(1) A person commits the crime of assault in
the second degree if:
(a) Repealed.
(b) With intent to cause bodily injury to another person, he or she causes such injury to
any person by means of a deadly weapon; or
(c) With intent to prevent one whom he or she knows, or should know, to be a peace
officer, firefighter, emergency medical care provider, or emergency medical service provider
from performing a lawful duty, he or she intentionally causes bodily injury to any person; or
(c.5) With intent to prevent one whom he or she knows, or should know, to be a peace
officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider from performing a lawful duty, he or
she intentionally causes serious bodily injury to any person; or
(d) He recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another person by means of a deadly
weapon; or
(e) For a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally
causes stupor, unconsciousness, or other physical or mental impairment or injury to another
person by administering to him, without his consent, a drug, substance, or preparation capable of
producing the intended harm; or
(f) While lawfully confined or in custody, he or she knowingly and violently applies
physical force against the person of a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service
provider engaged in the performance of his or her duties, or a judge of a court of competent
jurisdiction, or an officer of said court, or, while lawfully confined or in custody as a result of
being charged with or convicted of a crime or as a result of being charged as a delinquent child
or adjudicated as a delinquent child, he or she knowingly and violently applies physical force
against a person engaged in the performance of his or her duties while employed by or under
contract with a detention facility, as defined in section 18-8-203 (3), or while employed by the
division in the department of human services responsible for youth services and who is a youth
services counselor or is in the youth services worker classification series, and the person
committing the offense knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer,
firefighter, or emergency medical service provider engaged in the performance of his or her
duties, or a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction, or an officer of said court, or a person
engaged in the performance of his or her duties while employed by or under contract with a
detention facility or while employed by the division in the department of human services
responsible for youth services. A sentence imposed pursuant to this paragraph (f) shall be served
in the department of corrections and shall run consecutively with any sentences being served by
the offender; except that, if the offense is committed against a person employed by the division
in the department of human services responsible for youth services, the court may grant
probation or a suspended sentence in whole or in part, and the sentence may run concurrently or
consecutively with any sentences being served. A person who participates in a work release
program, a furlough, or any other similar authorized supervised or unsupervised absence from a
detention facility, as defined in section 18-8-203 (3), and who is required to report back to the
detention facility at a specified time is deemed to be in custody.
(f.5) (I) While lawfully confined in a detention facility within this state, an actor with
intent to infect, injure, or harm a person in a detention facility whom the actor knows or
reasonably should know to be an employee of a detention facility, causes such employee to come
into contact with blood, seminal fluid, urine, feces, saliva, mucus, vomit, or any toxic, caustic, or
hazardous material by any means, including, but not limited to, throwing, tossing, or expelling
such fluid or material.
(II) Repealed.
(III) (A) As used in this paragraph (f.5), "detention facility" means any building,
structure, enclosure, vehicle, institution, or place, whether permanent or temporary, fixed or
mobile, where persons are or may be lawfully held in custody or confinement under the authority
of the state of Colorado or any political subdivision of the state of Colorado.
(B) As used in this paragraph (f.5), "employee of a detention facility" includes
employees of the department of corrections, employees of any agency or person operating a
detention facility, law enforcement personnel, and any other persons who are present in or in the
vicinity of a detention facility and are performing services for a detention facility. "Employee of
a detention facility" does not include a person lawfully confined in a detention facility.
(g) With intent to cause bodily injury to another person, he or she causes serious bodily
injury to that person or another; or
(h) With intent to infect, injure, or harm another person whom the actor knows or
reasonably should know to be engaged in the performance of his or her duties as a peace officer,
a firefighter, an emergency medical care provider, or an emergency medical service provider, he
or she causes such person to come into contact with blood, seminal fluid, urine, feces, saliva,
mucus, vomit, or any toxic, caustic, or hazardous material by any means, including by throwing,
tossing, or expelling such fluid or material; or
(i) With the intent to cause bodily injury, he or she applies sufficient pressure to impede
or restrict the breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by applying such pressure
to the neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of the other person and thereby causes bodily
injury.
(2) (a) If assault in the second degree is committed under circumstances where the act
causing the injury is performed upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a serious and highly
provoking act of the intended victim, affecting the person causing the injury sufficiently to excite
an irresistible passion in a reasonable person, and without an interval between the provocation
and the injury sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, it is a class 6 felony.
(b) If assault in the second degree is committed without the circumstances provided in
paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), it is a class 4 felony.
(b.5) Assault in the second degree by any person under subsection (1) of this section
without the circumstances provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) is a class 3 felony if
the person who is assaulted, other than a participant in the crime, suffered serious bodily injury
during the commission or attempted commission of or flight from the commission or attempted
commission of murder, robbery, arson, burglary, escape, kidnapping in the first degree, sexual
assault, sexual assault in the first or second degree as such offenses existed prior to July 1, 2000,
or class 3 felony sexual assault on a child.
(c) (I) If a defendant is convicted of assault in the second degree pursuant to subsection
(2)(b.5) of this section, except with respect to sexual assault or sexual assault in the first degree
as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, the court shall sentence the defendant in accordance with the
provisions of section 18-1.3-406. A defendant convicted of assault in the second degree pursuant
to paragraph (b.5) of this subsection (2) with respect to sexual assault or sexual assault in the
first degree as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, shall be sentenced in accordance with section 18-
1.3-401 (8)(e) or (8)(e.5).
(II) If a defendant is convicted of assault in the second degree pursuant to subsection
(1)(b), (1)(c.5), (1)(d), or (1)(g) of this section, the court shall sentence the defendant in
accordance with section 18-1.3-406; except that, notwithstanding the provisions of section 18-
1.3-406, the court is not required to sentence the defendant to the department of corrections for a
mandatory term of incarceration.
(d) For purposes of determining sudden heat of passion pursuant to subsection (2)(a) of
this section, a defendant's act does not constitute an act performed upon a sudden heat of passion
if it results solely from the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim's
actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including
but not limited to under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible
romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant.
(3) Repealed.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 420, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-3-203. L. 76, Ex. Sess.: (1)(f)
amended, p. 8, § 2, effective September 18. L. 79: (2) R&RE, p. 732, § 2, effective May 18. L.
81: (1)(f) amended and (1)(g) added, p. 973, § 7, effective July 1. L. 86: (1)(f) amended, p. 789,
§ 2, effective July 1; (2)(c) added, p. 777, § 3, effective July 1. L. 88: (2)(c) amended, p. 717, §
4, effective July 1. L. 90: (1)(f) amended, p. 992, § 2, effective April 5; (1)(f) amended, p. 986, §
9, effective April 24. L. 91: (2)(a) and (2)(c) amended, p. 405, § 9, effective June 6. L. 94: (1)(a)
repealed, p. 1717, § 8, effective July 1; (1)(f) amended, p. 2655, § 138, effective July 1. L. 95:
(1)(b) and (2)(c) amended and (2)(b.5) added, p. 1250, § 7, effective July 1. L. 97: (1)(f.5)
added, p. 1591, § 1, effective July 1; (2)(a) amended, p. 1544, § 14, effective July 1; (1)(c) and
(1)(f) amended, p. 1011, § 16, effective August 6. L. 98: (2)(c) amended, p. 1441, § 26, effective
July 1. L. 2000: (1)(f) amended, p. 693, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2002: (2)(b.5) and (2)(c)
amended, p. 757, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(c) amended, p. 1512, § 187, effective October 1. L.
2003: (1)(f) amended, p. 1430, § 17, effective April 29. L. 2014: (1)(c) and (1)(f) amended, (HB
14-1214), ch. 336, p. 1497, § 6, effective August 6. L. 2015: (1)(f.5)(II) repealed and (3) added,
(SB 15-126), ch. 109, p. 316, § 1, effective July 1; (1)(c) and (1)(g) amended and (1)(h) added,
(SB 15-067), ch. 337, p. 1366, § 2, effective September 1; (1)(c.5) added and (2)(c) amended,
(HB 15-1303), ch. 211, p. 771, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2016: (1)(h) amended and (1)(i)
added, (HB 16-1080), ch. 327, p. 1327, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(c) amended, (SB 16-102), ch.
181, p. 620, § 1, effective July 1; (3) repealed, (HB 16-1393), ch. 304, p. 1226, § 4, effective
July 1. L. 2020: (2)(d) added, (SB 20-221), ch. 279, p. 1369, § 9, effective July 13. L. 2023:
(1)(f.5)(I) and (2)(c) amended, (HB 23-1293), ch. 298, p. 1783, § 5, effective October 1.
Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (1)(f) in Senate Bill 90-58 and House Bill
90-1255 were harmonized. Amendments to subsection (2)(c) in House Bill 02-1046 and House
Bill 02-1225 were harmonized.
(2) In People v. Slaughter, 2019 COA 27, 439 P.3d 80, the Colorado Court of Appeals
found that, where the prosecution seeks to charge a defendant with strangulation under
subsection (1)(i) of this section together with the crime of violence sentence enhancer under §
18-1.3-406 (2)(a)(I)(A), such charging would cause a violation of the defendant's right to equal
protection of the laws, and thus would be unconstitutional.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending
subsection (1)(f), see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994. For the
legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (2)(c), see section 1 of
chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in SB 20-221, see
section 1 of chapter 279, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
300
cases (
64 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case:
People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28 (Colo. 2015).
People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28 (Colo. 2015).
· cites it 48× “The legislative history of section 18-3-203(1)(F) is ambiguous and sheds no light upon its meaning.”
People v. Nguyen, 900 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1995).
· cites it 130× “Section 18-3-203 provides: (1) A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if: .”
People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1990).
· cites it 51× “At the sentencing hearing the prosecutor argued that section 18-3-203, upon which the defendant was convicted, required that the district court impose a violent crimes sentence on the defendant pursuant to section 16-11-309, even though the court granted the prosecutor’s motion…”
v. Payne, 2019 COA 167 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 11× “” Payne’s 2Section 18-3-203(1)(f), C.R.S. 2019, provides that an individual commits second degree assault when, while “lawfully confined or in custody, he .”
People v. Lee, 2020 CO 81 (Colo. 2020).
· cites it 45× “¶1 This case requires us to determine whether, under prevailing Colorado equal protection principles, a defendant may be charged with second degree assault based on conduct involving strangulation under both the deadly weapon subsection of the second degree assault statute,…”
v. Denhartog, 2019 COA 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 10× “¶ 72 Denhartog was convicted of two counts of second degree assault under section 18-3-203: one for causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon (subsection (1)(b)) and one for causing bodily injury to prevent a peace officer from performing a lawful duty (subsection (1)(c)).”
Cervantes v. People, 715 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1986).
· cites it 57× “The amended count one stated that the alleged conduct by Cervantes violated section 18-3-203, 8 C.R.S. (1978), which is the Colorado statute that defines the offense of second degree assault.”
Close v. People, 180 P.3d 1015 (Colo. 2008).
· cites it 42× “[2] See Amended Complaint/Information (identifying criminal charges against Close as "Assault in the Second Degree, C.R.S. § 18-3-203," denoting them as counts 17-22, and stating, "That on the 7th day of October, 1990, at the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado, James…”
v. Rigsby, 2020 CO 74 (Colo. 2020).
· cites it 6× “§ 18-3-203(1), C.R.S. (2019). It did not authorize multiple punishments for second degree assault based on the same criminal conduct.”
People v. Armstrong, 720 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1986).
· cites it 39× “(1978), the People appeal the dismissal by the trial court of two counts of second degree assault on a peace officer under section 18-3-203(1)(f), 8 C.R.S. (1978 and 1985 Supp.”
Peo v. Plemmons, 2021 COA 10 (Colo. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 48× “In 2015, the General Assembly removed “infect,” “injure,” and “harm” from the misdemeanor assault statute and added those terms to a new subsection of section 18-3-203, which defines second degree assault.”
v. Tibbels, 2019 COA 175 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 4× “¶ 49 In a separate instruction, the court defined “contraband” as only a “dangerous instrument,” and it excluded the other potential items identified as contraband in section 18-3-203(1)(a). The court defined “dangerous instrument” as set forth in section 18-8-203(4).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1) — 27 cases
v. Rigsby, 2020 CO 74 (Colo. 2020).
“§ 18-3-203(1), C.R.S. (2019). It did not authorize multiple punishments for second degree assault based on the same criminal conduct.”
Close v. People, 180 P.3d 1015 (Colo. 2008).
“[2] See Amended Complaint/Information (identifying criminal charges against Close as "Assault in the Second Degree, C.R.S. § 18-3-203," denoting them as counts 17-22, and stating, "That on the 7th day of October, 1990, at the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado, James…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(4) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(F) — 1 case
People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28 (Colo. 2015).
“The legislative history of section 18-3-203(1)(F) is ambiguous and sheds no light upon its meaning.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(a) — 12 cases
v. Tibbels, 2019 COA 175 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
“¶ 49 In a separate instruction, the court defined “contraband” as only a “dangerous instrument,” and it excluded the other potential items identified as contraband in section 18-3-203(1)(a). The court defined “dangerous instrument” as set forth in section 18-8-203(4).”
People v. Nguyen, 900 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1995).
“Section 18-3-203 provides: (1) A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if: .”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(b) — 40 cases
People v. Nguyen, 900 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1995).
“Section 18-3-203 provides: (1) A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if: .”
People v. Lee, 2020 CO 81 (Colo. 2020).
“¶1 This case requires us to determine whether, under prevailing Colorado equal protection principles, a defendant may be charged with second degree assault based on conduct involving strangulation under both the deadly weapon subsection of the second degree assault statute,…”
v. Denhartog, 2019 COA 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
“¶ 72 Denhartog was convicted of two counts of second degree assault under section 18-3-203: one for causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon (subsection (1)(b)) and one for causing bodily injury to prevent a peace officer from performing a lawful duty (subsection (1)(c)).”
Close v. People, 180 P.3d 1015 (Colo. 2008).
“[2] See Amended Complaint/Information (identifying criminal charges against Close as "Assault in the Second Degree, C.R.S. § 18-3-203," denoting them as counts 17-22, and stating, "That on the 7th day of October, 1990, at the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado, James…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(c) — 21 cases
v. Denhartog, 2019 COA 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
“¶ 72 Denhartog was convicted of two counts of second degree assault under section 18-3-203: one for causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon (subsection (1)(b)) and one for causing bodily injury to prevent a peace officer from performing a lawful duty (subsection (1)(c)).”
Cervantes v. People, 715 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1986).
“The amended count one stated that the alleged conduct by Cervantes violated section 18-3-203, 8 C.R.S. (1978), which is the Colorado statute that defines the offense of second degree assault.”
v. Snider, 2021 COA 19 (Colo. Ct. App. 2021).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(d) — 16 cases
v. Rigsby, 2020 CO 74 (Colo. 2020).
“§ 18-3-203(1), C.R.S. (2019). It did not authorize multiple punishments for second degree assault based on the same criminal conduct.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(e) — 3 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(f) — 23 cases
People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28 (Colo. 2015).
“The legislative history of section 18-3-203(1)(F) is ambiguous and sheds no light upon its meaning.”
v. Payne, 2019 COA 167 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
“” Payne’s 2Section 18-3-203(1)(f), C.R.S. 2019, provides that an individual commits second degree assault when, while “lawfully confined or in custody, he .”
People v. Armstrong, 720 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1986).
“(1978), the People appeal the dismissal by the trial court of two counts of second degree assault on a peace officer under section 18-3-203(1)(f), 8 C.R.S. (1978 and 1985 Supp.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(g) — 24 cases
v. Rigsby, 2020 CO 74 (Colo. 2020).
“§ 18-3-203(1), C.R.S. (2019). It did not authorize multiple punishments for second degree assault based on the same criminal conduct.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(h) — 1 case
Peo v. Plemmons, 2021 COA 10 (Colo. Ct. App. 2021).
“In 2015, the General Assembly removed “infect,” “injure,” and “harm” from the misdemeanor assault statute and added those terms to a new subsection of section 18-3-203, which defines second degree assault.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(i) — 18 cases
People v. Lee, 2020 CO 81 (Colo. 2020).
“¶1 This case requires us to determine whether, under prevailing Colorado equal protection principles, a defendant may be charged with second degree assault based on conduct involving strangulation under both the deadly weapon subsection of the second degree assault statute,…”
v. Lee, 2019 COA 130 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(2) — 7 cases
v. Gillis, 2020 COA 68 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(2)(a) — 14 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(2)(b) — 13 cases
People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28 (Colo. 2015).
“The legislative history of section 18-3-203(1)(F) is ambiguous and sheds no light upon its meaning.”
People v. Nguyen, 900 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1995).
“Section 18-3-203 provides: (1) A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if: .”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(2)(c) — 16 cases
People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1990).
“At the sentencing hearing the prosecutor argued that section 18-3-203, upon which the defendant was convicted, required that the district court impose a violent crimes sentence on the defendant pursuant to section 16-11-309, even though the court granted the prosecutor’s motion…”
People v. Nguyen, 900 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1995).
“Section 18-3-203 provides: (1) A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if: .”
Close v. People, 180 P.3d 1015 (Colo. 2008).
“[2] See Amended Complaint/Information (identifying criminal charges against Close as "Assault in the Second Degree, C.R.S. § 18-3-203," denoting them as counts 17-22, and stating, "That on the 7th day of October, 1990, at the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado, James…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(2)(c)(I) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(2)(c)(II) — 4 cases
v. Lee, 2019 COA 130 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(2)(e) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(3) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(4) — 1 case
v. Tibbels, 2019 COA 175 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
“¶ 49 In a separate instruction, the court defined “contraband” as only a “dangerous instrument,” and it excluded the other potential items identified as contraband in section 18-3-203(1)(a). The court defined “dangerous instrument” as set forth in section 18-8-203(4).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(b) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(e) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(f) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(g)(2) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(l) — 2 cases
People v. Nguyen, 900 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1995).
“Section 18-3-203 provides: (1) A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if: .”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(l)(a) — 21 cases
People v. Nguyen, 900 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1995).
“Section 18-3-203 provides: (1) A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if: .”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(l)(b) — 34 cases
People v. Nguyen, 900 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1995).
“Section 18-3-203 provides: (1) A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if: .”
People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1990).
“At the sentencing hearing the prosecutor argued that section 18-3-203, upon which the defendant was convicted, required that the district court impose a violent crimes sentence on the defendant pursuant to section 16-11-309, even though the court granted the prosecutor’s motion…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(l)(c) — 18 cases
Cervantes v. People, 715 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1986).
“The amended count one stated that the alleged conduct by Cervantes violated section 18-3-203, 8 C.R.S. (1978), which is the Colorado statute that defines the offense of second degree assault.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(l)(d) — 9 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(l)(e) — 4 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(l)(f) — 19 cases
People v. Armstrong, 720 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1986).
“(1978), the People appeal the dismissal by the trial court of two counts of second degree assault on a peace officer under section 18-3-203(1)(f), 8 C.R.S. (1978 and 1985 Supp.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-203(l)(g) — 9 cases
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.