architects (2×)
Ga. · 1981 · confidence medium
If the actor does not have this intent, his conduct does not subject him to liability under this rule even if it has the unintended effect of deterring the third person from dealing with the other.' Restatement, Second, Torts § 766, p. 11, h." Bodge v. Salesworld, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 65, 66 ( 267 SE2d 505 ) (1980).
discussed Cited "see" Brown v. Reeves (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bodge v. Salesworld, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 65 ( 267 SE2d 505 ) (1980); Plough Broadcasting Co. v. Dobbs, 163 Ga. App. 264 ( 293 SE2d 526 ) (1982); Dept. of Human Resources v. Montgomery, 248 Ga. 465 ( 284 SE2d 263 ) (1981).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Integrated Micro Systems, Inc. v. NEC Home Electronics (USA), Inc. (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Bodge v. Salesworld, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 65 ( 267 SE2d 505 ) (1980); Architectural Mfg.
BODGE
v.
SALESWORLD, INC. Et Al.
59539.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Mar 19, 1980.
267 S.E.2d 505
Larry K. Janney, William Boyd Lyons, for appellant., Robert E. Shields, Palmer Ansley, for appellees.
Banke, McMurray, Smith.
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published
Banke, Judge.

Appellant sued Salesworld, Inc., for damages alleging malicious and wrongful interference with his employment with the DICO Corporation. DICO was joined by Salesworld as a third party defendant. Salesworld is an organization which specializes in[*66] locating applicants to fill sales positions for businesses in need of such personnel and when successful receives a fee for the service from the employer. Appellant was hired by DICO, but whether this was as a result of Salesworld’s efforts and whether DICO owed a fee to Salesworld are disputed questions. Salesworld’s fee schedule, communicated to DICO, specified a fee of $3,240 and also specified that all fees were refundable unconditionally if the employee left voluntarily or was discharged within 30 days of employment. A representative of DICO testified that a Salesworld representative informed him "that we could keep Mr. Bodge in our employ and pay the fee or terminate Mr. Bodge or failing either one of those two, there would be legal proceedings ...” Negotiations were then underway for the sale of DICO; and apparently rather than become involved in a lawsuit, the company fired appellant with less than 30 days on the job. This appeal is from a directed verdict for appellees. Held:

Argued March 11, 1980 Decided March 19, 1980. Larry K. Janney, William Boyd Lyons, for appellant. Robert E. Shields, Palmer Ansley, for appellees.

This state recognizes a cause of action where one maliciously and wrongfully, and with intent to injure, harms the business of another. Dale v. City Plumbing &c. Co., 112 Ga. App. 723 (2) (146 SE2d 349) (1965). "The act is malicious when the thing done is with the knowledge of the plaintiffs rights, and with the intent to interfere therewith.” Employing Printers Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 519 (50 SE 353) (1905). "The essential thing is the intent to cause the result. If the actor does not have this intent, his conduct does not subject him to liability under this rule even if it has the unintended effect of deterring the third person from dealing with the other.” Restatement, Second, Torts § 766, p. 11, h.

"A verdict should not be directed unless there is no issue of fact, or unless the proved facts viewed from all possible legal points of view, sustain no other findings than that directed.” Twisdale v. Ga. R. Bank & Trust Co., 129 Ga. App. 18, 19 (198 SE2d 396) (1973). While Salesworld argues that it gained nothing by the appellant’s termination and, therefore, that no unlawful purpose was involved, a jury might find that this very absence of financial benefit points to a malicious intent. The question is one for the jury, and the trial court’s direction of the verdict was error.

Judgment reversed.

McMurray, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.