Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976). · Go Syfert
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Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned”
450 citation events (116 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: WHITNEY BANK, a Mississippi state v. Von Daniel Grant Jr., and Lisa D. Grant (fladistctapp, 2017-08-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) WHITNEY BANK, a Mississippi state v. Von Daniel Grant Jr., and Lisa D. Grant
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the legislature must be assumed to know the meaning of words and to have expressed its intent by the use of the words found in the statute.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Pruco Life Insurance Company (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2016 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
to determine the legislative intent look to the plain language of the statute.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Jordan v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
it is, of course, a general principle of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 1985 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Knight v. Markel American Insurance Company
M.D. Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
The Legislature specifically provided that “marinas may not adopt, maintain, or enforce [such] policies,” Fla. Stat. § 327.59 (1)(emphasis added), and then specifically defined “marinas.” Fla. Stat. § 327.02 (26). “[W]here a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned.” Locke v. Hawkes, 595 So. 2d 32 , 36–37 (Fla. 1992)(alteration in original)(quoting Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gina Signor v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois
11th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 844 (2018); Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976); LaCroix v. Town of Fort Myers Beach, 38 F.4th 941, 949 (11th Cir. 2022); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 107–11 (2012).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Joan Schoeff, etc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State of Florida v. Daryl Miller (4×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) & SC16-400 Elizabeth White v. Mederi Caretenders Visiting Services of Southeast Florida, LLC., and Americare Home Therapy, Inc., etc. v. Carla Hiles
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
“To determine the legislative intent we look to the plain language of the statute.” Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 816 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Hence, where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, ... it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned.” Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mercury Insurance Co. v. Emergency Physicians of Central
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Henee, where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed .as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned”) (quoting Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cricket Properties, LLC v. Nassau Pointe at Heritage Isles Homeowners Ass'n
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
This omission calls for the application of the rule of statutory construction that by mentioning one thing the legislature intended to exclude the other, or “expressio uhius est exclusio alteráis.” See Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 2010 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. s 114.04 , Fla. Stat., providing in pertinent part that "the Governor shall fill by appointment any vacancy in a state, district, or county office, other than a member or officer of the Legislature, for the remainder of the term of an appointive officer. . . ." 10 See generally Thayer v. State, supra n. 8; Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel , 56 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1952); Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands , 19 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1944). 11 163 So. 248 (Fla. 1935).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stelmack v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
DAVIS and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur. . " ‘[T]he mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.’ ” Capers v. State, 678 So.2d 330, 332 (Fla.1996) (quoting Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976)). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Salgado
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Hence, where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned.” Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976); see also Young v. Progressive Se.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 2009 · confidence medium
A county and municipality may join together to issue bonds authorized by this subsection." (e.s.) 6 See Alsop v. Pierce , 19 So. 2d 799 , 805-806 (Fla. 1944); Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel , 56 So. 2d 341 , 342 (Fla. 1952); Thayer v. State , 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 2008 · confidence medium
Sincerely, Bill McCollum Attorney General BM/tals 1 See City of Lakeland Ordinance 4829, enacted February 5, 2007, and Florida Department of Community Affairs, Official List of Special Districts, www.floridaspecialdistricts.org . 2 Section 190.002 (1)(a), Fla. Stat. 3 Section 190.002 (1)(b), Fla. Stat. 4 Section 190.007 (2), Fla. Stat. 5 See Alsop v. Pierce , 19 So. 2d 799 , 805-806 (Fla. 1944); Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel , 56 So. 2d 341 , 342 (Fla. 1952); Thayer v. State , 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976). 6 Section 218.39 (1)(h), Fla. Stat. 7 See City of St.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Essex Ins. Co. v. Zota
Fla. · 2008 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Capers v. State, 678 So.2d 330, 332 (Fla.1996) ("It is, of course, a general principle of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius." (quoting Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976))).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Burkhart v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ago
Fla. Att'y Gen. · 2008 · confidence medium
Completes 30 years of any creditable service, regardless of age, which may include a maximum of 4 years of military service credit as long as such credit is not claimed under any other system. `Normal retirement age' is attained on the `normal retirement date.'" 2 Section 112.0801 (1), Fla. Stat. 3 Section 72 (t)(2)(A)(i), Internal Revenue Code, provides: "(t) 10-percent additional tax on early distributions from qualified retirement plans (1) Imposition of additional tax If any taxpayer receives any amount from a qualified retirement plan (as defined in section 4974(c) [ 26 USCS § 4974 (c)])…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dianderas v. FL. BIRTH RELATED NEUROLOGICAL
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Co., 609 So.2d at 1317 ; Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976); Sheffield v. Davis, 562 So.2d 384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kilgore
Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
Co., 753 So.2d 80, 85 (Fla.2000) ("Under the principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another." (quoting Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla.1996))); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976) ("Hence, where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned." (citing Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554 , 19 So.2d 234 (194…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lane v. MRA HOLDINGS, LLC
M.D. Fla. · 2002 · confidence medium
Therefore, where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, the statute will ordinarily be construed as excluding from its operation all those things not expressly mentioned.” DeSisto College, Inc. v. Town of Howey-in-the-Hills, 706 F.Supp. 1479, 1495 (M.D.Fla.1989) (citing Towerhouse Condominium, Inc. v. Millman, 475 So.2d 674, 676 (Fla.1985); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976); Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554 , 19 So.2d 234, 239 (1944)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hankey v. Yarian
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 609 So.2d 1315, 1317 (Fla. 1992); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976); Sheffield v. Davis, 562 So.2d 384, 386 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McFadden v. State
Fla. · 1999 · confidence medium
See § 775.084(1)(a)3, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1996); Capers v. State, 678 So.2d 330 (Fla.1996), 678 So.2d 330 ; Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976)("It is, of course, a general principle of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius.").
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Talty
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So.2d 281, 283 (Fla.1988); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
It is a firmly established principle of statutory construction that the mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of another or “ex-pressio unius est exclusio alteráis.” Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976); Tillman v. Smith, 533 So.2d 928, 929 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE DHSMV v. Killen
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
In Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976), the Florida Supreme Court stated: The law clearly requires that the legislative intent be determined primarily from the language of the statute because a statute is to be taken, construed, and applied in the forms enacted.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hillsborough County v. NCJ Investment Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Under that principle “the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.” Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TRINITY EPISCOPAL SCHOOL v. Robbins
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
In no event shall an incidental use of property either qualify such property for an exemption or impair the exemption of an otherwise exempt property." The second sentence is pertinent only to a determination of the portion of property used for "charitable, religious, scientific or literary" purposes entitled to exempt status; the legislature omitted reference in that section to property used for educational purposes. "[W]here a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion
Fla. · 1992 · confidence medium
Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976); McDonald v. Roland, 65 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1953).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Locke v. Hawkes
Fla. · 1992 · confidence medium
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. "[W]here a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned." Thayer v. *37 State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976) (emphasis added); see also Department of Professional Regulation, Const. Indus.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Stephens
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
The court also rejected the defendant's argument on appeal that the Legislature did not intend for the burglary statute to cover this particular factual situation: In Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976), the supreme court said, `The law clearly requires that the legislative intent be determined primarily from the language of the statute because a statute is to be taken, construed and applied in the form enacted.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Roland
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
In Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976), the Florida Supreme Court stated: It is, of course, a general principle of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
cited Cited as authority (rule) D.A.O. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dao v. Dhrs
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Birnholz v. 44 Wall Street Fund, Inc.
11th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
We hold that the plain language of the amended statute is contrary to Birnholz' position and find it unnecessary to resort to extrinsic aids to determine the legislative intent behind the law. 7 14 Florida law "clearly requires that the legislative intent be determined primarily from the language of the statute because a statute is to be taken, construed and applied in the form enacted." Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Birnholz v. 44 Wall Street Fund, Inc.
11th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
We hold that the plain language of the amended statute is contrary to Birnholz’ position and find it unnecessary to resort to extrinsic aids to determine the legislative intent behind the law. 7 Florida law “clearly requires that the legislative intent be determined primarily from the language of the statute because a statute is to be taken, construed and applied in the form enacted.” Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) DeSisto College, Inc. v. Town of Howey-In-The-Hills
M.D. Fla. · 1989 · confidence medium
See Towerhouse Condominium, Inc. v. Millman, 475 So.2d 674, 676 (Fla.1985); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976); Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 19 So.2d 234, 239 (Fla.1944).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Satellite Television Engineering, Inc. v. Department of General Services
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879 (Fla.1983); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 816 (Fla.1976); State v. Hodges, supra. In addition, it is generally recognized that an agency’s interpretation of a statute which it is charged to administer is entitled to great weight.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Department of Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board v. Pariser
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
This principle of statutory construction means “that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another,” Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Associates Commercial Corporation v. Sel-O-Rak Corporation
11th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State, Dept. of Ins. v. Ins. Services Office
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Dalby
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
In Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (1976), the supreme court said, "The law clearly requires that the legislative intent be determined primarily from the language of the statute because a statute is to be taken, construed and applied in the form enacted.
cited Cited "see" WESLEY BROWN v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: accord · confidence high
Co., 753 So. 2d 80, 85 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Moonlit Waters, 666 So. 2d at 900 ); accord Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited "see" Germer v. Churchill Downs Management, Etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976) (conveying intent pursuant to the principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the mention of one thing implies the .exclusion- of another”).
discussed Cited "see" Germer v. Churchill Downs Management, Etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Thayer v. State, 335 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976) (pursuant to the principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, “the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another”).
discussed Cited "see" Catalina West Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Federal National Mortgage Association
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976) (“It is, of course, a general principle of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
cited Cited "see" Siegle v. Lee County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976).
George THAYER, Etc., et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE of Florida, Etc., et al., Defendants.
47481.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jul 21, 1976.
335 So. 2d 815
Boyd.
Cited by 425 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 71%
Citer courts: Florida Attorney General Reports (1)

[*816] S. LaRue Williams, Kinsey, Vincent, Pyle & Williams, Daytona Beach, for plaintiffs.

Charles L. Curtis, Tallahassee, for defendants.

BOYD, Justice.

Pursuant to Rule 4.6 of the Florida Appellate Rules we are responding to questions certified to this Court by the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Volusia County. See Jaworski v. City of Opa-Locka, 149 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1963).

The questions are:

1. Does the enactment of Section 561.20(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes, by Chapter 72-230, Laws of Florida, which states in pertinent part: "(2)(a) No such limitation of the number of licenses as herein provided shall henceforth prohibit the issuance of a special license to: ... 3. Any restaurant ... deriving at least fifty-one percent of its gross revenue from the sale of food and nonalcoholic beverages" apply to those special restaurant licenses issued prior to the effective date of Chapter 72-230?

2. If the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, does that application violate those sections of the Florida and Federal Constitutions guaranteeing due process, equal protection, non-discrimination and non-impairment of contract and, if so, are all provisions of Chapter 72-230 unconstitutional or only that provision relating to the 51% requirement?

We have jurisdiction even though our answer to the first question makes it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues. Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch Inc., 275 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1973); McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1974).

In answering the first question we must determine whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply prospectively or to all special restaurant licenses even if issued prior to the effective date of the statute.

The respondents claim the Legislature simply amplified and made more restrictive a rule of the Beverage Department existing since 1969 which required special license restaurants to derive at least 30% of all proceeds from food and non-alcoholic beverages.

To determine the legislative intent we look to the plain language of the statute.

Section 561.20(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes, speaks in terms of future licenses only:

"No such limitation of the number of licenses as herein provided shall henceforth prohibit the issuance of a special license to: 3. Any restaurant .. . deriving at least fifty-one per cent of its[*817] gross revenue from the sale of food and nonalcoholic beverages... ."

According to Webster's New International Dictionary (unabridged edition) the word "henceforth" is defined as "From this time forward." The Legislature is simply imposing the 51% requirement on special restaurant licenses issued after the effective date of the Act.

The law clearly requires that the legislative intent be determined primarily from the language of the statute because a statute is to be taken, construed and applied in the form enacted. Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918); Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So.2d 664 (Fla.1st DCA 1960). The reason for this rule is that the Legislature must be assumed to know the meaning of words and to have expressed its intent by the use of the words found in the statute.

In the same subsection of Section 561.20(2)(a)3, the Legislature made three direct references to the treatment of existing licenses. In one instance the following language appears:

"However, any license heretofore issued to any such hotel, motel, motor court, or restaurant or hereafter issued to any such hotel, motel, or motor court ... under the general law shall not be moved to a new location... ."

At another point in the same subsection the Act says:

"Any special license now in existence heretofore issued under the provisions of this law cannot be renewed except in the name of the owner ... and must remain in the name of said owner or lessee so long as the license is in existence."

Finally, the Act attempts to protect those persons relying on the predecessor section of the statute:

"[N]othing herein provided shall limit, restrict, or prevent the issuance of a special license for any restaurant or motel which shall hereafter meet the requirements of the law existing immediately prior to the effective date of this act, if construction of such restaurant has commenced prior to the effective date of this act and is completed within thirty days thereafter, or if an application is on file for such special license at the time this act takes effect; and any such licenses issued under this proviso may be annually renewed as now provided by law."

If the Legislature intended to protect those licenses which had not even been issued and allow such licenses to come under the old section of the law then certainly petitioners' licenses, which have been in existence for a number of years, are likewise protected.

It is, of course, a general principle of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Hence, where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, or forbids certain things, it is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all those not expressly mentioned. Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554, 19 So.2d 234 (1944). By the Legislature's use of the term "henceforth" in the subject statute, and by its obvious reference to "the issuance" of special licenses in the future, the implication is that those licenses in existence prior to the effective date of the Act are excluded from the 51% requirement. Any other interpretation would extend the meaning of the language of the subject Act to include a class of persons not referred to by the Legislature.

The final applicable rule of statutory construction relates to whether a statute should be applied retrospectively or prospectively. The rule is stated succinctly in 30 Fla.Jur., Statutes, § 151, as follows:

"A statute operates prospectively unless the intent that it operate retrospectively is clearly expressed. Indeed, an act should never be construed retrospectively unless this was clearly the intention of the legislature. This is especially so where the effect of giving it a retroactive operation would be to interfere with an existing contract, destroy a vested right, or create a new liability in connection[*818] with a past transaction. The presumption is that it was intended to operate prospectively, unless its language requires that it be given a retroactive operation. The basis for retrospective interpretation must be unequivocal and leave no doubt as to the legislative intent."

By its use of prospective language only, i.e. "henceforth" and "the issuance" of a special license, by its failure to mention existing licenses and by its obvious attempt to protect those restaurants under construction or in which applications have been filed by allowing them to meet the requirements of the old law, the Act is unequivocal in leaving no doubt as to the legislative intent. It should therefore be applied prospectively to those licenses issued after the effective date of the Act and not applied retroactively to petitioners' licenses.

Respondents argue that if this Court interprets the Act in favor of petitioners' contentions, then a great deal of mischief will result because petitioners' licenses would contemporaneously with the Court's ruling be converted to "quota" licenses contrary to Section 561.20(1), Florida Statutes. This argument is without merit for the following reason. Respondents have promulgated "bona fide restaurant" requirements for special licenses in Chapter 7A-3.15, Florida Administrative Code. "Quota" licenses are not held to these requirements. Even if the 51% requirements of Section 561.20(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes, is not applied to petitioners, the Chapter 72-3.15, Florida Administrative Code, requirements save petitioners' licenses from effective conversion into quota licenses.

Having held that the statute does not operate retroactively it is unnecessary that we reach the second certified question.

We have dealt only with the narrow question of whether the statute applies retroactively. It is not our duty nor our right to invade the legislative domain by expressing our views on the wisdom of the law.

Accordingly the first certified question is answered in the negative and the second question is not reached. The cause is remanded to the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C.J., and ROBERTS, ADKINS, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.