C.F.R. » Title 29 » CHAPTER XIV—EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION › PART 1604—GUIDELINES ON DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX

29 C.F.R. § 1604.2

Sex as a bona fide occupational qualification

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(a) The commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Label—“Men's jobs” and “Women's jobs”—tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one sex or the other.

(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception:

(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of women in general. For example, the assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher than among men.

(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable of assembling intricate equipment: that women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship. The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group.

(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers except as covered specifically in paragraph (a)(2) of this section.

(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Commission will consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualification, e.g., an actor or actress.

(b) Effect of sex-oriented State employment legislation.

(1) Many States have enacted laws or promulgated administrative regulations with respect to the employment of females. Among these laws are those which prohibit or limit the employment of females, e.g., the employment of females in certain occupations, in jobs requiring the lifting or carrying of weights exceeding certain prescribed limits, during certain hours of the night, for more than a specified number of hours per day or per week, and for certain periods of time before and after childbirth. The Commission has found that such laws and regulations do not take into account the capacities, preferences, and abilities of individual females and, therefore, discriminate on the basis of sex. The Commission has concluded that such laws and regulations conflict with and are superseded by title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Accordingly, such laws will not be considered a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as a basis for the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception.

(2) The Commission has concluded that State laws and regulations which discriminate on the basis of sex with regard to the employment of minors are in conflict with and are superseded by title VII to the extent that such laws are more restrictive for one sex. Accordingly, restrictions on the employment of minors of one sex over and above those imposed on minors of the other sex will not be considered a defense to an otherwise established unlawful employment practice or as a basis for the application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception.

(3) A number of States require that minimum wage and premium pay for overtime be provided for female employees. An employer will be deemed to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice if:

(i) It refuses to hire or otherwise adversely affects the employment opportunities of female applicants or employees in order to avoid the payment of minimum wages or overtime pay required by State law; or

(ii) It does not provide the same benefits for male employees.

(4) As to other kinds of sex-oriented State employment laws, such as those requiring special rest and meal periods or physical facilities for women, provision of these benefits to one sex only will be a violation of title VII. An employer will be deemed to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice if:

(i) It refuses to hire or otherwise adversely affects the employment opportunities of female applicants or employees in order to avoid the provision of such benefits; or

(ii) It does not provide the same benefits for male employees. If the employer can prove that business necessity precludes providing these benefits to both men and women, then the State law is in conflict with and superseded by title VII as to this employer. In this situation, the employer shall not provide such benefits to members of either sex.

(5) Some States require that separate restrooms be provided for employees of each sex. An employer will be deemed to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice if it refuses to hire or otherwise adversely affects the employment opportunities of applicants or employees in order to avoid the provision of such restrooms for persons of that sex.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 55 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1972–2021 · leading case: Dothard v. Rawlinson
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Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977) scotus · cites it 2× “" 29 CFR § 1604.2 (a). It has adhered to that principle consistently, and its construction of the statute can accordingly be given weight.”
Molly Joll v. Valparaiso Community Schools (2020) ca7 “”); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 No. 18-3630 17 (“Such stereotypes include, for example, … that women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship.”
Shirley FERRILL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE PARKER GROUP, INC., Defendant-Appellant (1999) ca11 · cites it 2× “2d 786 (1977); EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (referring to BFOQ for gender), and is not available for racial discrimination.”
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. C.R. England, Inc. (2011) ca10 “29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (a)(l)(iii) (providing that the bona fide occupational qualification exception does not generally apply to "refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers”).”
Angeline OSTAPOWICZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHNSON BRONZE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant (1976) ca3 “§ 2000e-2(e)(l); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (bona fide occupational qualifications based on sex, but not race, are permissible), and precedents from one area may not be freely interchangeable with those of the other.”
Alan Willingham v. MacOn Telegraph Publishing Company (1975) ca5 · cites it 2× “The Commission’s regulations go a step further, assuming (we infer) that such codes are sexually discriminatory and asserting that “[t]he refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped (sic) characterizations of the sexes” does not warrant the application of the BFOQ…”
Norwood v. Dale Maintenance System, Inc. (1984) ilnd · cites it 2× “Nevertheless, the language of the bfoq exception is “compelling.” LeBeau v.”
Molesworth v. Brandon (1996) md “29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (a)(1)(iii) (1994); Diaz v.”
Anderson v. City and County of San Francisco (2014) ca9 “Code § 12940 (excepting discrimination “based upon a bona fide occupational qualification” from prohibition against employment discrimination).”
Delia L. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Company, a Corporation, and Wynn's International, Inc., a Corporation (1981) ca9 “29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (a)(2) (1972). Blake, supra, and Diaz, supra, held that customer preference based on sexual stereotype cannot justify discriminatory conduct.”
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co. (1981) txnd · cites it 2× “” See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (a) (1965). The agency Guidelines further stated that the BFOQ exception did not justify “the refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of .”
Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc. (1978) ded “In addition to this statutory exception, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued guidelines interpreting the bfoq exception as it relates to discrimination because of sex, at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 . Those guidelines state, in pertinent part: (a) The Commission…”
Show all 55 citing cases →
— 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) — 1 case
Stone v. Belgrade School District No. 44 (1985) mont
— 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1) — 1 case
Alan Willingham v. MacOn Telegraph Publishing Company (1975) ca5 “The Commission’s regulations go a step further, assuming (we infer) that such codes are sexually discriminatory and asserting that “[t]he refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped (sic) characterizations of the sexes” does not warrant the application of the BFOQ…”
— 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) — 2 cases
Long v. Sapp (1974) ca5
8 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1079, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9712 Pearl G. Long v. c.b.sapp, Jr., Etc. (1974) ca5
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