Mason v. Celina Mut. Ins. Co., 423 P.2d 24 (Colo. 1967). · Go Syfert
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Mason v. Celina Mut. Ins. Co., 423 P.2d 24 (Colo. 1967). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the vehicle was parked at the time, the engine was not in operation and no part of body struck the vehicle to occasion the discharge of the firearm.”
181 citation events (35 in the last 25 years) across 25 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: v. Bristol West Insurance (coloctapp, 2020-07-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1968 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1968 1997 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) HUNT
E.D. Pa. · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the vehicle was parked at the time, the engine was not in operation and no part of body struck the vehicle to occasion the discharge of the firearm.
cited Cited as authority (rule) v. Bristol West Insurance
Colo. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Co., 161 Colo. 442, 444 , 423 P.2d 24, 25 (1967); see also Roque v. Allstate Ins.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Haygood v. USAA
N.M. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Co., 423 P.2d 24, 25 (Colo. 1967) (en banc) (concluding sitting in car did not meet use requirement); Chock v. Gov’t Emp.’s Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Kastner (2×)
Colo. · 2003 · confidence medium
Co., 161 Colo. 442, 444 , 423 P.2d 24, 25 (Colo.1967) (quoting 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4317). [2] While the parties to an insurance contract may certainly contract for coverage beyond that required by law, Kastner and State Farm did not do so, and Kastner's policy does not define or expand upon "use." Accordingly, we apply the basic rules of insurance contract interpretation.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. McMichael (4×)
Colo. · 1995 · confidence medium
Co., 161 Colo. 442, 444 , 423 P.2d 24, 25 (1967).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cung La v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. (2×)
Colo. · 1992 · confidence medium
We held that: Even though in a technical sense it might be argued that [the boy who accidentally fired the gun] was using the vehicle at the time the shot was fired, for he was sitting in it, such a use, however, is not the type of use contemplated by the policy in question where the injury would have to be, one originating from the use of the vehicle as such. 161 Colo. at 444 , 423 P.2d at 25 (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona v. Till
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Co., 161 Colo. 442 , 423 P.2d 24, 25 (1967), quoting 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4317, at 146. 2 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Criterion Insurance Co. v. Velthouse
Alaska · 1988 · confidence medium
See, also, Brenner, 445 P.2d 474, 478 (no coverage where on return from hunting trip, gun discharged when passenger in front seat played with gun and pointed it at passenger in rear seat); Mason v. Celina Mutual Insurance, 161 Colo. 442 , 423 P.2d 24, 25 (1967) (no coverage where, after target practice, gun discharged when passenger sitting in parked car played with gun); Boyer, 269 N.W.2d at 15 (no coverage where after leaving bar, passenger sitting in parked car accidentally discharged gun wounding entering passenger).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Criterion Insurance Co. v. Velthouse
Alaska · 1986 · confidence medium
See, also, Brenner, 445 P.2d 474, 478 (no coverage where on return from hunting trip, gun discharged when passenger in front seat played with gun and pointed it at passenger in rear seat); Mason v. Celina Mutual Insurance, 161 Colo. 442 , 423 P.2d 24, 25 (1967) (no coverage where, after target practice, gun discharged when passenger sitting in parked car played with gun); Boyer, 269 N.W.2d at 15 (no coverage where after leaving bar, passenger sitting in parked car accidentally discharged gun wounding entering passenger).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kangas v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
Mich. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
In Mason v Celina Mutual Insurance Co, 161 Colo *14 442; 423 P2d 24, 25 (1967), four high school students had driven to the high school to target practice with firearms.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Norgaard v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Company
N.D. · 1972 · confidence medium
Mason v. Celina Mutual Insurance Company, 161 Colo. 442 , 423 P.2d 24, at 25 (1967).
examined Cited "see" Sanchez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (4×)
Colo. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mason v. Celina Mutual Insurance Co., 161 Colo. 442 , 423 P.2d 24 (1967).
examined Cited "see" Dairyland Insurance v. Drum (4×)
Colo. · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mason v. Celina Mutual Insurance Co., 161 Colo. 442 , 423 P.2d 24 (1967).
discussed Cited "see" Raines v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (2×)
N.C. Ct. App. · 1970 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mason v. Celina Mutual, 161 Colo. 442 , 423 P. 2d 24 (1967); National Union Fire Ins.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Bredemeier v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (4×)
Colo. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Mason v. Celina Mutual Insurance Co., 161 Colo. 442 , 423 P.2d 24 (1967) (death occurring from discharge of pistol while three youths were toying with the weapon in insured's vehicle did not arise out of a covered use of vehicle).
Donald R. Mason
v.
the Celina Mutual Insurance Company
21065.
Supreme Court of Colorado.
Jan 23, 1967.
423 P.2d 24
Yegge, Hall and Shulenburg, Charles W. Johnson, for plaintiff in error., Houtchens, Houtchens and Dooley, for defendant in error.
Sutton.
Cited by 68 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 77%
Citer courts: E.D. Pennsylvania (1)
Mr. Justice Sutton

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a third party action against Celina, an insurance company, on its liability policy which had insured the automobile of one Weathers.

It appears that Weathers’ son Ricky, who was also a named insured, had driven Donald R. Mason, Francis Zimmerman and two other youths from the Greeley High School to target practice with some firearms. On returning to the school, Weathers parked the vehicle and went back to class with one of the boys. The other three youths remained in the automobile with Ricky’s consent. Francis moved into the driver’s seat with Donald on his right and the third person in the rear seat. While Donald was toying with a pistol, it accidentally discharged killing Francis. The vehicle was parked at the time, the engine was not in operation and no part of Donald’s body struck the vehicle to occasion the discharge of the firearm. Fred J. Zimmerman, father of Francis, thereafter sued Donald Mason for the alleged wrongful death of his son. Mason then brought in Celina as a third party defendant contending that he was protected by Weathers’ car insurance policy.

The sole question on this writ of error is whether an insurance policy provision that reads in pertinent part that it will pay on behalf of the insured sums he is legally obligated to pay as damages because of death sustained by any person “caused by accident and arising out of the * * * use of the automobile” affords coverage to the guest of a named insured under the facts presented. The trial court held it did not, and we agree.

[*444] Assuming, arguendo, that Mason comes within the definition of an insured and also that he was permissively “using” the insured vehicle at the time of the tragedy, nevertheless, in our view the accident did not arise out of a covered use of the automobile. Here no causal connection between the discharge of the pistol and the stopped vehicle was shown, as is required to afford coverage under such a policy. See Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 150. Even though in a technical sense it might be argued that Donald was using the vehicle at the time the shot was fired, for he was sitting in it, such a use, however, is not the type of use contemplated by the policy-in question where the injury would have to be one originating . from the use of the vehicle as such. 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4317, at 144. In Appleman at page 146, it is stated that: “1. The accident must have arisen out of the inherent nature of the automobile, as such” in order to bring one within the terms of such a policy.

The judgment is affirmed.