C.F.R. » Title 29 » CHAPTER V—WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR › SUBCHAPTER B—STATEMENTS OF GENERAL POLICY OR INTERPRETATION NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO REGULATIONS › PART 782—EXEMPTION FROM MAXIMUM HOURS PROVISIONS FOR CERTAIN EMPLOYEES OF MOTOR CARRIERS

29 C.F.R. § 782.1

Statutory provisions considered

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(a) Section 13(b)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides an exemption from the maximum hours and overtime requirements of section 7 of the act, but not from the minimum wage requirements of section 6. The exemption is applicable to any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, (part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 546, as amended; 49 U.S.C. 304, as amended by Pub. L. 89-670, section 8e which substituted “Secretary of Transportation” for “Interstate Commerce Commission”—Oct. 15, 1966) except that the exemption is not applicable to any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service solely by virtue of section 204(a)(3a) of part II of the Interstate Commerce Act. (Pub. L. 939, 84th Cong., second sess., Aug. 3, 1956, secs. 2 and 3) The Fair Labor Standards Act confers no authority on the Secretary of Labor or the Administrator to extend or restrict the scope of this exemption. It is settled by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that the applicability of the exemption to an employee otherwise entitled to the benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act is determined exclusively by the existence of the power conferred under section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to him. It is not material whether such qualifications and maximum hours of service have actually been established by the Secretary of Transportation; the controlling consideration is whether the employee comes within his power to do so. The exemption is not operative in the absence of such power, but an employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has such power is excluded, automatically, from the benefits of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. (Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44; Boutell v. Walling, 327 U.S. 463; Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649; Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695; Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422)

(b) Section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, provides that it shall be the duty of the Interstate Commerce Commission (now that of the Secretary of Transportation (see § 782.0(c))) to regulate common and contract carriers by motor vehicle as provided in that act, and that “to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to * * * qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment.” (Motor Carrier Act, sec. 204(a)(1)(2), 49 U.S.C. 304(a)(1)(2)) Section 204 further provides for the establishing of similar regulations with respect to private carriers of property by motor vehicle, if need therefor is found. (Motor Carrier Act, sec. 204(a)(3), 49 U.S.C. 304(a)(3))

(c) Other provisions of the Motor Carrier Act which have a bearing on the scope of section 204 include those which define common and contract carriers by motor vehicle, motor carriers, private carriers of property by motor vehicle (Motor Carrier Act, sec. 203(a) (14), (15), (16), (17), 49 U.S.C. sec. 303(a) (14), (15), (16), (17)) and motor vehicle (Motor Carrier Act, sec. 203(a)(13)); those which confer regulatory powers with respect to the transportation of passengers or property by motor carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce (Motor Carrier Act, sec. 202(a)), as defined in the Motor Carrier Act, sec. 203(a) (10), (11), and reserve to each State the exclusive exercise of the power of regulation of intrastate commerce by motor carriers on its highways (Motor Carrier Act, sec. 202(b)); and those which expressly make section 204 applicable to certain transportation in interstate or foreign commerce which is in other respects excluded from regulation under the act. (Motor Carrier Act, sec. 202(c))

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 18 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: Donald Allen v. Coil Tubing Servs., L.L.C, 755 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2014).
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Donald Allen v. Coil Tubing Servs., L.L.C, 755 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2014). · cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. § 782.1 (a) (“The Fair Labor Standards Act confers no authority on the Secretary of Labor or the Administrator to extend or restrict the scope of this exemption.”
Dole v. Solid Waste Servs., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1989). · cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. § 782.1 . Such employees, however, are not exempted from the minimum wage provisions, section 6, of the Act.”
Badgett v. Rent-Way, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 642 (W.D. Pa. 2004). · cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. § 782.1 (2004). Nevertheless, Renb-Way has moved for summary judgment on this claim as well, arguing that, at all times, it complied with the minimum wage requirement.”
Williams v. Cent. Transp. Int'l, Inc., 830 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2016). “See 29 C.F.R. § 782.1 (a). Accordingly, we give no weight or deference to the DOL’s regulation purporting to define who is an exempt loader.”
Abelardo Baez, Angel Baez v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., a Corp. Doing Bus. in the State of Florida, 938 F.2d 180 (11th Cir. 1991). “See 29 C.F.R. § 782.1 (b); Brennan v. Schwerman Trucking Co.”
Finn v. Dean Transp., Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1043 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). “that the applicability of the exemption to an employee otherwise entitled to the benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act is determined exclusively by the existence of the power conferred under section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act to establish qualifications and maximum hours of…”
Webb v. Athens Newspapers, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 1464 (M.D. Ga. 1998). “” 3 29 C.F.R. § 782.1 (a). The Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”) extends the power of the Secretary of Transportation to “motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce.”
Smith v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.W. Va 1995). “As stated therein, “The power of the Secretary of Transportation to establish maximum hours and qualifications of service of employees, on which exemption depends, extends to those classes of employees and those only who: (1) Are employed by carriers whose transportation of…”
Bowe v. SMC Elec. Prods., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1996). “SMC cites the language of the pertinent regulation: The exemption is applicable to any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor Carrier…”
Billingslea v. S. Freight, Inc., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2010). “” 29 C.F.R. § 782.1 (a). 7 . See also Fletcher v.”
Tomlin v. JCS Enter., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2014). “1991) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 782.1 (b) and holding that the issuance of the permit by the Secretary indicates that jurisdiction under the MCA has already been exercised).”
Mazzarella v. Fast Rig Support, LLC, 115 F. Supp. 3d 500 (M.D. Penn. 2015). “Further, no DOT certificate for defendant FAST was mentioned.”
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