OPINION

The Florida Election Code, Florida Statutes § 99.061(1), F.S.A., requires candidates seeking election to the state [*228] legislature as the nominee of a recognized political party to qualify for the election at least forty-nine days prior to the date of the first primary held to determine the party nominees.^[1] In this general election year, the first primary is scheduled for September 12th. Thus, under the Code, persons seeking party nominations must have qualified by July 25th. The controversy in this case centers on the election for State Senate Seat No. 16 in Brevard, Seminole, Orange and Osceola Counties.

One Republican and one Democrat have qualified for that office and are running unopposed. Their names will appear automatically on the general election ballot in November. Plaintiff, Lori Wilson, seeks election to that senate seat as an independent candidate. The Code provides that an independent candidate may be assigned a position on the general election ballot by submitting to the Supervisor of Elections in each county of the election district a petition bearing the signatures of 3% of the registered voters of that district.^[2]

On August 7, 1972, the plaintiff submitted her petition, bearing legally sufficient signatures, to the appropriate supervisors of elections. The supervisors have until September 12th to certify the petition to the Secretary of State. If satisfied that the statutory requirements have been met, the Secretary must notify the plaintiff who then has five days to qualify as a candidate.^[3] If the supervisors utilize the full statutory period before certifying her petition to the Secretary, the plaintiff will not be entitled to qualify as an independent candidate until after the 12th of September.

Meanwhile, plaintiff’s Democratic and Republican opponents are campaigning for the general election and have been [*229] doing so since July 25th. They are advertising their candidacies through the traditional media, the use of billboards, campaign literature, and handouts. Plaintiff contends that she is precluded from doing this, however, because she has not yet qualified as a “candidate.” The Code provides that a person, prior to becoming a candidate, may not “spend money and make any expenditure” for advertising.^[4]

The gist of plaintiff’s complaint is that the Florida Election Code invidiously discriminates against an independent candidate by giving party candidates, as in this case, a 49-day head start in their campaigns. Thus, plaintiff complains that this statutory scheme gives unconstitutionally unequal treatment to independent candidates, particularly, as is the ease here, when the party candidates are running unopposed in the primary. Those candidates are campaigning not for their party’s nomination, but for the general election, while the plaintiff is forced to wait until she attains the status of a “candidate.”^[5] Plaintiff argues, then, that four sections of the Election Code are unconstitutional: Florida Statutes §§ 97.021(18), 99.061(1), 99.-161 (2) (e), and 99.153, F.S.A. The plaintiff does not contend that any one of these sections is invalid on its face, but that the combined operation of the sections which requires the plaintiff to refrain from any campaigning amounts to an unconstitutional statutory scheme. Plaintiff would be satisfied, as brought out in argument, with any determination short of declaring all the sections invalid if she could just be permitted to campaign on an equal basis with the party candidates.^[6]

The State concedes that, under the plaintiff’s construction of the Code, she is at a serious disadvantage in her campaign and may well be denied equal protection. It suggests, however, that her remedy should be fashioned by the Florida courts and that we should abstain to permit them to do so.

Although vested with jurisdiction in a given case, a federal court may decline its exercise when the constitutional issue might be averted or settled by resort to the state forum. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). Abstention is indicated where, as here, alternative dispositions are available to the state court which would obviate a federal constitutional adjudication of the legislation under attack. As a matter of comity, it is desirable for the state tribunal to have the first opportunity to interpret a state statute. This is particularly true where a uni [*230] form state regulatory scheme, such as an election code, is involved. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943). The more intricate the statutory pattern, the greater the chance of frustration by premature federal intervention. Jackson v. Ogilvie, 401 U.S. 904, 91 S.Ct. 642, 27 L.Ed.2d 803 (1971); Flook v. Nearing, No. 72-345 Civ-J (M.D.Fla. June 30,1972).

The arguments in this case suggest several alternative dispositions available to the state courts^[7] which would make abstention appropriate here. The state courts may decide that Section 99.153 is wholly inapplicable in this situation and that the plaintiff is free to campaign without further delay. The applicability of the statutory definition of a “candidate” may also be subject to varying construction, as well as the election supervisors’ duties and the scope of their discretion in delaying certification of an independent candidate.

In addition to construing the Code so as to avoid any constitutional issue, the state court could, of course, agree with the plaintiff and declare the entire statutory scheme invalid'. That court could also take a narrow constitutional approach and consider only the issue of the application of the Code to the plaintiff on the facts of this case. Any one of these decisions by the state court would remedy the plaintiff’s complaint and render unnecessary the exercise of jurisdiction by a three-judge federal court. Moreover, the Florida courts should be permitted to interpret this election Code. It is extremely difficult to fashion a remedy which will avoid disrupting the entire regulatory scheme. The Florida courts, with their familiarity and expertise with the Code, are better suited to perform this task.

It is for these reasons that we abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction and dismiss the case.