Baker v. State, 150 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). · Go Syfert
Search
Baker v. State, 150 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Rivas (fladistctapp, 2010-01-06)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Rivas
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
A Cl’s identity must be disclosed under the second, due process prong under circumstances such as the following: (1) if the defendant is charged with delivering or selling drugs to the informant, see Miller, 729 So.2d at 420 (citing Zamora, 534 So.2d at 869 (citing Roviaro)); (2) if the informant is called as a witness at trial, e.g., State v. Hassberger, 350 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla.1977) (“Where the state produces the informer at trial, and attempts to prevent the witness from giving certain testimony on cross-examination, the sixth amendment right of an accused to confront the witnesses against …
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Simmons
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Zamora, 534 So.2d at 870 ; Baker v. State, 150 So.2d 729, 730 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Diaz
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
That is, if the defense was wrong in its assertion, no disclosure of the tipster's identity would be made to the defense. [5] The State does not dispute that Diaz's mere presence defense is a valid defense to this prosecution. [6] Zamora cites Monserrate v. State, 232 So.2d 444, 445 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (disclosure required where the defendant is charged with selling or delivering illegal drugs to confidential informant); Hassberger, 350 So.2d at 5 (Fla.1977) (disclosure required when the state calls the confidential informant as a witness at trial); Smith v. State, 318 So.2d 506, 508 (Fla. 2d D…
discussed Cited "see" City of Miami v. Jones
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1964 · signal: see · confidence high
Petitioner alleges error on the part of the circuit court in making the following ruling: “THIS CAUSE having come on before the Court upon Appeal by Appellant, Clifford Jones, from a judgment of conviction in the Municipal Court of the City of Miami, Florida, and the Court having heard argument of counsel and having examined the record on appeal and memoranda submitted, and, it appearing to the Court that Appellant’s Point III on appeal is well taken, and that the Court below erred in denying Defendant’s motion to produce the name of the alleged informer, alleged lottery ticket itself, a…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Samuel Lee BAKER, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
62-213.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Mar 12, 1963.
150 So. 2d 729
Pearson, Tillman, C.J., and Barkdull and Hendry.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published

Taylor & Bergstresser, Miami, for appellant

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Herbert P. Benn, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before PEARSON, TILLMAN, C.J., and BARKDULL and HENDRY, JJ.

BARKDULL, Judge.

The appellant, defendant in the trial court, appeals a judgment and conviction of operating a gambling house contrary to the statutes of this State.

The affidavit which supported the search warrant in this case was issued upon certain assertions made by one R. Brown, pursuant to the provisions of § 933.18, Fla. Stat., F.S.A.[1] By appropriate proceedings, the defendant moved to quash the search warrant and suppress the evidence obtained thereunder, averring that there was in fact no such person and further moved the State Attorney, by an appropriate motion, for a bill of particulars seeking a full disclosure of information relative to the said R. Brown. The several motions were denied by the trial court and the appellant was tried and convicted upon evidence obtained as a result of the aforesaid search warrant.[2]

There is a fundamental principle of judicial process that one accused of a[*730] crime is entitled to be confronted by his accuser. See: U.S.Const. Amend. VI; Fla. Const., Declaration of Rights, § 11, F.S.A. The failure of the trial judge to require the State to disclose such information as it had relative to R. Brown, the individual who signed the affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued, vitiated all evidence obtained thereunder. The conviction and sentence will be reversed upon the established principle that illegally obtained evidence by virtue of a defective search warrant may not be used to secure a conviction. See Cooper v. State, 106 Fla. 254, 143 So. 217; Hogan v. Carlton, 112 Fla. 442, 150 So. 604; 13 Fla.Jur., Evidence, § 180. Even though the judge who issued the search warrant may have been justified in issuing the warrant upon the affidavit, at the time it was called to the attention of the trial court [both in the motion to quash and suppress and in the motion for a bill of particulars], an issue was made as to the "credibility" of the affiant who set in motion the search and subsequent criminal proceedings. It was then incumbent upon the trial judge to require the State to reveal such facts as it had relative to the said R. Brown. See: Byers v. State, Fla. App. 1959, 109 So.2d 382. The State urges that it was protected in failing to disclose any information relative to the affiant; that the trial court was well within its discretion in refusing to compel disclosure because it was averred that the said R. Brown was a confidential informant. See: Chacon v. State, Fla. 1957, 102 So.2d 578; Harrington v. State, Fla.App. 1959, 110 So.2d 495; Garcia v. State, Fla.App. 1959, 110 So.2d 709; State v. Hardy, Fla.App. 1959, 114 So.2d 344. It is true that it has been held in this State that the prosecution may not always be required to reveal the name of a confidential informant, but this rule should not be applicable where a so-called alleged "confidential informant" actually executes the affidavit which is the initial instrument which sets in motion what ultimately results in a criminal proceeding. To expand the rule protecting "confidential informant" to protect one who actually executes an affidavit in accordance with § 933.18, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., supra, would do violence to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions previously referred to.

Therefore, we hold that the evidence obtained upon the search warrant [issued as a result of an affidavit made by the said R. Brown] should be suppressed upon the motion made by the defendant, he having traversed the allegation that there was in fact such person, and the State having refused to identify or produce the affiant. The record failing to have any evidence other than that obtained by the aforesaid search warrant, it lacks the necessary ingredients to sustain the conviction of the appellant and, therefore, the judgment and sentence is hereby reversed for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

1 § 933.18, Fla. Stat., F.S.A. reads in part, as follows:

"No warrant shall be issued for the search of any private dwelling under any of the conditions hereinabove mentioned except on sworn proof by affidavit of some creditable witness that he has reason to believe that one of said conditions exists, which affidavit shall set forth the facts on which such reason or belief is based."

2 It appears from the record that appropriate objections to the evidence were made at the time of the trial. See: Robertson v. State, 1927, 94 Fla. 770, 114 So. 534.