(a) Actions taken by an employer, or others, which adversely affect an employee may be predicated upon nondiscriminatory grounds. The proscriptions of section 11(c) apply when the adverse action occurs because the employee has engaged in protected activities. An employee's engagement in activities protected by the Act does not automatically render him immune from discharge or discipline for legitimate reasons, or from adverse action dictated by non-prohibited considerations. See, NLRB v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 128 F. 2d 201 (5th Cir., 1942).
(b) At the same time, to establish a violation of section 11(c), the employee's engagement in protected activity need not be the sole or primary consideration behind discharge or other adverse action. If the discharge or other adverse action would not have taken place “but for” engagement in protected activity, section 11(c) has been violated. See Bostock v. Clay County, Ga., 140 S Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). Ultimately, the issue as to whether a discharge or other adverse action was because of protected activity will have to be determined on the basis of the facts in the particular case.
[38 FR 2681, Jan. 29, 1973, as amended at 86 FR 49476, Sept. 3, 2021]
Notes of Decisions
Thomas Perez v. Ohio Bell Tel., 655 F. App'x 404 (6th Cir. 2016).
· cites it 4× “” 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6 . But discipline or discharge by an employer must be based on legitimate reasons alone.”
Kennard v. Louis Zimmer Commc'ns, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
· cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. § 1977.6 (a). But, an employer who discharges an employee for a combination of reasons is not protected if the employee’s protected activity was a substantial reason for the employer’s action or if the employer would not have acted “but for” the employee’s protected…”
Donovan v. Diplomat Envelope Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1417 (E.D.N.Y 1984).
“If protected activity was a substantial reason for the action, or if the discharge or pther adverse action would not have taken place “but for” engagement in protected activity, section 11(c) has been violated.”
Perez v. United States Postal Serv., 76 F. Supp. 3d 1168 (W.D. Wash. 2015).
“(3) The adverse actions taken against Williams were caused by his protected activities The Secretary has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Williams’ protected activities were a “substantial reason” for the aforementioned adverse actions.”
Gaffney, Michael P. v. Riverboat Serv IN, 451 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 2006).
“” 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6 (b). In such circumstances, as under § 2114, the ultimate question is whether the discharge or other adverse action would have “taken place ‘but for’ engagement in protected activity.”
Dole v. H.M.S. Direct Mail Serv., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 573 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
“” 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6 (b) Therefore, based on the above discussed statute and regulation, to prevail in this lawsuit plaintiff must prove the following four elements: A.”
Walsh v. Tara Constr., Inc. (D. Mass. 2023).
“§ 660 (c); see 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6 (b) (stating that Section 11(c) is violated if “adverse action would not have taken place ‘but for’ engagement in protected activity”).”
Su v. United States Postal Serv. (D. Or. 2024).
“Accordingly, the Court finds that the Secretary has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Hankins's protected activities were a "substantial reason" for the aforementioned adverse actions.”
Walsh v. United States Postal Serv. (W.D. Pa. 2022).
“See also 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6 (b) (“If the discharge or other adverse action would not have taken place ‘but for’ engagement in protected activity, section 11(c) has been violated.”
Marshall v. Dexter Corp., 487 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
“( 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6 (b)). Consequently, defendant’s discharge of Mrs.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6(b) — 2 cases
Donovan v. Diplomat Envelope Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1417 (E.D.N.Y 1984).
“If protected activity was a substantial reason for the action, or if the discharge or pther adverse action would not have taken place “but for” engagement in protected activity, section 11(c) has been violated.”
Kennard v. Louis Zimmer Commc'ns, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
“29 C.F.R. § 1977.6 (a). But, an employer who discharges an employee for a combination of reasons is not protected if the employee’s protected activity was a substantial reason for the employer’s action or if the employer would not have acted “but for” the employee’s protected…”
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