40 C.F.R. § 201.10

Applicability

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The provisions of this subpart apply to all rail cars and all locomotives, except steam locomotives, operated or controlled by carriers as defined in subpart A of this part, except that § 201.11 (a), (b), and (c) do not apply to gas turbine-powered locomotives and to any locomotive type which cannot be connected by any standard method to a load cell. They apply to the total sound level emitted by rail cars and locomotives operated under the conditions specified, including the sound produced by refrigeration and air conditioning units which are an integral element of such equipment. The provisions of this subpart apply to all active retarders, all car coupling operations, all switcher locomotives, and all load cell test stands. These provisions do not apply to the sound emitted by a warning device, such as a horn, whistle or bell when operated for the purpose of safety. They do not apply to special purpose equipment which may be located on or operated from railcars; they do not apply to street, suburban or interurban electric railways unless operated as a part of a general railroad system of transportation. When land use changes after the publication date of this regulation from some other use to residential or commercial land use around a specific railyard facility, this regulation will become effective four (4) years from the date of that land use change.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3 cases, 1991–2020 · leading case: Civil City of South Bend, Ind. v. Conrail, 880 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
Civil City of South Bend, Ind. v. Conrail, 880 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ind. 1995). “3 (b)(3) (1993); 40 C.F.R. § 201.10 (1994). The court cannot agree.”
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. City of Hapeville, 779 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Ga. 1991). “40 C.F.R. § 201.10 . Defendant contends that § 11-1-30 governs only when train whistles and horns may be used, rather than how loud such devices may be, and therefore that the ordinance does not conflict with EPA regulations.”
The Belt Ry. Co. of Chicago v. Weglarz Hotel III, L.L.C. (N.D. Ill. 2020). “; 40 C.F.R. § 201.10 et seq. The NCA also contains its own preemption provision, which states: [N]o State or political subdivision thereof may adopt or enforce any standard applicable to noise emissions from the operation of [any equipment or facility of a surface carrier…”
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