A person at any time may file a petition to reopen any administratively final action of the Board pursuant to the requirements of § 1115.3 (c) and (d) of this part. A petition to reopen must state in detail the respects in which the proceeding involves material error, new evidence, or substantially changed circumstances and must include a request that the Board make such a determination.
[61 FR 52714, Oct. 8, 1996]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
18
cases, 1984–2018 · leading case:
Rosler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 241 (Vet. App. 1991).
Rosler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 241 (Vet. App. 1991).
“See also 49 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1986) (“person at any time may file a petition to reopen any administratively final action of the Commission”); but cf.”
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Interstate Com. Comm'n United States, 43 F.3d 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
· cites it 3× “§ 10327 (g)(1) (1988) (Commission may reconsider action on basis of “substantially changed circumstances”); 49 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1993) (permitting a petition to reopen “any administratively final action of the.”
Jack O. Black v. Interstate Com. Comm'n & United States, 762 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
“49 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1984). Second, without ruling as to whether the Commission was or was not correct in invoking the “revocation” provision in § 10505(d), it plainly appears from the Commission’s decision on reconsideration that the Commission fully addressed all of UTU’s…”
City of South Bend v. Surface Transp. Bd., 566 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
“How long “a reasonable period of time” may be in this context we leave to the Board to decide in the first instance. The petitioners also challenge as arbitrary and capricious the Board’s order denying their petition, based upon new evidence, to reopen the proceeding pursuant to…”
Vill. of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., 892 F.3d 252 (7th Cir. 2018).
“§ 1322 (c) ; see also 49 C.F.R. § 1115.4 . Notably, regardless of the avenue pursued, the alleged grounds must be sufficient to lead the Board to materially alter its prior decision.”
Town of Springfield v. Surface Transp. Bd., 412 F.3d 187 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
“” 49 C.F.R. § 1115.4 . The municipalities say they satisfied the reopening regulation because Union County first passed a resolution stating that the final stages of the railway rehabilitation would not occur without the municipalities’ approval and then passed a second…”
W. Coal Traffic League v. Surface Transp. Bd., 264 F. App'x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
· cites it 2× “§ 722 (c) and 49 C.F.R. § 1115.4 . These provisions make it clear that any interested party may petition the Board to reconsider an action such as the one here in dispute, and Government counsel conceded as much during oral argument.”
Cartersville Elevator, Inc. v. Interstate Com. Comm'n, 724 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1984).
“The two methods of administrative appeal from an ICC decision are petitions to reopen administratively final actions, 49 C.F.R. § 1115.4 , § 1152.25(e)(6) (1982), and discretionary appeals, id.”
Schneider Nat'l, Inc. v. Interstate Com. Comm'n, 948 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1991).
“Consequently, we think that Schneider’s petition is more properly understood to be a petition under 49 C.F.R. § 1115.4 (1990). Section 1115.4 allows a person to petition to reopen an administratively final order at any time pursuant to the requirements set out in 49 C.”
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