Saylor v. Troup Cnty., 484 S.E.2d 298 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · Go Syfert
Saylor v. Troup Cnty., 484 S.E.2d 298 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the purchase of insurance coverage waives a county's sovereign immunity only to the extent of such insurance coverage”
43 citation events (37 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, Georgia (gasd, 2002-02-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1999 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1999 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, Georgia (2×)
S.D. Ga. · 2002 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the purchase of insurance coverage waives a county's sovereign immunity only to the extent of such insurance coverage
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Roswell v. Clementina Hernandez-Flores
Ga. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
We have concluded similarly in numerous other cases that police officers using their vehicles as static props does not constitute using their vehicles “as vehicles.” See, e.g., Williams v. Whitfield County, 289 Ga. App. 301, 302-305 ( 656 SE2d 584 ) (2008), superseded by statute on other grounds, as stated in Columbus Consolidated Govt. v. Woody, 342 Ga. App. 233 , 237 n.4 ( 802 SE2d 717 ) (2017) (large excavator on the side of the road used to warn motorists of a road closure was not used “as a vehicle” because it was “merely present as a static physical mass”); Saylor v. Troup Co…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Columbus Consolidated Government v. Woody (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
While we recognize that determining whether an event arises from the “use” of a motor vehicle can depend on the particular circumstances, and a bright-line definition may be elusive, 5 “[t]he question to be answered is whether the injury originated from, had its origin in, grew out of, or flowed from the use of the motor vehicle as a vehicle.” Saylor v. Troup County, 225 Ga. App. 489, 490 ( 484 SE2d 298 ) (1997) (citation and punctuation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Polk County v. Ellington
Ga. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
A copy of the report was then given to the hospital emergency room, at the time the patient was delivered. 7 Lincoln County v. Edmond, 231 Ga. App. 871, 872 (1) ( 501 SE2d 38 ) (1998). 8 Woodard v. Laurens County, 265 Ga. 404, 405 (1) ( 456 SE2d 581 ) (1995). 9 Harry v. Glynn County, 269 Ga. 503 ( 501 SE2d 196 ) (1998). 10 Robinson v. DeKalb County, 261 Ga. App. 163, 165 (2) ( 582 SE2d 156 ) (2003). 11 Saylor v. Troup County, 225 Ga. App. 489, 489 ( 484 SE2d 298 ) (1997). 12 Clive v. Gregory, 280 Ga. App. 836, 841 (2) ( 635 SE2d 188 ) (2006). 13 McDowell v. Smith, 285 Ga. 592, 593 ( 678 SE2d 9…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gish v. Thomas
Ga. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
This finding is in accordance with cases such as Williams, 289 Ga. App. at 305 (vehicle merely present as a static physical mass); Tittle, 256 Ga. App. at 864 (2) (injury did not arise from use of the patrol car whose lights were used to illuminate the area and suspect placed against the hood of the car); Saylor, 225 Ga. App. at 490 (van was inoperative, parked on the side of the road with its engine not engaged, when plaintiff was injured); Hicks v. Walker County School Dist., 172 Ga. App. 428, 429 (1) ( 323 SE2d 231 ) (1984) (no causal connection between the injury deliberately inflicted on …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chamlee v. Henry County Board of Education
Ga. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Butler v. Dawson County, 238 Ga. App. 808 ( 518 SE2d 430 ) (1999) (no waiver despite insurance where damages caused by county’s negligence not connected with motor vehicles); Saylor v. Troup County, 225 Ga. App. 489, 490 ( 484 SE2d 298 ) (1997) (no waiver because injury not covered by the policy); Lincoln County v. Edmond, 231 Ga. App. 871, 873-874 (1) ( 501 SE2d 38 ) (1998) (no waiver because non-use of motor vehicle not encompassed in definition of policy in OCGA § 33-24-51 (a)); Long v. Hall County Bd. of Commrs., 219 Ga. App. 853, 857 (2) (b) ( 467 SE2d 186 ) (1996) (no waive…
discussed Cited "see" SHERRI MCBRAYER v. GENE SCARBROUGH, SHERIFF (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Saylor v. Troup County, 225 Ga. App. 489, 490 ( 484 SE2d 298 ) (1997) (concluding that the injury did not arise out of “use” of motor vehicle, where injury occurred when county “van was inoperative, parked off the roadway with its engine not engaged”).
discussed Cited "see" Scott v. City of Valdosta (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Saylor v. Troup County, 225 Ga. App. 489, 490 ( 484 SE2d 298 ) (1997) (injury that occurred when plaintiff fell on swing blade attached to county van did not “flow from” use of the van).
discussed Cited "see" Horton v. Whitaker (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
(Emphasis in original.) Id.; see Saylor v. Troup County, 225 Ga. App. 489 ( 484 SE2d 298 ) (1997); Blumsack v. Bartow County, 223 Ga. App. 392, 394 (1) ( 477 SE2d 642 ) (1996).
Saylor
v.
Troup County
A97A0233.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Mar 14, 1997.
484 S.E.2d 298
Robert M. Beauchamp, L. Chandler Vreeland, for appellant., Willis, McKenzie & Long, Edward L. Long, Jr., Mark L. Degennaro, for appellee.
Harold R. Banke.
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 72%
Citer courts: S.D. Georgia (2)
Judge Harold R. Banke.

Joseph Saylor filed a personal injury action against Troup County (“County”). Saylor appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment based on the County’s sovereign immunity.

The salient facts are undisputed. Saylor was injured while working as an inmate on a prison work detail. At the time of the incident, Saylor was sharpening a swing blade on a vise attached to the bumper of a van for which the County had obtained liability insurance. As Saylor was sharpening the blade, another inmate was using a tractor to mow the grass on the right-of-way. The tractor slightly bumped Saylor, allegedly causing him to lose his balance and fall across the swing blade. Saylor sued the County contending it was liable for the negligence of his fellow inmate and for the negligent supervision by Officer Donald V. Osborne, the County employee in charge of the prison work detail.

The County moved for summary judgment based on its defense of sovereign immunity. OCGA § 36-1-4. Assistant County Manager Michael Dobbs testified that both of the County’s liability insurers had denied coverage of Saylor’s claim. Dobbs further attested that the County had no other policy of insurance available which could provide coverage. Held:

Saylor’s sole enumeration is that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment. He contends that a jury must determine whether his injuries arose out of the “ownership, use or maintenance” of the van at issue so as to trigger liability insurance coverage.

A county is not required to purchase liability insurance and is entitled to sovereign immunity in the absence of insurance. OCGA § 33-24-51 (a); Ward v. Bulloch County, 258 Ga. 92, 93 (365 SE2d 440) (1988). The purchase of insurance coverage waives a county’s sovereign immunity only to the extent of such insurance coverage. See OCGA § 33-24-51 (b); Dugger v. Sprouse, 257 Ga. 778, 779 (364 SE2d 275) (1988). Further, a county’s sovereign immunity is waived only[*490] when its insurer satisfies a claim under the coverage provided. Ward, 258 Ga. at 93.

Decided March 14,1997. Robert M. Beauchamp, L. Chandler Vreeland, for appellant. Willis, McKenzie & Long, Edward L. Long, Jr., Mark L. Degennaro, for appellee.

It is undisputed that no liability insurance coverage was available for the tractor and that the County had no general liability or public officials’ insurance coverage either. The only possible coverage was under the liability insurance policy for the van. That policy provided coverage for bodily injury caused by an accident “resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use” of a covered vehicle. Although under such a policy the injury need not be the proximate result of “use” in the strict sense, the meaning of “use” cannot be extended to something distinctly remote. Leverette v. Aetna Cas. &c. Co., 157 Ga. App. 175, 176 (276 SE2d 859) (1981). “‘ “The question to be answered is whether the injury ‘originated from,’ ‘had its origin in,’ ‘grew out of,’ or ‘flowed from’ the use of the (motor vehicle as a) vehicle.” ’ [Cit.]” Id.

When the tractor bumped Saylor, the van was inoperative, parked off the roadway with its engine not engaged. Saylor was merely using the bumper of the van for placement of the vise, and the van itself was only remotely related to the accident. Saylor’s injury did not “originate in” or “flow from” the use of the van as a motor vehicle. Leverette, 157 Ga. App. at 176. Compare Northbrook Property &c. Ins. Co. v. Merchant, 215 Ga. App. 273, 275 (1) (450 SE2d 425) (1994); see also Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., .222 Ga. App. 177, 179 (2) (474 SE2d 89) (1996); Daniels v. Decatur County, 212 Ga. App. 378, 380 (2) (441 SE2d 790) (1994). Because the County showed it had no applicable liability insurance, it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Dugger, 257 Ga. at 779.

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, P. J., and Smith, J., concur.