Inasmuch as it is an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) for any employer (including persons acting in that capacity) to dominate or interfere with the administration of any labor organization, it follows that employers, while they may be members, may not be candidates for office or serve as officers. Thus, while it is recognized that in some industries, particularly construction, members who become supervisors, or contractors traditionally keep their union membership as a form of job security or as a means of retaining union benefits, such persons may not be candidates for or hold office.
29 Whether a restriction on officeholding by members who are group leaders or others performing some supervisory duties is reasonable depends on the particular circumstances. For instance, if such persons might be considered “supervisors”
30 under the LMRA, their right to be candidates under the Act may be limited. Another factor in determining the reasonableness of a ban on such persons is the position (if any) of the NLRB on the status of the particular employees involved. If, for example, the NLRB has determined that certain group leaders are part of the bargaining unit, it might be unreasonable for the union to prohibit them from running for office. An overall consideration in determining whether a member may fairly be denied the right to be a candidate for union office as an employer or supervisor is whether there is a reasonable basis for assuming that the person involved would be subject to a conflict of interest in carrying out his representative duties for employees and rank and file union members.
29 See Nassau and Suffolk Contractors' Association, 118 NLRB No. 19 (1957). See also Local 636, Plumbers v. NLRB, 287 F.2d 354 (C.A. D.C. 1961).
30 Under section 2(11) of the Labor Management Relations Act, supervisors include individuals “having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.”
[38 FR 18324, July 3, 1973, as amended at 39 FR 37360, Oct. 21, 1974]
Notes of Decisions
Herman v. New York Metro Area Postal Union, 30 F. Supp. 2d 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
“”) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 452.47 (b)). 1. The LMRDA Requirement of Notice The specific challenge to Metro’s application of the deadline is that Metro did not provide adequate notice of the deadline before enforcing it against nominees.”
McLaughlin v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 680 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
· cites it 2× “See 29 C.F.R. section 452.47 (1987). This power, however, is subject to the limitation that a reasonable basis exist for believing that the person involved would be subject to a conflict of interest between those duties owed to management and those owed to the union membership.”
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