Earl Thomas Moultrie v. State of Georgia, Cnty. of Richmond, Georgia Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 464 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
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Earl Thomas Moultrie v. State of Georgia, Cnty. of Richmond, Georgia Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 464 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
10 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Saenz-Jurado v. Suthers (ca10, 2010-09-17)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Saenz-Jurado v. Suthers
10th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Bennett v. Bogan, 66 F.3d 812, 818 (6th Cir.1995); United States v. Williams, 558 F.2d 224, 226 (5th Cir.1977); Moultrie v. Georgia, 464 F.2d 551, 552 (5th Cir.1972); Kartman v. Parrott, 535 F.2d 450, 455 (8th Cir.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donald A. Lock v. Leo D. Jenkins
7th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
While recognizing that the two hours daily of recreation or exercise out of cells was “not ideal,” the court concluded that that amount of time was sufficient to meet constitutional requirements. 464 F.2d at 551.
Earl Thomas MOULTRIE, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF GEORGIA, County of Richmond, Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole, Respondent-Appellee
72-1746.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jul 19, 1972.
464 F.2d 551
Earl Thomas Moultrie, pro se., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., William F. Bartee, Jr., Courtney Wilder Stanton, Asst. Attys. Gen., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for respondent-appellee.
Wisdom, Godbold, Roney.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Petitioner, a South Carolina prisoner, seeks removal of a detainer lodged against him by the State of Georgia. While on parole with two years to run[*552] on a Georgia sentence for burglary, petitioner was convicted' of armed robbery and sentenced to twelve years confinement in South Carolina. Georgia temporarily revoked his parole and filed a detainer.

Petitioner's pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus asserts that his constitutional right to a speedy trial compels a dismissal of the detainer because Georgia has denied his request for a hearing on the parole revocation. However, the right to a speedy trial is not applicable to parole revocation proceedings. Lipscomb v. United States Board of Parole (5th Cir. 1972) [No. 71-2505, January 3, 1972] ; Cox v. Feldkamp, 438 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1971). Georgia law requires a hearing but where a person has committed a crime in another state, has been convicted, and is incarcerated in that state, it is not unconstitutional to delay the parole revocation hearing until expiration of that later sentence. Galloway v. Attorney General, 451 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1971).

Petitioner’s contention that the expiration date of his original sentence has passed so that the detainer should be discharged is likewise without merit. The violation of the conditions of his parole interrupted the running of his sentence so that it has not expired. Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 44 S.Ct. 43, 68 L.Ed. 247 (1923).

Petitioner’s real complaint is that he cannot return to Georgia to serve out the lesser sentence there so that it will not affect the conditions of his longer confinement in South Carolina. He alleges that because of the Georgia detainer, South Carolina policy forbids his transfer from maximum detention and precludes him from becoming a trusty, engaging in work release and vocational training programs, or participating in other rehabilitative activities. While recognizing the plight in which petitioner finds himself, we perceive no constitutional relief available to him in this jurisdiction.

The district court correctly denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Affirmed.