Linville v. Escambia Cnty., 436 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). · Go Syfert
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Linville v. Escambia Cnty., 436 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
4 citation events across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: BRADEN WOODS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. MAVARD TRADING, LTD (fladistctapp, 2019-06-21)
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discussed Cited as authority (rule) BRADEN WOODS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. MAVARD TRADING, LTD
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Augustine Beach, 588 So. 2d 666, 667 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (stating that the city enacted a void ordinance because it did not comply with notice and hearing requirements); Linville v. Escambia County, 436 So. 2d 293, 294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (dealing with county commission that enacted ordinance without proper notice).
Jaunice LINVILLE, d/b/a Stardust Club
v.
ESCAMBIA COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida Vince Seely, Sheriff of Escambia County, Florida and Curtis Golden, State Attorney for the First Judicial Circuit of Florida
No. AO-313.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug 3, 1983.
436 So. 2d 293
Charles J. Kahn, Jr., of Levin, Warfield, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A., Pensacola, for appellant., Jan J. Hevier, County Atty., Pensacola, for appellees.
Shivers, Smith, Ton, Wiggin.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published
SHIVERS, Judge.

Linville challenges the validity of Escam-bia County Ordinance No. 82-2, which pertains to the regulation and operation of bottle clubs, alleging that the ordinance was invalidly enacted and that the ordinance is constitutionally infirm on several grounds. We agree that the ordinance was invalidly enacted and, therefore, invalidate the ordinance and reverse the order of the trial court upholding the validity of the ordinance.

On review of the record, we find that no notice of intent to consider the challenged ordinance was on file, in a separate book, 15 days before the county commission acted on the ordinance, as required by Section 125.-66(2), Fla.Stat. (1981). On that basis, we declare the ordinance invalid. Since we decide this case on procedural grounds, we do not express any opinion on the constitutional issues presented here for review.

ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., and WIGGIN-TON, JJ., concur.