Rash v. State, 356 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · Go Syfert
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Rash v. State, 356 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Self v. State (gactapp, 2007-10-25)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "see" Self v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rash v. State, 182 Ga. App. 655, 655-656 ( 356 SE2d 719 ) (1987) (lawful occupancy constitutes ownership for purposes of the damage-to-property statute, and “the question of legal title is not involved”); Kerlin v. Lane Co., 165 Ga. App. 622, 623-624 (2) ( 302 SE2d 369 ) (1983) (person damaging property cannot be allowed to raise “nice and delicate questions” concerning title of that property).
discussed Cited "see" Ginn v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: accord · confidence high
Andrews, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. 1 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Conyers v. State, 234 Ga. App. 830, 832 (1) ( 507 SE2d 842 ) (1998); accord Bradford v. State, 221 Ga. App. 232, 234 (2) ( 471 SE2d 248 ) (1996). 2 OCGA § 24-3-1 (b). 3 Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6, 10 (5) ( 515 SE2d 155 ) (1999). 4 See Higgs v. State, 256 Ga. 606, 608 (4) ( 351 SE2d 448 ) (1987). 5 See Johnson v. State, 273 Ga. 345, 347-348 (5) ( 541 SE2d 357 ) (2001). 6 (Punctuation omitted.) OCGA § 17-9-1 (a). 7 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Grier v. State, 218 Ga. App. 637, 638 (1) ( 463 SE2d 130 ) (1995)…
discussed Cited "see" Frost v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rash v. State, 182 Ga. App. 655 ( 356 SE2d 719 ) (1987).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Turner (2×)
N.M. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see also · confidence low
See People v. Allen, 76 Ill.App.3d 920 , 32 Ill.Dec. 287 , 395 N.E.2d 397, 399 (1979) (holding that former wife’s home was “property of another,” where although the divorce decree awarded the house to the former wife, the defendant had not yet delivered a quitclaim deed); see also Rash v. State, 182 Ga.App. 655 , 356 S.E.2d 719, 720 (1987) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that his failure to deliver a quitclaim deed to his ex-wife meant that he retained a property interest in the house and carport that was awarded to the wife in the divorce). {21} Although Defendant contends that be…
examined Cited "see, e.g." MacK v. State (3×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence low
Pope, P. J., and Barnes, J., concur. 1 The State also charged Mack with aggravated stalking, but the trial court directed a verdict for Mack on this count. 2 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Leigh v. State, 223 Ga. App. 726, 728 (2) ( 478 SE2d 905 ) (1996). 4 OCGA § 16-7-23 (a) (1). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 249 Ga. App. 857, 860 (1) ( 549 SE2d 813 ) (2001). 6 See Bacon v. State, 249 Ga. App. 347, 349 (1) (b) ( 548 SE2d 78 ) (2001). 7 Id. 8 Hayes, supra; see also Bacon, supra. 9 See Rash v. State, 182 Ga. App. 6…
Rash
v.
the State
73872.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Apr 16, 1987.
356 S.E.2d 719
Christine A. Van Dross, for appellant., Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Joseph J. Drolet, Richard E. Hicks, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Benham, Banke, Carley.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published
Benham, Judge.

Appellant was indicted for arson and convicted of criminal damage to property in the second degree. On appeal, he raises the sufficiency of the evidence generally and, specifically, the sufficiency of the evidence that he damaged the “property of another person.” See OCGA § 16-7-23 (a) (2).

The evidence, although conflicting, authorized the jury to find that appellant, intoxicated and angry at his former wife, poured gasoline on the carport of their former marital home, then occupied by his former wife, and lit it in furtherance of his threat to “burn the mother down” if his former wife did not admit him to the house. A divorce decree, entered less than two weeks before the incident, awarded title to and use of the house to appellant’s former wife and ordered him to quitclaim his interest in the house within 30 days of the decree.

Appellant’s argument is that since he had not yet complied with the order that he give his former wife a quitclaim deed, he was still an owner of the house and that, therefore, the house was not the “property of another person.” In rejecting a similar argument in an arson case, this court held, “Lawful occupancy by one in charge constitutes ownership as contemplated by the statute, and the question of legal title is not involved.” Tukes v. State, 125 Ga. App. 831 (189 SE2d 135) (1972). Although the Tukes court was speaking of the arson statute, the pertinent language, “dwelling house of another” in OCGA § 16-7-60 (a) (1), and “property of another person” in § 16-7-23 (a) (2),[*656] is sufficiently similar that the statement is equally applicable to this case. See also Corson v. State, 144 Ga. App. 559, 560 (241 SE2d 454) (1978), in which it was held that criminal damage to property is established by proof of the same conduct as first-degree arson except for the difference in proof of mental state.

Decided April 16, 1987. Christine A. Van Dross, for appellant. Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Joseph J. Drolet, Richard E. Hicks, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

Since the divorce decree, which is in the record of this case, awarded the wife “use” of the house, her legal occupancy was shown and the contested element of the offense was proved. The evidence at trial was sufficient to authorize any rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of criminal damage to property in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); OCGA § 16-7-23 (a) (2).

Judgment affirmed.

Banke, P. J., and Carley, J., concur.