Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106 (2026)

Vehicular homicide

✓ current as of July 2026 Cite as: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106 (2026)
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(1) (a) If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, such person commits vehicular homicide. (b) (I) If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of both alcohol and one or more drugs, and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, such person commits vehicular homicide. This is a strict liability crime. (I.5) If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle while the person's ability is impaired by alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of both alcohol and one or more drugs, and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, the person commits the crime of vehicular homicide. (II) For the purposes of this subsection (1), one or more drugs means any drug, as defined in section 27-80-203 (13), C.R.S., any controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18- 102 (5), and any inhaled glue, aerosol, or other toxic vapor or vapors, as defined in section 18- 18-412. (III) The fact that any person charged with a violation of this subsection (1) is or has been entitled to use one or more drugs under the laws of this state shall not constitute a defense against any charge of violating this subsection (1). (IV) "Driving under the influence" means driving a vehicle when a person has consumed alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of alcohol and one or more drugs, which alcohol alone, or one or more drugs alone, or alcohol combined with one or more drugs affect such person to a degree that such person is substantially incapable, either mentally or physically, or both mentally and physically, of exercising clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the safe operation of a vehicle. (V) "Driving while ability impaired" means driving a motor vehicle or vehicle when a person has consumed alcohol or one or more drugs, or a combination of both alcohol or one or more drugs, that affects the person to the slightest degree so that the person is less able than the person ordinarily would have been, either mentally or physically, or both mentally and physically, to exercise clear judgment, sufficient physical control, or due care in the safe operation of a motor vehicle or vehicle. (c) Vehicular homicide, in violation of subsection (1)(b)(I.5) of this section, is a class 4 felony. Vehicular homicide, in violation of subsection (1)(a) of this section, is a class 4 felony. Vehicular homicide, in violation of subsection (1)(b)(I) of this section, is a class 3 felony. (2) In any prosecution for a violation of subsection (1) of this section, the amount of alcohol in the defendant's blood or breath at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, or within a reasonable time thereafter, as shown by analysis of the defendant's blood or breath, gives rise to the following: (a) If there was at such time 0.05 or less grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of blood, or if there was at such time 0.05 or less grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath, it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of alcohol. (b) If there was at such time in excess of 0.05 but less than 0.08 grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of blood, or if there was at such time in excess of 0.05 but less than 0.08 grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath, such fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining whether or not the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. (c) If there was at such time 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of blood, or if there was at such time 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath, such fact gives rise to the permissible inference that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. (d) If at such time the driver's blood contained five nanograms or more of delta 9- tetrahydrocannabinol per milliliter in whole blood, as shown by analysis of the defendant's blood, such fact gives rise to a permissible inference that the defendant was under the influence of one or more drugs. (3) The limitations of subsection (2) of this section shall not be construed as limiting the introduction, reception, or consideration of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether or not the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. (4) (a) If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that any person was driving a motor vehicle in violation of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section, the person, upon the request of the law enforcement officer, shall take, and complete, and cooperate in the completing of any test or tests of the person's blood, breath, saliva, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content within his or her system. The type of test or tests shall be determined by the law enforcement officer requiring the test or tests. If the person refuses to take, or to complete, or to cooperate in the completing of any test or tests, the test or tests may be performed at the direction of a law enforcement officer having probable cause, without the person's authorization or consent. If any person refuses to take or complete, or cooperate in the taking or completing of any test or tests required by this paragraph (a), the person shall be subject to license revocation pursuant to the provisions of section 42-2-126 (3), C.R.S. When the test or tests show that the amount of alcohol in a person's blood was in violation of the limits provided for in section 42-2-126 (3)(a), (3)(b), (3)(d), or (3)(e), C.R.S., the person shall be subject to license revocation pursuant to the provisions of section 42-2-126, C.R.S. (b) Any person who is required to submit to testing shall cooperate with the person authorized to obtain specimens of his blood, breath, saliva, or urine, including the signing of any release or consent forms required by any person, hospital, clinic, or association authorized to obtain such specimens. If such person does not cooperate with the person, hospital, clinic, or association authorized to obtain such specimens, including the signing of any release or consent forms, such noncooperation shall be considered a refusal to submit to testing. (c) The tests shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer having probable cause to believe that the person committed a violation of subparagraph (I) of paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the state board of health concerning the health of the person being tested and the accuracy of such testing. Strict compliance with such rules and regulations shall not be a prerequisite to the admissibility of test results at trial unless the court finds that the extent of noncompliance with a board of health rule has so impaired the validity and reliability of the testing method and the test results as to render the evidence inadmissible. In all other circumstances, failure to strictly comply with such rules and regulations shall only be considered in the weight to be given to the test results and not to the admissibility of such test results. It shall not be a prerequisite to the admissibility of test results at trial that the prosecution present testimony concerning the composition of any kit used to obtain blood, urine, saliva, or breath specimens. A sufficient evidentiary foundation concerning the compliance of such kits with the rules and regulations of the department of public health and environment shall be established by the introduction of a copy of the manufacturer's or supplier's certificate of compliance with such rules and regulations if such certificate specifies the contents, sterility, chemical makeup, and amounts of chemicals contained in such kit. (d) No person except a physician, a registered nurse, an emergency medical service provider certified or licensed under part 2 of article 3.5 of title 25 who is authorized within his or her scope of practice to draw blood, or a person whose normal duties include withdrawing blood samples under the supervision of a physician or registered nurse may withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol or drug content of the blood for purposes of this section. In a trial for a violation of subsection (1)(b) of this section, testimony of a law enforcement officer that the officer witnessed the taking of a blood specimen by a person who the officer reasonably believed was authorized to withdraw blood specimens is sufficient evidence that the person was authorized, and testimony from the person who obtained the blood specimens concerning the person's authorization to obtain blood specimens is not a prerequisite to the admissibility of test results concerning the blood specimens obtained. Civil liability does not attach to any person authorized to obtain blood, breath, saliva, or urine specimens or to any hospital, clinic, or association in or for which the specimens are obtained pursuant to this subsection (4) as a result of the act of obtaining the specimens from a person if the specimens were obtained according to the rules prescribed by the state board of health; except that this subsection (4)(d) does not relieve the person from liability for negligence in obtaining any specimen sample. (e) Any person who is dead or unconscious shall be tested to determine the alcohol or drug content of his blood or any drug content of his system as provided in this subsection (4). If a test cannot be administered to a person who is unconscious, hospitalized, or undergoing medical treatment because the test would endanger the person's life or health, the law enforcement agency shall be allowed to test any blood, urine, or saliva which was obtained and not utilized by a health-care provider and shall have access to that portion of the analysis and results of any tests administered by such provider which shows the alcohol or drug content of the person's blood or any drug content within his system. Such test results shall not be considered privileged communications and the provisions of section 13-90-107, C.R.S., relating to the physician-patient privilege shall not apply. Any person who is dead, in addition to the tests prescribed, shall also have his blood checked for carbon monoxide content and for the presence of drugs, as prescribed by the department of public health and environment. Such information obtained shall be made a part of the accident report. (f) If a person refuses to take, or to complete, or to cooperate in the completing of any test or tests as provided in this subsection (4) and such person subsequently stands trial for a violation of subsection (1)(b) of this section, the refusal to take or to complete, or to cooperate with the completing of any test or tests shall be admissible into evidence at the trial, and a person may not claim the privilege against self-incrimination with regard to the admission of his refusal to take, or to complete, or to cooperate with the completing of any test or tests. (g) Notwithstanding any provision in section 42-4-1301.1, C.R.S., concerning requirements which relate to the manner in which tests are administered, the test or tests taken pursuant to the provisions of this section may be used for the purposes of driver's license revocation proceedings under section 42-2-126, C.R.S., and for the purposes of prosecutions for violations of section 42-4-1301 (1) or (2), C.R.S. (5) In all actions, suits, and judicial proceedings in any court of this state concerning alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offenses, the court shall take judicial notice of methods of testing a person's alcohol or drug level and of the design and operation of devices, as certified by the department of public health and environment, for testing a person's blood, breath, saliva, or urine to determine his alcohol or drug level. This subsection (5) shall not prevent the necessity of establishing during a trial that the testing devices used were working properly and that such testing devices were properly operated. Nothing in this subsection (5) shall preclude a defendant from offering evidence concerning the accuracy of testing devices.

Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 419, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-3-106. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 624, § 1, effective June 26. L. 77: (1) R&RE, p. 960, § 8, effective July 1. L. 81: (1)(b) amended, p. 1992, § 4, effective June 19. L. 83: (4) added, p. 1648, § 17, effective July 1. L. 88: IP(2) amended, p. 1365, § 5, effective July 1. L. 89: (1)(b), (2), and (3) amended, (4) R&RE, and (5) added, pp. 893, 894, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 93: (1) amended, p. 1986, § 14, effective July 1; (1)(b)(II) amended, p. 1731, § 13, effective July 1. L. 94: (4)(c), (4)(e), and (5) amended, p. 2733, § 356, effective July 1; (4)(a) and (4)(g) amended, p. 2551, § 40, effective January 1, 1995. L. 97: (4)(a) amended, p. 1470, § 18, effective July 1. L. 2002: (4)(g) amended, p. 1915, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2004: (2)(b) and (2)(c) amended, p. 781, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2008: (4)(a) amended, p. 243, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2012: (1)(b)(II) amended, (HB 12-1311), ch. 281, p. 1618, § 38, effective July 1; (4)(d) amended, (HB 12-1059), ch. 271, p. 1434, § 12, effective July 1. L. 2013: (1)(b)(II), IP(2), and (2)(c) amended and (2)(d) added, (HB 13-1325), ch. 331, p. 1878, § 2, effective May 28. L. 2019: (4)(d) amended, (SB 19-242), ch. 396, p. 3526, § 10, effective May 31. L. 2021: (1)(b)(I.5) and (1)(b)(V) added and (1)(c) amended, (SB 21- 271), ch. 462, p. 3172, § 193, effective March 1, 2022. Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (1) in House Bill 93-1302 and House Bill 93- 1088 were harmonized.

Cross references: (1) For penalties for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, see § 42-4-1301. (2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending subsections (4)(c), (4)(e), and (5), see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994.

18-3-107. First degree murder of a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider - legislative declaration. (1) A person who commits murder in the first degree, as defined in section 18-3-102, and the victim is a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider, engaged in the performance of his or her duties, commits the felony crime of first degree murder of a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider. (2) As used in this section, "peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider engaged in the performance of his or her duties" means a peace officer, as described in section 16-2.5-101, a firefighter, as defined in section 18-3-201 (1.5), or an emergency medical service provider, as defined in section 18-3-201 (1.3), who is engaged or acting in, or who is present for the purpose of engaging or acting in, the performance of any duty, service, or function imposed, authorized, required, or permitted by law to be performed by a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider, whether or not the peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider is within the territorial limits of his or her jurisdiction, if the peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider is in uniform or the person committing an assault upon or offense against or otherwise acting toward the peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider. (3) A person convicted of first degree murder of a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider shall be punished by life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the rest of his or her natural life, unless the offense was charged prior to July 1, 2020, and a proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in section 18-1.3-1201, 18-1.3-1302, or 18-1.4-102 results in a verdict that requires imposition of the death penalty, in which event the person shall be sentenced to death. Nothing in this subsection (3) is construed as limiting the power of the governor to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons pursuant to section 7 of article IV of the Colorado constitution. (4) In the event the death penalty as provided for in this section is held to be unconstitutional by the Colorado supreme court or the United States supreme court, a person convicted of first degree murder of a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider under subsection (1) of this section shall be punished by life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In such circumstance, the court which previously sentenced a person to death shall cause the person to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence the person to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (5) The general assembly recognizes that protection of peace officers, firefighters, and emergency medical service providers from crime is a major concern of our state because society depends on peace officers, firefighters, and emergency medical service providers for protection against crime and other dangers and because peace officers, firefighters, and emergency medical service providers are disproportionately damaged by crime because their duty to protect society often places them in dangerous circumstances. Society as a whole benefits from affording special protection to peace officers, firefighters, and emergency medical service providers because the protection deters crimes against them and allows them to better serve and protect our state. The general assembly therefore finds that the penalties for first degree murder of a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider should be more severe than the penalty for first degree murder of other members of society.

Source: L. 88: Entire section added, p. 718, § 5, effective July 1. L. 95: (3) amended, p. 1294, § 4, effective July 1. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 1010, § 13, effective August 6. L. 2002: (3) amended, p. 1512, § 185, effective October 1. L. 2002, 3rd Ex. Sess.: (3) amended, p. 15, §§ 9, 10, effective July 12. L. 2003: (2) amended, p. 1624, § 45, effective August 6. L. 2014: Entire section amended, (HB 14-1214), ch. 336, p. 1495, § 3, effective August 6. L. 2018: (2) amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1702, § 25, effective May 29. L. 2020: (3) amended, (SB 20-100), ch. 61, p. 212, § 14, effective March 23.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (3), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (3), see section 16 of chapter 1 of the supplement to the Session Laws of Colorado 2002, Third Extraordinary Session.

PART 2

ASSAULTS

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 92 cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case: Frazier v. People
Frazier v. People (2004) colo · cites it 17× “Background Section 18-3-106 defines the substantive offense of vehicular homicide.”
People v. Weinreich (2005) colo · cites it 8× “[5] § 18-3-106(1)(a), C.R.S. (2001). [6] § 18-3-104(1)(a), C.”
People v. Nhan Dao Van (1984) colo · cites it 29× “The defendant, Dao Nhan Van, 1 was convicted of vehicular homicide, section 18-3-106, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
Juhl v. People (2007) colo · cites it 6× “(2007), a class two felony; section 18-3-106(1)(a), C.R.S. (2007), a class four felony; section 18-3-202(1)(c), C.”
People v. Barry (2014) coloctapp · cites it 7× “1[ 86 Section 18-3-106 provides, as relevant here: (1)(a) If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, such person commits vehicular homicide.”
Lopez v. People (2005) colo · cites it 4× “The jury returned verdicts of guilty for: Vehicular Homicide—Reckless Driving, see *718 section 18-3-106(1)(2)(a), 6 C.R.S. (2001); [3] Driving Under the Influence and Driving with Excessive Alcohol Content, see section 42-4-1301(1)(f), (2)(a), (2)(c), 11 C.”
People v. Rostad (1983) colo · cites it 16× “Prior to trial defendant moved to dismiss the vehicular homicide charge on the grounds that section 18-3-106 is unconstitutionally vague and violates equal protection guarantees of the federal and Colorado constitutions.”
Abarca v. People No. 13SC750, Hill v. People No. 14SC3, Medrano-Bustamante v. People No. 14SC7, People v. Smoots (2017) colo · cites it 4× “§ 18-3-106(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2016). ¶72 The criminal code defines “motor vehicle” to include, as pertinent here, “any self-propelled device by which persons or property may be moved, carried, or 27 transported from one place to another by land, water, or air.”
People v. Strock (2010) coloctapp · cites it 3× “Strock was charged with vehicular homicide while driving under the influence pursuant to section 18-3-106(1)(b)(I), C.R.S.2009 ("If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol .”
People v. Viduya (1985) colo · cites it 10× “See § 18-3-106, 8 C.R.S. (1978). 1 Because the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard *1285 when concluding that statements made by Viduya to the police were constitutionally obtained and admissible at trial, we reverse and remand with directions to hold a new hearing on…”
Rickstrew v. People (1991) colo · cites it 12× “In February 1988, Rickstrew was convicted by a jury of vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death under sections 18-3-106, 8B C.R.S. (1986) and XX-X-XXXX, 17 C.”
People v. Deadmond (1984) colo · cites it 5× “Defendant, Thomas Gene Deadmond, appeals his jury conviction of vehicular homicide under section 18-3-106, 8 C.R.S. (1973 & Supp.1983).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(1) — 6 cases
People v. Viduya (1985) colo “See § 18-3-106, 8 C.R.S. (1978). 1 Because the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard *1285 when concluding that statements made by Viduya to the police were constitutionally obtained and admissible at trial, we reverse and remand with directions to hold a new hearing on…”
People v. Nhan Dao Van (1984) colo “The defendant, Dao Nhan Van, 1 was convicted of vehicular homicide, section 18-3-106, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
People v. Loeser (1999) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(1)(2)(a) — 1 case
Lopez v. People (2005) colo “The jury returned verdicts of guilty for: Vehicular Homicide—Reckless Driving, see *718 section 18-3-106(1)(2)(a), 6 C.R.S. (2001); [3] Driving Under the Influence and Driving with Excessive Alcohol Content, see section 42-4-1301(1)(f), (2)(a), (2)(c), 11 C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(1)(a) — 11 cases
Juhl v. People (2007) colo “(2007), a class two felony; section 18-3-106(1)(a), C.R.S. (2007), a class four felony; section 18-3-202(1)(c), C.”
People v. Weinreich (2005) colo “[5] § 18-3-106(1)(a), C.R.S. (2001). [6] § 18-3-104(1)(a), C.”
Lopez v. People (2005) colo “The jury returned verdicts of guilty for: Vehicular Homicide—Reckless Driving, see *718 section 18-3-106(1)(2)(a), 6 C.R.S. (2001); [3] Driving Under the Influence and Driving with Excessive Alcohol Content, see section 42-4-1301(1)(f), (2)(a), (2)(c), 11 C.”
Mata-Medina v. People (2003) colo
People v. Lage (2009) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(1)(b) — 5 cases
v. Quezada-Caro (2019) coloctapp
People v. Schall (2002) colo
People v. MacLaren (2010) coloctapp
People v. Grassi (2008) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(1)(b)(1) — 2 cases
People v. Manzo (2005) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(1)(b)(D) — 1 case
People v. Barry (2014) coloctapp “1[ 86 Section 18-3-106 provides, as relevant here: (1)(a) If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, such person commits vehicular homicide.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(1)(b)(I) — 18 cases
People v. Strock (2010) coloctapp “Strock was charged with vehicular homicide while driving under the influence pursuant to section 18-3-106(1)(b)(I), C.R.S.2009 ("If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol .”
People v. Weinreich (2005) colo “[5] § 18-3-106(1)(a), C.R.S. (2001). [6] § 18-3-104(1)(a), C.”
Abarca v. People No. 13SC750, Hill v. People No. 14SC3, Medrano-Bustamante v. People No. 14SC7, People v. Smoots (2017) colo “§ 18-3-106(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2016). ¶72 The criminal code defines “motor vehicle” to include, as pertinent here, “any self-propelled device by which persons or property may be moved, carried, or 27 transported from one place to another by land, water, or air.”
People v. Lopez (2006) coloctapp
People v. Frazier (2003) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(1)(b)(ID) — 1 case
People v. Frazier (2003) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(1)(c) — 3 cases
People v. Frazier (2003) coloctapp
Peo v. Tarr (2024) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(2) — 6 cases
People v. Nhan Dao Van (1984) colo “The defendant, Dao Nhan Van, 1 was convicted of vehicular homicide, section 18-3-106, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
Charnes v. Boom (1988) colo
People v. Duemig (1980) colo
People v. Lucero (1999) coloctapp
People v. Perez (1981) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(2)(b) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(2)(c) — 7 cases
Rickstrew v. People (1991) colo “In February 1988, Rickstrew was convicted by a jury of vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death under sections 18-3-106, 8B C.R.S. (1986) and XX-X-XXXX, 17 C.”
People v. Garner (1989) colo
People v. Rodriquez (1982) coloctapp
People v. Viduya (1985) colo “See § 18-3-106, 8 C.R.S. (1978). 1 Because the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard *1285 when concluding that statements made by Viduya to the police were constitutionally obtained and admissible at trial, we reverse and remand with directions to hold a new hearing on…”
People v. Perez (1981) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(3) — 3 cases
People v. Rostad (1983) colo “Prior to trial defendant moved to dismiss the vehicular homicide charge on the grounds that section 18-3-106 is unconstitutionally vague and violates equal protection guarantees of the federal and Colorado constitutions.”
Charnes v. Boom (1988) colo
People v. Duemig (1980) colo
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(4) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(4)(c) — 2 cases
People v. Barry (2014) coloctapp “1[ 86 Section 18-3-106 provides, as relevant here: (1)(a) If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, such person commits vehicular homicide.”
People v. Martinez (2011) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(F) — 1 case
People v. Miranda (2007) colo
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(a)(d) — 1 case
People v. Barry (2014) coloctapp “1[ 86 Section 18-3-106 provides, as relevant here: (1)(a) If a person operates or drives a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, and such conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another, such person commits vehicular homicide.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(b)(1) — 1 case
People v. Frazier (2003) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(l)(a) — 14 cases
People v. Avila (1997) coloctapp
Lopez v. People (2005) colo “The jury returned verdicts of guilty for: Vehicular Homicide—Reckless Driving, see *718 section 18-3-106(1)(2)(a), 6 C.R.S. (2001); [3] Driving Under the Influence and Driving with Excessive Alcohol Content, see section 42-4-1301(1)(f), (2)(a), (2)(c), 11 C.”
Mata-Medina v. People (2003) colo
People v. Nhan Dao Van (1984) colo “The defendant, Dao Nhan Van, 1 was convicted of vehicular homicide, section 18-3-106, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
People v. Bettis (1979) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(l)(b) — 5 cases
People v. Nhan Dao Van (1984) colo “The defendant, Dao Nhan Van, 1 was convicted of vehicular homicide, section 18-3-106, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
People v. Rodriquez (1982) coloctapp
People v. Viduya (1985) colo “See § 18-3-106, 8 C.R.S. (1978). 1 Because the trial judge applied the wrong legal standard *1285 when concluding that statements made by Viduya to the police were constitutionally obtained and admissible at trial, we reverse and remand with directions to hold a new hearing on…”
People v. Lage (2009) coloctapp
People v. Loeser (1999) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(l)(b)(I) — 10 cases
Frazier v. People (2004) colo “Background Section 18-3-106 defines the substantive offense of vehicular homicide.”
People v. Rostad (1983) colo “Prior to trial defendant moved to dismiss the vehicular homicide charge on the grounds that section 18-3-106 is unconstitutionally vague and violates equal protection guarantees of the federal and Colorado constitutions.”
Abarca v. People No. 13SC750, Hill v. People No. 14SC3, Medrano-Bustamante v. People No. 14SC7, People v. Smoots (2017) colo “§ 18-3-106(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2016). ¶72 The criminal code defines “motor vehicle” to include, as pertinent here, “any self-propelled device by which persons or property may be moved, carried, or 27 transported from one place to another by land, water, or air.”
People v. Garner (1989) colo
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(l)(b)(IV) — 1 case
People v. Lucero (1999) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(l)(b)(l) — 1 case
People v. Manzo (2005) coloctapp
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-106(l)(c) — 1 case
People v. Loeser (1999) coloctapp
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.