(a) General. A public accommodation shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered.
(b) Safety. A public accommodation may impose legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation. Safety requirements must be based on actual risks and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.
(c) Charges. A public accommodation may not impose a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability or any group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids, barrier removal, alternatives to barrier removal, and reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, that are required to provide that individual or group with the nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act or this part.
Notes of Decisions
J.D. by Doherty v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 925 F.3d 663 (4th Cir. 2019).
· cites it 2× “And although “[a] public accommodation may impose legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation,” 28 C.F.R. § 36.301 (b), such requirements won’t inevitably override a reasonable modification request.”
Anderson v. Macy's, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 531 (W.D. Pa. 2013).
· cites it 4× “Count I — Alleged Improper Surcharge In Count I of her Amended Complaint, Anderson alleges that Macy’s stores acted discriminatorily in violation of 28 C.F.R. § 36.301 (c) by effectively imposing a “surcharge” on women’s plus-sized clothing items.”
Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2016).
· cites it 2× “3 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.301 (b)). In any event, we do not hold today that Octapharma must allow Levorsen to donate plasma.”
Anderson v. Franklin Inst., 185 F. Supp. 3d 628 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
· cites it 2× “” 28 C.F.R. § 36.301 (c). The above statutory requirements and definitions have been condensed by the case law into a three part test: “[t]o state a claim of disability discrimination under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff must show (1) discrimination on the basis of a…”
Hulett v. City of Syracuse, 253 F. Supp. 3d 462 (N.D.N.Y. 2017).
“28 C.F.R. § 36.301 (“Safety requirements must be based on actual risks and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.”
L.J.P. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts US, Inc., 900 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2018).
“(quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.301 (b) ). 15 Disney also argues that Title III of the ADA provides only a statutory discrimination claim for failure to make reasonable and necessary modifications, not a statutory claim for intentional or disparate-impact discrimination.”
Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012).
“” 28 C.F.R. § 36.301 (b). New technology presents risks as well as opportunities; we must not allow fear of the former to deprive us of the latter.”
Larsen v. Carnival Corp., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
· cites it 2× “35544, 35564 (July 26, 1991), codified at 28 C.F.R. § 36.301 (b); see also U.S. Department of Justice, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual, § III-4.”
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