Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101 (2026)

Limitation of eighteen years

✓ current as of July 2026

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(1) No person shall commence or maintain an action for the recovery of the title or possession or to enforce or establish any right or interest of or to real property or make an entry thereon unless commenced within eighteen years after the right to bring such action or make such entry has first accrued or within eighteen years after he or those from, by, or under whom he claims have been seized or possessed of the premises. Eighteen years' adverse possession of any land shall be conclusive evidence of absolute ownership. (2) The limitation provided for in subsection (1) of this section shall not apply against the state, county, city and county, city, irrigation district, public, municipal, or quasi-municipal corporation, or any department or agency thereof. No possession by any person, firm, or corporation, no matter how long continued, of any land, water, water right, easement, or other property whatsoever dedicated to or owned by the state of Colorado, or any county, city and county, city, irrigation district, public, municipal, or quasi-municipal corporation, or any department or agency thereof shall ever ripen into any title, interest, or right against the state of Colorado, or such county, city and county, city, public, municipal, or quasi-municipal corporation, irrigation district, or any department or agency thereof. (3) (a) In order to prevail on a claim asserting fee simple title to real property by adverse possession in any civil action filed on or after July 1, 2008, the person asserting the claim shall prove each element of the claim by clear and convincing evidence. (b) In addition to any other requirements specified in this part 1, in any action for a claim for fee simple title to real property by adverse possession for which fee simple title vests on or after July 1, 2008, in favor of the adverse possessor and against the owner of record of the real property under subsection (1) of this section, a person may acquire fee simple title to real property by adverse possession only upon satisfaction of each of the following conditions: (I) The person presents evidence to satisfy all of the elements of a claim for adverse possession required under common law in Colorado; and (II) Either the person claiming by adverse possession or a predecessor in interest of such person had a good faith belief that the person in possession of the property of the owner of record was the actual owner of the property and the belief was reasonable under the particular circumstances. (4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the provisions of subsections (3) and (5) of this section shall be limited to claims of adverse possession for the purpose of establishing fee simple title to real property and shall not apply to the creation, establishment, proof, or judicial confirmation or delineation of easements by prescription, implication, prior use, estoppel, or otherwise, nor shall the provisions of subsections (3) or (5) of this section apply to claims or defenses for equitable relief under the common-law doctrine of relative hardships, or claims or defenses governed by any other statute of limitations specified in this article. Nothing in this section shall be construed to mean that any elements of a claim for adverse possession that are not otherwise applicable to the creation, establishment, proof, or judicial confirmation or delineation of easements by prescription, implication, prior use, estoppel, or otherwise are made applicable pursuant to the provisions of this section. (5) (a) Where the person asserting a claim of fee simple title to real property by adverse possession prevails on such claim, and if the court determines in its discretion that an award of compensation is fair and equitable under the circumstances, the court may, after an evidentiary hearing separately conducted after entry of the order awarding title to the adverse possessor, award to the party losing title to the adverse possessor: (I) Damages to compensate the party losing title to the adverse possessor for the loss of the property measured by the actual value of the property as determined by the county assessor as of the most recent valuation for property tax purposes. If the property lost has not been separately taxed or assessed from the remainder of the property of the party losing title to the adverse possessor, the court shall equitably apportion the actual value of the property to the portion of the owner's property lost by adverse possession including, as appropriate, taking into account the nature and character of the property lost and of the remainder. (II) An amount to reimburse the party losing title to the adverse possessor for all or a part of the property taxes and other assessments levied against and paid by the party losing title to the adverse possessor for the period commencing eighteen years prior to the commencement of the adverse possession action and expiring on the date of the award or entry of final nonappealable judgment, whichever is later. If the property lost has not been separately taxed or assessed from the remainder of the property of the party losing title to the adverse possessor, such reimbursement shall equitably apportion the amount of the reimbursement to the portion of the owner's property lost by adverse possession, including, as appropriate, taking into account the nature and character of the property lost and of the remainder. The amount of the award shall bear interest at the statutory rate from the dates on which the party losing title to the adverse possessor made payment of the reimbursable taxes and assessments. (b) At any hearing conducted under this subsection (5), or in the event that adverse possession is claimed solely as a defense to an action for damages based upon a claim for trespass, forcible entry, forcible detainer, or similar affirmative claims by another against the adverse possessor, and not to seek an award of legal title against the claimant, the burden of proof shall be by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defendant is claiming adverse possession solely as a defense to an action and not to seek an award of legal title, the defendant shall so state in a pleading filed by the defendant within ninety days after filing an answer or within such longer period as granted by the court in the court's discretion, and any such statement shall bind the defendant in the action.

Source: L. 27: p. 598, § 30. CSA: C. 40, § 136. CRS 53: § 118-7-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 118- 7-1. L. 67: p. 351, § 1. L. 2008: (3), (4), and (5) added, p. 668, § 1, effective July 1.

Cross references: For the effect of this section on registration of land under the Torrens title system, see § 38-36-137.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 71 cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: ge Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).

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ge Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 8× “It argues in the alternative that Foy’s July 1991 letter shows that Woodbridge’s use of the disputed parcel was permissive, not adverse, as of mid-1991, so Woodbridge didn’t show eighteen continuous years of adverse use from 1975 or from 11 mid-1991, as required by section…”

Matoush v. Lovingood, 177 P.3d 1262 (Colo. 2008). · cites it 14× “Most importantly, however, even if I considered such a rule meritorious policy, I would nevertheless reject its judicial adoption as a flagrant usurpation of the legislative function, allocated elsewhere by our constitution.”

Bittle v. Cam-Colorado, LLC, 318 P.3d 65 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 2× “See § 38-41-101(1), C.R.S.2011; Hunter v. Mansell, 240 P.”

Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 6× “Therefore, to satisfy the adverse possession statute, § 38-41-101, C.R.S.2005, the adverse claimant’s open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use or occupancy of the Piekel Placer, the Silver Queen, and the Morning Glory must have commenced on or before March 9,1983.”

McIntyre v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 86 P.3d 402 (Colo. 2004). · cites it 4× “In regard to private prescriptive rights, section 38-41-101(1), 10 C.R.S. (2003), provides that eighteen years of "adverse possession of any land shall be conclusive evidence of absolute ownership" in a case for recovery of title or possession by the prior owner of the real…”

Salazar v. Terry, 911 P.2d 1086 (Colo. 1996). · cites it 6× “[4] In practical effect, once the common ownership destroyed the prior acquiescence of the fence as boundary, the twenty-year clock, for purposes of the acquiescence statute, started ticking anew. See § 38-44-109, 16A C.”

Peters v. Smuggler-Durant Mining Corp., 910 P.2d 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 10× “However, contrary to his representations, not only did his original complaint claim a right of adverse possession under § 38-41-101, C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A), the eighteen year statute, it also alleged adverse possession "through payment of taxes and color of title for more…”

Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002). · cites it 2× “§ 38-41-101, 10 C.R.S. (2001); Proper, 827 P.”

People v. Bruno, 342 P.3d 587 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 8× “See § 38-41-101, C.R.S. 2014. Moreover, changes to the adverse possession statute in 2008 demonstrate that the General Assembly intended to eliminate the potential for such intentional or bad faith adverse possession claims.”

Hunter v. Mansell, 240 P.3d 469 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 3× “A division of this court rejected the disclaimer, stating: [Wle do not agree with defendants' contention that the disclaimer signed by Mrs. Thomas [the first predecessor] prior to her execution of the quitclaim deed to plaintiff divested her of title to the property.”

Smith v. Hayden, 772 P.2d 47 (Colo. 1989). · cites it 5× “Because the trial court’s conclusions were based on adverse possession principles under § 38-41-101, 16A C.R.S. (1982), the *50 statutory disputed boundary provisions are not applicable to the resolution of the issues presented on appeal.”

Weisiger v. Harbour, 62 P.3d 1069 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 3× “Section 38-41-101, C.R.S.2002. On review, we will not disturb a trial court’s determination concerning the existence of a prescriptive easement when the court bases its factual findings on competent evidence in the record.”

Show all 71 citing cases →

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101(1) — 36 cases

Matoush v. Lovingood, 177 P.3d 1262 (Colo. 2008). “Most importantly, however, even if I considered such a rule meritorious policy, I would nevertheless reject its judicial adoption as a flagrant usurpation of the legislative function, allocated elsewhere by our constitution.”

ge Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lo Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020). “It argues in the alternative that Foy’s July 1991 letter shows that Woodbridge’s use of the disputed parcel was permissive, not adverse, as of mid-1991, so Woodbridge didn’t show eighteen continuous years of adverse use from 1975 or from 11 mid-1991, as required by section…”

Bittle v. Cam-Colorado, LLC, 318 P.3d 65 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012). “See § 38-41-101(1), C.R.S.2011; Hunter v. Mansell, 240 P.”

McIntyre v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 86 P.3d 402 (Colo. 2004). “In regard to private prescriptive rights, section 38-41-101(1), 10 C.R.S. (2003), provides that eighteen years of "adverse possession of any land shall be conclusive evidence of absolute ownership" in a case for recovery of title or possession by the prior owner of the real…”

Salazar v. Terry, 911 P.2d 1086 (Colo. 1996). “[4] In practical effect, once the common ownership destroyed the prior acquiescence of the fence as boundary, the twenty-year clock, for purposes of the acquiescence statute, started ticking anew. See § 38-44-109, 16A C.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101(2) — 6 cases

Archuleta v. Gomez, 200 P.3d 333 (Colo. 2009).

Meyer v. Haskett, 251 P.3d 1287 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).

Bd. of Com'rs of Pitkin Cnty. v. Timroth, 87 P.3d 102 (Colo. 2004).

Goodwin v. Thieman, 74 P.3d 526 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).

City of Canon City v. Cingoranelli, 740 P.2d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101(3) — 3 cases

LR Smith Investments, LLC v. Butler, 378 P.3d 743 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).

Beaver Creek Ranch, L.P. v. Gordman Leverich Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P'ship, 226 P.3d 1155 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).

People v. Gutierrez-Vite, 411 P.3d 119 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101(3)(b)(II) — 2 cases

Bernhardt v. Thompson (Colo. Ct. App. 2026).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101(4) — 2 cases

LR Smith Investments, LLC v. Butler, 378 P.3d 743 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).

Bernhardt v. Thompson (Colo. Ct. App. 2026).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101(5) — 1 case

Beaver Creek Ranch, L.P. v. Gordman Leverich Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P'ship, 226 P.3d 1155 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101(5)(b) — 1 case

Bernhardt v. Thompson (Colo. Ct. App. 2026).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101(8)(2) — 1 case

People v. Bruno, 342 P.3d 587 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014). “See § 38-41-101, C.R.S. 2014. Moreover, changes to the adverse possession statute in 2008 demonstrate that the General Assembly intended to eliminate the potential for such intentional or bad faith adverse possession claims.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-101(8)(b)(IN) — 1 case

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