Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Seasholtz, 278 S.E.2d 429 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981). · Go Syfert
Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Seasholtz, 278 S.E.2d 429 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
12 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Gwinnett County v. Howington (gactapp, 2006-07-10)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gwinnett County v. Howington
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
We disagree. “[T]he courts of this state have long held that sales of land to condemning authorities are inadmissible as evidence in condemnation proceedings on the issue of the value of the land sought to be condemned.” (Citations omitted.) Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Seasholtz, 157 Ga. App. 723, 724 (1) ( 278 SE2d 429 ) (1981); see also Jordan v. Dept. of Transp., 178 Ga. App. 133 (1) ( 342 SE2d 482 ) (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williamson v. Yang
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Co., 142 Ga. App. 218, 221 (1) ( 235 SE2d 729 ) (1977). 8 See Nottingham Co. v. Resource Materials Corp., 210 Ga. App. 128, 131 (2) ( 435 SE2d 447 ) (1993) (physical precedent only) (delay in filing may be shown where it pertains to other issues). 9 Dept. of Transp. v. Swanson, 191 Ga. App. 752, 754 (3) ( 382 SE2d 711 ) (1989). 10 Cf. Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Seasholtz, 157 Ga. App. 723, 724 (1) ( 278 SE2d 429 ) (1981) (recent sale of comparable land is relevant in determining damages). 11 See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v. Roberts, 263 Ga. 405, 408 (1) ( 434 SE2d 450 ) (1993) (all f…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jordan v. Department of Transportation
Ga. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
This “valid historical and pragmatic basis” for the exclusion of evidence of land sales to condemning authorities, Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Seasholtz, 157 Ga. App. 723, 724 (1) ( 278 SE2d 429 ) (1981), is applicable to such evidence regardless whether the evidence of land sales to condemning authorities is sought to be introduced as direct evidence of value or as indirect evidence supporting a non-expert’s opinion of value.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Collins v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
“It is true that the courts of this state have long held that sales of land to condemning authorities are inadmissible as evidence in condemnation proceedings on the issue of the value of the land sought to be condemned. [Cits.]” Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Seasholtz, 157 Ga. App. 723, 724 ( 278 SE2d 429 ). “[T]his general rule [is] based upon the consideration that in such transactions neither party is necessarily free from compulsion — the necessity to acquire as to the one party and the positive necessity to give up on the part of the other.” Ga. Power Co. v. Brooks, 207 Ga. 406, 41…
discussed Cited "see" Pak v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Seasholtz, 157 Ga. App. 723, 724-725 (1) ( 278 SE2d 429 ) (1981).
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION
v.
SEASHOLTZ Et Al.
61012.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Feb 6, 1981.
278 S.E.2d 429
E. Kontz Bennett, Sr., E. Kontz Bennett, Jr., Harry D. Dixon, Jr., for appellant., J. Baker McGee, for appellees.
Carley, Quillian, Shulman.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
Carley, Judge.

Appellant sought to condemn a right of way to construct and operate a transmission line over 3.1 acres of appellee Seasholtz’ land. Deeming the finding of the appointed special master as to the value of the easement to be inadequate, Seasholtz filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Code Ann. § 36-614a seeking a jury trial as to the issue of just and adequate compensation. Evidence concerning the value of the easement was presented at trial by both sides. The jury returned a[*724] verdict for Seasholtz in the amount of $20,000. Appellant appeals from the judgment entered on the jury verdict.

1. In its first three enumerations of error appellant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence two deeds conveying title to land located near the Seasholtz property and testimony pertaining to the realty conveyed by these two deeds. Appellant contends that the sales evidenced by the two deeds were not “comparable sales” having a bearing upon the value of the subject easement, and further that one of the deeds represented a sale of land to a condemning authority and was, therefore, inadmissible.

We find no error in the admission of the deed and testimony concerning the sale of land between private parties. “Generally, evidence of sales of property similar to that in question made at or near the time of the taking is competent evidence and may be considered to throw light on the issue of the value of the property sought to be condemned. [Cits.] However, as to whether or not the witness testified as to comparable properties similar to that in question is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” City of Atlanta v. Brookins, 147 Ga. App. 869, 870-871 (250 SE2d 577) (1978). Appellant has shown no abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting the deed and testimony pertaining to the relatively recent sale of property concluded between private parties as evidence of a “comparable sale” having a bearing on the issue of the valuation of the easement sought. Appellant’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive.

Also, we find that appellant has waived any right to enumerate as error the admission in evidence of the deed to another condemning authority and testimony relating thereto. It is true that the courts of this state have long held that sales of land to condemning authorities are inadmissible as evidence in condemnation proceedings on the issue of the value of the land sought to be condemned. See Ga. Power Co. v. Brooks, 277 Ga. 406 (2) (62 SE2d 183) (1950); Dept. of Transp. v. El Carlo Motel, 140 Ga. App. 779 (2) (232 SE2d 126) (1976); DeKalb County v. Noble, 122 Ga. App. 373 (177 SE2d 117) (1970); Sumner v. State Hwy. Dept., 110 Ga. App. 646 (2) (139 SE2d 493) (1965); Garden Parks, Inc. v. Fulton County, 88 Ga. App. 97 (2) (76 SE2d 31) (1953). This rule has a valid historical and pragmatic basis and we recognize and endorse its continuing viability. However, the law is also clear that “[t] hough the admission of certain testimony objected to be erroneous, a reversal will not result where other testimony to the same effect and of like nature was introduced without objection.” Sapp v. Callaway, 208 Ga. 805 (3) (69 SE2d 734) (1952). The record discloses that appellant failed to object to testimony concerning the sale to a condemning authority elicited from appellant’s own witness[*725] on cross-examination prior to the admission of the subject deed and testimony. As a result, appellant will not now be heard to complain of error in this regard.

Decided February 6, 1981 Rehearing denied March 3, 1981. E. Kontz Bennett, Sr., E. Kontz Bennett, Jr., Harry D. Dixon, Jr., for appellant. J. Baker McGee, for appellees.

2. Appellant next enumerates as error the failure of the trial court “to charge the jury [appellant’s] Request to Charge No. 8 and failing to charge elsewhere the law of Georgia as applied to this case regarding the legal way to appraise the easement involved.”

This enumeration is without merit. Appellant’s eighth requested instruction is extremely vague and completely fails to set forth any pertinent principles of law. Moreover, we find that the charge actually given by the trial court adequately informed the jury of the applicable legal standards to be utilized in its determinations. Appellant has failed to demonstrate error in this regard.

Judgment affirmed.

Quillian, C. J., and Shulman, P. J., concur.