Ordinarily the following types of requirements may be considered reasonable, depending on the circumstances in which they are applied and the effect of their application:
(a) Period of prior membership. It would ordinarily be reasonable for a local union to require a candidate to have been a member of the organization for a reasonable period of time, not exceeding two years, before the election. However, if a member is involuntarily compelled to transfer from one local to another, such a requirement would not be reasonable if he is not given credit for his prior period of membership.
(b) Continuity of good standing. A requirement of continuous good standing based on punctual payment of dues will be considered a reasonable qualification only if (1) it provides a reasonable grace period during which members may make up missed payments without loss of eligibility for office,
24 and (2) the period of time involved is reasonable. What are reasonable periods of time for these purposes will depend upon the circumstances. Section 401(e) of the Act provides that a member whose dues have been withheld by the employer for payment to the labor organization pursuant to his voluntary authorization provided for in a collective bargaining agreement may not be declared ineligible to vote or be a candidate for office by reason of alleged delay or default in the payment of dues. If during the period allowed for payment of dues in order to remain in good standing, a member on a dues checkoff system has no earnings from which dues can be withheld, section 401(e) does not relieve the member of the responsibility of paying his dues in order to remain in good standing.
24 In Goldberg v. Amarillo General Drivers, Teamsters Local 577, 214 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Tex. 1963), the disqualification of five nominees for union office for failure to satisfy a constitutional provision requiring candidates for office to have maintained continuous good standing for two years by paying their dues on or before the first business day of the current month, in advance, was held to be unreasonable. See also Wirtz v. Local Unions No. 9, 9-A and 9-B, International Union of Operating Engineers, 254 F. Supp. 980 (D. Colo. 1965), aff'd. 366 F. 2d 911 (CA 10 1966), vacated as moot 387 U.S. 96 (1967).
Notes of Decisions
Murray v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 99 F. Supp. 3d 149 (D.D.C. 2015).
· cites it 3× “Grace Period Plaintiffs first invoke 29 C.F.R. § 452.37 (b), a regulation adopted by the Department of Labor in service of its obligation to enforce 29 U.”
Solis v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 763 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D.D.C. 2011).
“” 29 C.F.R. § 452.37 (b). Mr. Castellano attempted to make up missed payments in March 2005 by submitting a check covering the June 2002 to June 2003 payment period, but the AFGE dismisses this as irrelevant because the “payment of back dues may correct a member’s status and…”
Brock v. Int'l Org. of Masters, 842 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988).
· cites it 2× “” The district court declined to abide by the Secretary’s regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 452.37 (b), which states that “[a] requirement of continuous good standing based on punctual payment of dues will be considered a reasonable qualification only if (1) it provides a reasonable grace…”
Solis v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees (D.D.C. 2011).
“" 29 C.F.R. § 452.37 (b). Mr. Castellano attempted to make up missed payments in March 2005 by submitting a check covering the June 2002 to June 2003 payment period, but the AFGE dismisses this as irrelevant because the "payment of back dues may correct a member's status and…”
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