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C.F.R.Title 42Chapter I—Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human ServicesSubchapter A—General ProvisionsPart 2—Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient RecordsSubpart E—Court Orders Authorizing Use and Disclosure

42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (2026)

Confidential communications

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 1985–2025 46citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 46 opinions since 1985, 4 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(3) (3 cases).

(a) A court order under the regulations in this part may authorize disclosure of confidential communications made by a patient to a part 2 program in the course of diagnosis, treatment, or referral for treatment only if:

(1) The disclosure is necessary to protect against an existing threat to life or of serious bodily injury, including circumstances which constitute suspected child abuse and neglect and verbal threats against third parties;

(2) The disclosure is necessary in connection with investigation or prosecution of an extremely serious crime, such as one which directly threatens loss of life or serious bodily injury, including homicide, rape, kidnapping, armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, or child abuse and neglect; or

(3) The disclosure is in connection with a civil, criminal, administrative, or legislative proceeding in which the patient offers testimony or other evidence pertaining to the content of the confidential communications.

(b) [Reserved]

[82 FR 6115, Jan. 18, 2017, as amended at 85 FR 80632, Dec. 14, 2020; 89 FR 12629, Feb. 16, 2024]
The 20 cases that cite 42 C.F.R. § 2.63 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENIn re Adoption (&, 102 N.E.3d 1018 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 2.63 3×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“See 42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (1975). After the decision in Whyte , the regulation was amended to allow for the court-ordered disclosure of "confidential communications" as well.”
The case’s holding
A parent's willingness to ignore or minimize abusive behavior can be an indicator of unfitness, regardless of whether the child is at risk of abuse or witnessing abuse.
Later courts cite it for
“a parent's willingness to ignore or minimize abusive behavior can be an indicator of unfitness, regardless of whether the child is at risk of abuse or witnessing abuse” · 7 citing courts
2
GREENAdoption of Virgil., 102 N.E.3d 1009 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 2.63 2×cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“8 Title 42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (1987) provides in relevant part: "(a) A court order under these regulations may authorize the disclosure of confidential communications made by a patient to a .”
Later courts cite it for
“must also find that the current parental unfitness is not a temporary condition.” · 13 citing courts
3
GREENIn re Marvin M., 711 A.2d 756 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 2.63 5×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“1995) (concluding that 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.63 and 2.64 should be read together).”
Later courts cite it for
“personal rehabilitation as used in the statute refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent. . . . section 17a-112 requires the trial court to analyze the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENIn re Romance M., 622 A.2d 1047 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
cites § 2.63 2×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“The trial court determined that there was good cause for disclosure of the treatment information and that it was highly relevant to the issue of the respondent’s mental health, an issue that the respondent herself raised when she testified that she was capable of responsibly…”
The case’s holding
A trial court may admit confidential alcohol and drug treatment records in a termination of parental rights proceeding if the disclosure is necessary to protect against child abuse and neglect.
Later courts cite it for
“necessary to protect against . . . child abuse and neglect.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENPeople ex rel. Denver Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. R.D.H., 944 P.2d 660 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 2.63 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“The counselor’s testimony falls under 42 C.F.R. § 2.63 , which governs the disclosure of confidential communications.”
6
GREENIn re B.S., 659 A.2d 1137 (Vt. 1995).
cites § 2.63 2×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“” 42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (a). These restrictions apply both to confidential communications found in the CDAS records on appellant, as well as confidential communications to which the CDAS counselor might testify.”
7
GREENFannon v. Johnston, 88 F. Supp. 2d 753 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
cites § 2.63 3×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (a)(3). Therefore, if the information sought contains “confidential communications,” plaintiff must satisfy both the “good cause” requirements of § 290dd-2(b)(2)(C) and the requirements of Subdivision (a)(3).”
8
GREENPeople v. Jimenez, 217 P.3d 841 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 2.63 1×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“Legality of the Court's Disclosure Order Defendant contends that even if some or all of the information in question fell within the exception for reports of incidents of suspected child abuse, the district court erred in ordering that it should be disclosed to and could be used…”
The case’s holding
A court need not reverse a conviction for a verdict-form error omitting a lesser-included offense where the jurors were polled and each affirmatively indicated agreement with the guilty verdict.
Later courts cite it for
“under the circumstances, these brief, isolated statements, even if erroneously admitted, did not affect defendant's substantial rights.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENUnited States ex rel. Janet Chandler v. Cook Cnty., 277 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2002).
cites § 2.63 1×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (a). Because none of those conditions apply here, any confidential communications must be redacted before Dr.”
The case’s holding
Counties and other municipal political subdivisions are persons subject to False Claims Act qui tam liability, and their common-law immunity from punitive damages does not bar FCA treble damages.
Later courts cite it for
“cut the other way for municipalities” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENJANE H. v. Rothe, 488 N.W.2d 879 (N.D. 1992).
cites § 2.63 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“42 CFR § 2.63 (a)(3). Under this specific regulation, “confidential communications made by a patient” while seeking and receiving drug abuse treatment cannot be disclosed even though the court has found “good cause” for disclosure of other information in the patient’s records,…”
Later courts cite it for
“exercise of our original, supervisory jurisdiction is discretionary with this court, and that jurisdiction is exercised rarely and cautiously.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENBowling v. State, 717 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. 2011).
cites § 2.63 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“” 42 CFR § 2.63 (a) (2). Bowling’s reliance on Georgia statutes is equally unavailing.”
Later courts cite it for
“confronted with an immediate need to locate a gun that the suspect recently possessed” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENUnited States v. Ray L. Corona, 849 F.2d 562 (11th Cir. 1988).
cites § 2.63 1×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“The trial court limited the number of pages disclosed in compliance with 42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (a) which, as of October 1986, required that disclosure be limited to objective data.”
The case’s holding
Federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit recognize no physician or psychotherapist-patient privilege in federal criminal trials, and drug treatment records may be disclosed upon adequate good cause findings.
13
REDLile v. McKune, 224 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2000).
cites § 2.63 1×cited by 33 cases
Reversed by McKune v. Lile (2002): the U.S. Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 2.63
“at 116-18, 253; 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.63 (a)(2), 2.65 (authorizing disclosure of confidential communications and patient records for criminal investigation or prosecution of patient); see also Lile, 24 F.”
The case’s holding
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is violated when a state imposes substantial penalties for an individual's refusal to provide potentially incriminating testimony.
Later courts cite it for
“exactly the same as those 'punishments' automatically imposed upon a prisoner for termination from a work assignment for cause, offenses for which felony charges are filed by a state prosecutor, or disciplinary convictions for offenses such as theft, drunkenness, use of narcotics, sodomy, riot, arson, assault, sexual activity, a relationship with staff, and possession of contraband.” · 1 citing court
14
GREENMosier v. Am. Home Patient, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
cites § 2.63 1×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (a). The privilege should not be “lightly abrogated.”
15
GREENIn re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
cites § 2.63 3×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“Prior to an amendment in 1987, the regulations explicitly denominated this latter category as “objective data,” consisting of all information regarding a patient’s treatment in a program except “communications by a patient to personnel of the program_” 42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (a)…”
cites § 2.63 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (a)(3). Unfortunately for Certified, courts addressing the issue have determined that the mere fact that someone has filed a lawsuit and has put certain facts in issue does not constitute the requisite offering of testimony or evidence under 42 C.”
Later courts cite it for
“courts addressing the issue have determined that the mere fact that someone has filed a lawsuit and has put certain facts at issue does not constitute the requisite offering of testimony or evidence under 42 c.f.r. 2.63 (a)(3).” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENSkakel v. Benedict, 738 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
cites § 2.63 1×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“Although the plaintiff claims that the trial court should have applied the regulations that were in effect when he received treatment, he briefed and analyzed only 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.63 and 2.65. We therefore limit our review to these two regulations.”
18
GREENSpangler v. Olchowski, 654 S.E.2d 507 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 2.63 1×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (a)(3) (2005). Second, there is “good cause” for disclosure, which requires a finding that: “(1) Other ways of obtaining the information are not available or would not be effective; and (2) The public interest and need for the disclosure outweigh the potential…”
The case’s holding
A patient impliedly waives the patient-physician privilege regarding substance abuse treatment records by placing their mental health at issue through a claim for emotional distress.
Later courts cite it for
“in the sound discretion of the trial court.” · 1 citing court
19
NO FLAGUnited States v. Smith, 789 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1986).
cites § 2.63 1×cited by 102 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“Records can be disclosed only if they contain objective data unless they fall within the exception in 42 C.F.R. § 2.63 (1985) which provides that, “[w]hen a patient in litigation offers testimony or other evidence pertaining to the content of his communications with the…”
20
GREENIn re Maximo M., 186 Misc. 2d 266 (N.Y.C. Fam. Ct. 2000).
cites § 2.63 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 2.63
“(42 CFR 2.63 [a] [1], [2] .)* *** 5 Good cause for disclosure has been found under the Federal statutory standards in the context of a child protective proceeding.”
Later courts cite it for
“good cause for disclosure has been found under the federal statutory standards in the context of a child protective proceeding” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198520052025

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 2000. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.3N.D. Ill.3Mass. App. Ct.3Colo. Ct. App.2Mich. Ct. App.2Vt.2Ala.1Ala. Civ. App.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 37 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)2 cases
In re A., No. 09-06-00471-CV (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 28, 2006).
(a)(1)2 cases
In re Quintana Minors, No. 366579 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2024).
(a)(3)3 cases
Nelson v. Labor Finders, 897 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
In re Petition of Attorney Gen. for Subpoenas, No. 342680 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2019).

Show all 46 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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