Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 2003). · Go Syfert
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Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 2003). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“an appellate court has no power in exercising its jurisdiction in certiorari to direct the respondent to take any particular action. it can only quash the order or decision under review and remand for further proceedings.”
111 citation events (111 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: TERRY HENLEY v. CITY OF NORTH MIAMI (fladistctapp, 2022-08-17)
Treatment trajectory · 2003 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2003 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) TERRY HENLEY v. CITY OF NORTH MIAMI
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
limited to whether the circuit court (1) afforded procedural due process, and (2) applied the correct law.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA v. THURMOND STREET PARTNERS, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
limited to whether the circuit court (1) afforded procedural due process, and (2) applied the correct law.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Kimberly Regenesis, LLC v. Lee County, a Florida political subdivision
M.D. Fla. · 2020 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
an appellate court has no power in exercising its jurisdiction in certiorari to direct the respondent to take any particular action. it can only quash the order or decision under review and remand for further proceedings.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ybor Properties, LLC v. City of Tampa, Caldwell
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Acquisitions Corp., 415 So. 3d 1205 , 1207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting Miami- Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hillsborough County v. G.L. Acquisitions Corporation, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 198-99 (Fla. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hillsborough County v. Stephen J. Dibbs
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Nor is this court empowered to review the record to determine whether the [Board's] decision was supported by competent, substantial evidence." See City of Tampa v. City Nat'l Bank of Fla., 974 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (citing Miami–Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) VENTURA GOMEZ v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
“A ruling constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law when it amounts to ‘a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.’” Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SOMERSET ACADEMY, INC. AND THE UNIVERSITY BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
However, because certiorari is not the proper vehicle for such a challenge, the circuit court did not depart from the essential requirements of law in denying Somerset’s petition on 3 this basis. 1 See First Baptist Church of Perrine v. Miami-Dade County, 768 So. 2d 1114 , 1115 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (“We decline to address the merits of this issue because a petition for certiorari is not the proper procedural vehicle to challenge the constitutionality of this ordinance . . . [which] must be determined in original proceedings before the circuit court, not by way of a petition for writ of c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MIAMI-DADE COUNTY v. CITY OF MIAMI (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995)) (“[W]hen a district court considers a petition for second-tier certiorari review, the ‘inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law,’ or, as otherwise stated, departed from the essential requirements of law . . . .”); Miami-Dade Cty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003); Dusseau v. Metro.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Edgewater House Condominium Association, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, Florida
11th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
On second-tier certiorari review, “[t]he [appellate court] may not review the record to determine whether the underlying agency decision is supported by competent, substantial evidence.” Miami-Dade County v. OmniPoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Forte v. Miami-Dade County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Rather, our review “is limited to whether the circuit court (1) afforded procedural due process, and (2) applied the correct law.” Miami-Dade Cty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miami Dade College v. Del Pino Allen
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Rorke v. Savoy Energy, LP, 677 N.W.2d 45, 51 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003); see also Wright v. City of Miami Gardens, 200 So. 3d 765, 780 (Fla. 2016) (Canady, J., concurring in result only) (“It is not within the province of [this Court] to overturn the ruling of a lower court on a ground that has not been urged by the party challenging the lower court’s decision.”); Miami-Dade Cty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 200-01 (Fla. 2003) (holding the District Court of Appeal “exceeded the proper scope of . . . 10 review when it, sua sponte” passed on “an issue neither party raised …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ARTHUR LEE SMITH v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
"A ruling constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law when it amounts to 'a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.' " Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Tedder v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 842 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State, Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Canalejo
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla,2003) (quoting, Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995)); Dep’t of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. DeGroot, 971 So.2d 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State, Department of Highway Safety v. Baird
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003), quoting, Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995); Dep’t of High.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Rose
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
This court’s scope of review in this second-tier certiorari proceeding “is limited to whether the circuit court (1) afforded procedural due process [ ] and (2) applied the correct law.” Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mocio v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
In order to resolve this question, we must determine whether the court violated “‘a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.’ ” Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003) (quoting Tedder v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 842 So.2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Village of Palmetto Bay v. Palmer Trinity Private School, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Miami-Dade County v. Omni-point Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 198 (Fla.2008).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arenas v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
This is “simply another way of deciding whether the lower court ‘departed from the essential requirements of [the] law.’ ” Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Florida Mobile Home Relocation Corp. v. City of South Daytona
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 198-99 (Fla.2003); City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Altman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
This second-tier certiorari review is “simply another way of deciding whether the lower court ‘departed from the essential requirements of [the] law.’ ” “A ruling constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of [the] law when it amounts to ‘a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.’ ” Gould v. State, 974 So.2d 441, 444-45 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003)); see also Progressive Express Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Monroe County v. Carter
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
As before, this is a second-tier review “limited to whether the circuit court (1) afforded procedural due process, and (2) applied the correct law.” Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dougherty ex rel. Eisenberg v. City of Miami
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003) (citing City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla.1982)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Arvelo v. Park Finance of Broward, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Miami-Dade County v. Omni-point Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hofer
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
This two-part analysis allows this court to “decid[e] whether the lower court ‘departed from the essential requirements of [the] law.’ ” Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kirpalani v. DEPT. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
This two-part analysis is simply another way of deciding whether the lower court `departed from the essential requirements of [the] law.' Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McLaughlin v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
This two-part analysis is “simply another way of *991 deciding whether the lower court ‘departed from the essential requirements of [the] law.’ ” Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Retirement Bd. of City of Coral Gables v. Pinon
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of St. Petersburg v. Meaton
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
In this second-tier certiorari proceeding, our review "is limited to whether the circuit court (1) afforded procedural due process[] and (2) applied the correct law." Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DEPT. OF HIGHWAY SAFETY v. Boesch
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
We are to determine, in short, whether the circuit court "departed from the essential requirements of law," amounting to "a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gould v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
This secondtier certiorari review is "simply another way of deciding whether the lower court `departed from the essential requirements of [the] law." Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003) (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla. *445 1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Saadeh v. City of Jacksonville
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
On "first-tier" review, the circuit court must determine "(1) whether procedural due process is accorded, (2) whether the essential requirements of the law have been observed, and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence." Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003) (internal citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hernandez-Canton v. MIAMI CITY COM'N (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
We agree with the developer that a petition for writ of certiorari cannot be used for this purpose. "[A] petition seeking certiorari review is not the proper procedural vehicle to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance." Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Castro v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY CODE
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
We begin our analysis, acknowledging, as we must, that the "scope of the district court's review on second-tier certiorari is limited to whether the circuit court (1) afforded procedural due process, and (2) applied the correct law." Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003); S. Group Indem., Inc. v. Humanitary Health Care, Inc., 32 Fla. L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SOUTH MOTOR CO. v. Doktorczyk
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So.2d 885, 889 (Fla.2003); Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003); Auerbach v. City of Miami, 929 So.2d 693, 694-95 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Morningside Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Miami Comm'n, 917 So.2d 293, 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
cited Cited as authority (rule) ATLANTIC SHORES RESORT v. 507 S. St. Corp.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003); Peachtree Cas.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Auerbach v. City of Miami
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Failing to do so in this case would create both a direct conflict with these decisions, and an unjustified approval of the obvious failure of the circuit court to apply the correct law, see Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003); Morningside Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Miami Comm'n, 917 So.2d 293 (Fla. 3d *695 DCA 2005), and of the resulting "miscarriage of justice" which occurred below. [3] See Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Rosenthal, 908 So.2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Hernando County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ferrara v. Community Developers, Ltd.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003); Clear Channel Communications, Inc. v. City of North Bay Village, 911 So.2d 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sylvis v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003); Sheley, 703 So.2d 1202 ; see also Mabrey, 858 So.2d at 1181 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY v. Rosenthal
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
In this second-tier certiorari proceeding, our review "is limited to whether the circuit court (1) afforded procedural due process, and (2) applied the correct law." Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Everette
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
In Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003), the Florida Supreme Court restated a long-standing legal maxim that a ruling constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law when it amounts to "a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." We recently stated in State, Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Div. of Driver Licenses v. Possati, 866 So.2d 737, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), that "[t]o justify this court's issuance of a writ of certiorari, the circuit court's departure from the essential requ…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Telesz
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003) (holding that a district court's review on second-tier certiorari is limited to determining whether the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law).
discussed Cited "see" STATE OF FLORIDA v. ANDREW SCOTT CROSE
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 200 (Fla. 2003) ("Ordinarily an appellate court does not give consideration to issues not raised below." (quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941))).
discussed Cited "see" JACK KESSLER v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003) (“The district court may not review the record to determine whether the underlying agency decision is supported by competent, substantial evidence.
discussed Cited "see" Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Sperberg (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Omnipoint Holdings, 863 So. 2d at 200 (discussing the distinction between raising an issue for the first time on appeal versus never raising the issue at all). 7 We note that even if Sperberg’s arguments, in the reply brief filed with the circuit court, could be construed as raising issues of competent substantial evidence, Florida courts have held that in such circumstances, granting the petition on the new issues raised in the reply brief would deny the Department due process.
cited Cited "see" Hernandez v. Miami-Dade Cnty.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miami-Dade Cty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc. , 863 So.2d 195 , 199 (Fla. 2003).
cited Cited "see" Hernandez v. Miami-Dade County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miami-Dade Cty v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 2003).
cited Cited "see" Mears v. Lamb
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195 (Fla.2003).
cited Cited "see" WEKIVA SPRINGS RESERVE HOMEOWNERS v. Binns
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 199 (Fla.2003).
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, Petitioner,
v.
OMNIPOINT HOLDINGS, INC., Respondent.
SC02-815.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sep 25, 2003.
863 So. 2d 195
Bell.
Cited by 81 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 79%
Citer courts: M.D. Florida (1)

[*196] Robert A. Ginsburg, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Jay W. Williams and Robert L. Krawcheck, Assistant County Attorneys, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.

Deborah L. Martohue of Hayes & Martohue, P.A., St. Petersburg, FL, for Respondent.

Alejandro Vilarello, City Attorney, and Joel Maxwell, Deputy City Attorney, Miami, FL; and Robert S. Glazier of the Law Office of Robert S. Glazier, Miami, FL, for the City of Miami, Florida, Amicus Curiae.

Elizabeth Hernandez, City Attorney, Coral Gables, FL; and William Grodnick, City Attorney, Hialeah, FL, for City of[*197] Coral Gables, Florida and City of Hialeah, Florida, Amici Curiae.

Eileen Ball Mehta and Stanley B. Price of Bilzin, Sumberg, Baena, Price & Axelrod, LLP, Miami, FL, for Builders Association of South Florida, Inc.; Latin Builders Association; Chamber South; Sweet Home Missionary Baptist Church, Inc. of Miami; Greater New Bethel Baptist Church, Inc. of Opa Locka; and New Birth Baptist Church, Inc., Amici Curiae.

Lynn M. Dannheisser, City Attorney, and Hans Ottinot, Deputy City Attorney, Sunny Isles Beach, FL, for City of Sunny Isles Beach, Florida, Amicus Curiae.

BELL, J.

We have for review Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 811 So.2d 767 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), which expressly and directly conflicts with this Court's decision in Broward County v. G.B.V. International, Ltd., 787 So.2d 838 (Fla.2001). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. As discussed below, because the Third District's decision exceeds the proper scope of second-tier certiorari review by addressing, sua sponte, the facial constitutionality of the ordinances at issue, we quash that decision and remand for further review.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Omnipoint Holdings, Inc. (Omnipoint) applied for an "unusual use" exception to the Miami-Dade County zoning ordinances in order to erect a 148-foot (fourteen-story) telecommunications monopole. The proposed site of the monopole is zoned for limited business use. The county's zoning ordinances do not permit telecommunications towers in the limited business district as a matter of right. However, towers may be erected in the limited business district if an unusual use exception is granted by the zoning board.

Omnipoint also sought a modification to the prior site plan for the property and a nonuse variance of the zoning regulations to allow the tower to be set back eighty-four feet from the rear property line, instead of the 164 feet typically required. The county's limited business district zoning regulations restricted building height to forty-five feet for all uses permitted as of right. At the time Omnipoint's request was presented to the zoning board, a public storage facility existed on the target property; two fully developed single-family town-home neighborhoods were immediately north and south of the proposed tower site; a 150-foot telecommunications tower was located on an adjacent parcel to the east; and seventy-five-foot electric utility poles lined the roadway to the north. Otherwise, the tallest building in the area was two stories high.

Miami-Dade County staff issued a report recommending that the zoning board approve Omnipoint's requests. At a hearing before the zoning board, the staff report, photographs, zoning maps, and testimony were introduced. Homeowners testified that the cell tower, by virtue of its size, use, aesthetics, and location on the site, would be incompatible with the character of the surrounding area. After the hearing, the zoning board issued a resolution denying Omnipoint's application, finding as follows:

[T]he requested modification, ... unusual use, ... and non-use variance of zoning regulations ... would not be compatible with the area and its development and would not be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the regulations and would not conform with the requirements and intent of the Zoning Procedure Ordinance and the requested unusual use ... would have an[*198] adverse impact upon the public interest and should be denied without prejudice.

On certiorari review, the circuit court granted Omnipoint's petition and quashed the decision of the zoning board. The circuit court held that the board's decision was unsupported by competent, substantial evidence and constituted "unlawful discrimination among providers of equivalent services" under the Federal Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 332 (1996).[1] The circuit court remanded the case to the zoning board with instructions "to determine Omnipoint's application in accordance with" the court's opinion. Omnipoint did not allege in its petition that the zoning ordinance provisions were unconstitutional, and the circuit court did not address the constitutionality of those provisions. Miami-Dade filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Third District Court of Appeal.

On second-level certiorari review, the Third District denied the county's petition and left intact the circuit court's remand.[2] The district court found no error in the circuit court's opinion. In fact, the Third District reached the same ultimate result, but it did so on a fundamentally different basis. Sua sponte, the district court declared the relevant portions of the county code governing unusual uses, modifications of prior approvals, and nonuse variances facially unconstitutional because they lacked objective criteria to guide zoning boards in their decision-making process. See Omnipoint, 811 So.2d at 768-70.

Miami-Dade filed a petition to invoke this Court's discretionary jurisdiction, alleging that the district court opinion was in direct and express conflict with decisions of this Court restricting the scope of second-tier certiorari review. Additionally, Miami-Dade argued that the district court opinion conflicted with our decisions holding that constitutionality issues should not be addressed when a case can be resolved on other grounds. We granted jurisdiction.

SCOPE OF SECOND-TIER CERTIORARI REVIEW

Miami-Dade alleges that the Third District exceeded the scope of second-tier certiorari review when it declared the ordinances unconstitutional.

A. APPLICABLE LAW

After a zoning board rules on an application for a special zoning exception, the parties may twice seek review in the court system. First, a party may seek certiorari review at the circuit court level. This review is a matter of right. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So.2d 1089, 1092 (Fla.2000). As we delineated in City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1982), and reiterated in G.B.V., the circuit[*199] court's "first-tier" review is three-pronged. The circuit court must determine "(1) whether procedural due process is accorded, (2) whether the essential requirements of the law have been observed, and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment are supported by competent substantial evidence." G.B.V., 787 So.2d at 843 (quoting Vaillant, 419 So.2d at 626).

The parties may then seek "second-tier" certiorari review of the circuit court decision by petitioning for review in the district court. Second-tier certiorari review is not a matter of right and is similar in scope to common law certiorari review. See Florida Power, 761 So.2d at 1092-93. The scope of the district court's review on second-tier certiorari is limited to whether the circuit court (1) afforded procedural due process, and (2) applied the correct law. G.B.V., 787 So.2d at 843 (quoting Vaillant, 419 So.2d at 626). In other words, this two-pronged, second-tier review is simply another way of deciding whether the lower court "departed from the essential requirements of law." Heggs, 658 So.2d at 530. A ruling constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law when it amounts to "a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Tedder v. Florida Parole Comm'n, 842 So.2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (quoting Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 96 (Fla.1983)). The district court may not review the record to determine whether the underlying agency decision is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Florida Power, 761 So.2d at 1093. Therefore, as a practical matter, the circuit court's final ruling in most first-tier cases is conclusive because second-tier review is so extraordinarily limited. Id. at 1092.

Additionally, a petition seeking certiorari review is not the proper procedural vehicle to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. Vaillant, 419 So.2d at 626. For example, in First Baptist Church of Perrine v. Miami-Dade County, 768 So.2d 1114, 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), the petitioner, on second-tier certiorari review, attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the same county ordinance at issue here. The Third District properly declined to exceed the proper scope of second-tier certiorari review and stated:

The Church attempts to challenge the constitutionality of section 33-311 of the Miami-Dade County Code, which section establishes the Zoning Board and creates the criteria to be used by the Zoning Board in its consideration of zoning application [sic]. We decline to address the merits of this issue because a petition for certiorari is not the proper procedural vehicle to challenge the constitutionality of this ordinance. See City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla.1982) (The district court, in reviewing the circuit court's judgment determines "whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct law."). The constitutionality of the ordinance must be determined in original proceedings before the circuit court, not by way of a petition for writ of certiorari. See Nostimo, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 594 So.2d 779 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). Furthermore, this issue was never brought before the circuit court in the proceedings below and should not be considered initially by this Court.

Id. at 1115 n. 1 (emphasis added).

B. APPLICATION OF LAW

On first-tier certiorari review, the circuit court in this case applied the Vaillant test and quashed the zoning board's decision because it violated the second and third prongs. Specifically, the circuit[*200] court found: (1) the board's decision did not comport with the requirements of the Federal Telecommunications Act; and (2) there was no competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the denial of the application. The first prong was not addressed because the question of procedural due process was not raised by either party.

On its review, the district court did not address either prong of a proper second-tier certiorari review. The first prong, whether procedural due process was afforded to the parties, was not an issue raised by the parties. There was no need to consider the issue. However, the district court also did not address the second and final element of second-tier certiorari review, whether the circuit court applied the correct law. This issue was raised by Miami-Dade and should have been adequately addressed.

Instead of limiting itself to addressing the two prongs of second-tier certiorari review, the district court reached an issue neither party raised in any phase of the proceedings. Sua sponte, the Third District considered the facial constitutionality of the Miami-Dade County ordinances. The district court stated that although "[a]rguably Omnipoint did not preserve the constitutional question," portions of the county code are "fundamentally unfair and unjust" and proceeded to hold them invalid. Omnipoint, 811 So.2d at 769 n. 6. The district court justified reaching the question of constitutionality solely on the authority of In re R.W., 481 So.2d 548, 549 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding patently unconstitutional a termination of parental rights statute that set forth no standards or guidelines for performance agreements, thus leaving "the substance of such agreements entirely to the whims and caprices of the individual social worker who drafts them"), aff'd, 495 So.2d 133 (Fla.1986). In R.W., the appellant specifically raised the issue of the constitutionality of the statute. By contrast, neither party in this case raised the constitutionality of the ordinances as an issue for the Third District to address.

Further, unlike R.W., the county's ordinances in this case, even if facially unconstitutional, do not approach the fundamental defectiveness or unjustness evident in R.W. The authority cited by the Fifth District in R.W. as authority to declare the statute unconstitutional was the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 61 S.Ct. 719, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941), in which the Court stated:

Ordinarily an appellate court does not give consideration to issues not raised below. For our procedural scheme contemplates that parties shall come to issue in the trial forum vested with authority to determine questions of fact. This is essential in order that parties may have the opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant to the issues which the trial tribunal is alone competent to decide; it is equally essential in order that litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence.

Id. at 556, 61 S.Ct. 719. The Hormel Court did note that "[t]here may always be exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will prompt a reviewing or appellate court, where injustice might otherwise result, to consider questions of law which were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court or administrative agency below." Id. at 557, 61 S.Ct. 719. This case does not present the types of patent injustice considered in Hormel and R.W. Indeed, in the filings and arguments before this Court, both Omnipoint and Miami-Dade[*201] (as well as the numerous amici curiae) argue that the ordinances in question are facially constitutional.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we hold that the Third District exceeded the proper scope of second-tier certiorari review when it, sua sponte, held the ordinances in question facially unconstitutional. Accordingly, we quash the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal and remand to that court with instructions to review the circuit court's decision pursuant to the standards established by this Court in Vaillant, G.B.V., and Florida Power.

We decline to address whether this case could have been resolved on other grounds. We also decline to address the remaining issues raised by the parties that are beyond the scope of the conflict issue. See Kelly v. Community Hosp. of Palm Beaches, Inc., 818 So.2d 469, 470 n. 1 (Fla.2002).

It is so ordered.

ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., concur.

1 The unlawful discrimination claim was related to the adjacent 150-foot telecommunications tower.
2 More accurately, though stating it was leaving intact the circuit court's remand, the Third District actually went a step further. It modified the circuit court's remand by saying it was "for the purpose of the Board's granting approval of Omnipoint's application for the monopole." Miami-Dade County v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 811 So.2d 767, 770 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). The circuit court had properly limited its remand to the board "with instructions to determine the application in accordance" with its opinion. The Third District's modification exceeded a court's certiorari review power. An appellate court has no power in exercising its jurisdiction in certiorari to direct the respondent to take any particular action. It can only quash the order or decision under review and remand for further proceedings. See Broward County v. G.B.V. International, Ltd., 787 So.2d 838, 844 (Fla.2001).