Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201 (2026)

General definitions

✓ current as of July 2026
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(a) Unless the context otherwise requires, words or phrases defined in this section, or in the additional definitions contained in other articles of this title that apply to particular articles or parts thereof, have the meanings stated. (b) Subject to definitions contained in other articles of this title 4 that apply to particular articles or parts of this title 4: (1) "Action", in the sense of a judicial proceeding, includes recoupment, counterclaim, set-off, suit in equity, and any other proceeding in which rights are determined. (2) "Aggrieved party" means a party entitled to pursue a remedy. (3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in section 4-1-303. (Compare "contract".) (3.5) "Authenticate" means: (A) To sign; or (B) With the intent to sign a record, otherwise to execute or adopt an electronic symbol, sound, message, or process referring to, attached to, included in, or logically associated or linked with, that record. (4) "Bank" means a person engaged in the business of banking and includes a savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union, and trust company. (5) "Bearer" means a person in control of a negotiable electronic document of title or a person in possession of a negotiable instrument, negotiable tangible document of title, or certificated security that is payable to bearer or indorsed in blank. (6) "Bill of lading" means a document of title evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of directly or indirectly transporting or forwarding goods. The term does not include a warehouse receipt. (7) "Branch" includes a separately incorporated foreign branch of a bank. (8) "Burden of establishing" a fact means the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its nonexistence. (9) "Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person that buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind. A person buys goods in the ordinary course if the sale to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the seller is engaged or with the seller's own usual or customary practices. A person that sells oil, gas, or other minerals at the wellhead or minehead is a person in the business of selling goods of that kind. A buyer in ordinary course of business may buy for cash, by exchange of other property, or on secured or unsecured credit, and may acquire goods or documents of title under a preexisting contract for sale. Only a buyer that takes possession of the goods or has a right to recover the goods from the seller under article 2 of this title may be a buyer in ordinary course of business. A person that acquires goods in a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt is not a buyer in ordinary course of business. (10) "Conspicuous", with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is "conspicuous" or not is a decision for the court. (10.5) "Consumer" means an individual who enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. (11) "Contract" means the total legal obligation that results from the parties' agreement as determined by this title as supplemented by any other applicable laws. (Compare "agreement".) (12) "Creditor" includes a general creditor, a secured creditor, a lien creditor, and any representative of creditors, including an assignee for the benefit of creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver in equity, and an executor or administrator of an insolvent debtor's or assignor's estate. (13) "Defendant" includes a person in the position of defendant in a counterclaim or third-party claim. (14) "Delivery", with respect to an electronic document of title, means voluntary transfer of control; and with respect to an instrument, a tangible document of title, or an authoritative tangible copy of a record evidencing chattel paper, means voluntary transfer of possession. (15) "Document of title" means a record (i) that in the regular course of business or financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the person in possession or control of the record is entitled to receive, control, hold, and dispose of the record and the goods the record covers and (ii) that purports to be issued by or addressed to a bailee and to cover goods in the bailee's possession which are either identified or are fungible portions of an identified mass. The term includes a bill of lading, transport document, dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse receipt, and order for delivery of goods. An electronic document of title means a document of title evidenced by a record consisting of information stored in an electronic medium. A tangible document of title means a document of title evidenced by a record consisting of information that is inscribed on a tangible medium. (15.5) "Electronic" means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities. (16) "Fault" means a wrongful act, omission, breach, or default. (17) "Fungible goods" means either: (A) Goods of which any unit, by nature or usage of trade, is the equivalent of any other like unit; or (B) Goods that by agreement are treated as equivalent. (18) "Genuine" means free of forgery or counterfeiting. (19) "Good faith", except as provided in article 5 of this title, means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. (20) "Holder" means: (A) The person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession; (B) The person in possession of a negotiable tangible document of title if the goods are deliverable either to bearer or to the order of the person in possession; or (C) The person in control, other than pursuant to section 4-7-106 (g), of a negotiable electronic document of title. (21) "Insolvency proceeding" includes an assignment for the benefit of creditors or other proceeding intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the estate of the person involved. (22) An "insolvent" person is a person that: (A) Has generally ceased to pay debts in the ordinary course of business other than as a result of a bona fide dispute as to the debts; (B) Is unable to pay debts as they become due; or (C) Is insolvent within the meaning of federal bankruptcy law. (23) "Money" means a medium of exchange that is currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government and that is not in an electronic form. The term includes a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental organization or by agreement between two or more countries. (24) "Organization" means a person other than an individual. (25) "Party", as distinct from a "third party", means a person that has engaged in a transaction or made an agreement subject to this title. (26) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, government subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity. The term includes a protected series, however denominated, of an entity if the protected series is established under the laws of another state that: (A) Limits, or limits if conditions specified under the law are satisfied, the ability of a creditor of the entity or of any other protected series of the entity to satisfy a claim from assets of the protected series; and (B) Treats the protected series as an entity. (27) "Present value" means the amount as of a date certain of one or more sums payable in the future, discounted to the date certain by use of either an interest rate specified by the parties if that rate is not manifestly unreasonable at the time the transaction is entered into or, if an interest rate is not so specified, a commercially reasonable rate that takes into account the facts and circumstances at the time the transaction is entered into. (28) "Presumption" or "presumed" means that the trier of fact must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced that would support a finding of its nonexistence. (29) "Purchase" means taking by sale, lease, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, issue or reissue, gift, or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property. (30) "Purchaser" means a person that takes by purchase. (31) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. (32) "Remedy" means any remedial right to which an aggrieved party is entitled, with or without resort to a tribunal. (33) "Representative" means any person empowered to act for another, including an agent, an officer of a corporation or association, and a trustee, executor, or administrator of an estate. (34) "Right" includes remedy. (35) "Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures that secures payment or performance of an obligation. The term also includes any interest of a consignor and a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to article 9 of this title. The special property interest of a buyer of goods on identification of those goods to a contract for sale under section 4-2-401 is not a "security interest", but a buyer may also acquire a "security interest" by complying with article 9 of this title. Except as otherwise provided in section 4-2-505, the right of a seller or lessor of goods under article 2 or 2.5 of this title to retain or acquire possession of the goods is not a "security interest", but a seller or lessor may also acquire a "security interest" by complying with article 9 of this title. The retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (section 4-2-401) is limited in effect to a reservation of a "security interest". Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a "security interest" is determined pursuant to section 4-1-203. (36) "Send", in connection with a record or notification, means to: (A) Deposit in the mail, deliver for transmission, or transmit by any other usual means of communication with postage or cost of transmission provided for, addressed to any address reasonable under the circumstances; or (B) Cause the record or notification to be received within the time it would have been received if properly sent under subsection (b)(36)(A) of this section. (37) (A) "Sign" means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record: (i) Execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or (ii) Attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process. (B) "Signed", "signing", and "signature" have corresponding meanings. (38) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. (39) "Surety" includes a guarantor or other secondary obligor. (40) "Term" means a portion of an agreement that relates to a particular matter. (41) "Unauthorized signature" means a signature made without actual, implied, or apparent authority. The term includes a forgery. (42) "Warehouse receipt" means a document of title issued by a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire. (43) "Writing" includes printing, typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to tangible form. "Written" has a corresponding meaning.

Source: L. 2006: Entire article R&RE, p. 458, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2007: (b)(5), (b)(15), (b)(20)(A), and (b)(20)(C) amended, p. 374, § 26, effective August 3. L. 2023: IP(b), (b)(10), (b)(14), (b)(20)(C), (b)(23), (b)(26), (b)(36), and (b)(37) amended and (b)(15.5) added, (SB 23-090), ch. 136, p. 524, § 1 effective August 7. Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 4-1-201 as it existed prior to 2006.

Cross references: For offenses relating to security interest, see §§ 18-5-504, 18-5-505, and 18-5-511.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 66 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: West v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037 (Colo. 2006).
West v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037 (Colo. 2006). · cites it 20× “" § 4-1-201(19), C.R.S. A purchaser is one who "takes by purchase.”
Palmer v. AH Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984). · cites it 8× “" The process of "notification" or "giving notice" is described, in pertinent part, in section 4-1-201(26) as follows: "A person `notifies' or `gives' a notice or notification to another by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to *206 inform the other in ordinary…”
Knappenberger v. Shea, 874 P.2d 498 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 13× “The general definitions contained in § 4-1-201, C.R.S. (1992 Repl.Vol. 2) are applicable to § 4-8-302.”
Kelly v. Cent. Bank & Trust Co. of Denver, 794 P.2d 1037 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 8× “See §§ 4-1-201(20), 4-3-201(3) and Comment 8, and 4-3-307(2) and Comment 2, C.”
Lamson v. Com. Credit Corp., 531 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1975). · cites it 3× “” Section 4-1-201(20) defines a holder as “a person who is in possession of.”
Money Mart Check Cashing Ctr., Inc. v. Epicycle Corp., 667 P.2d 1372 (Colo. 1983). · cites it 8× “” Section 4-1-201(19), C.R.S.1973. The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended that this standard be a subjective one.”
Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding, Inc. v. Uioli, Inc., 872 P.2d 1359 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “See also § 4-1-203 and § 4-1-201(19), C.R.S. (1992 Repl.Vol. 2) (imposing obligation of good faith in performance or enforcement of contracts under Uniform Commercial Code).”
People v. Armijo, 589 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1979). · cites it 6× “” Section 4-1-201(37), C.R.S. 1973. The statutes under which defendant was charged in Counts II and III do not require that the security interest be perfected and we hold that they apply to any valid security interest, perfected or not.”
Young v. Golden State Bank, 560 P.2d 855 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). · cites it 6× “Section 4-1-201(19), C.R.S.1973. The knowledge that plaintiffs had an interest in the collateral is not in itself evidence of bad faith, as the foreclosing parties' security interest here was superior to that of plaintiffs.”
Lease Fin., Inc. v. Burger, 575 P.2d 857 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). · cites it 4× “Whether a transaction is characterized as a lease or sale is not conclusive, but rather it is the intention of the parties which is controlling, that intention to be determined by the facts of each case.”
In re Rust-Oleum Restore Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 3d 772 (N.D. Ill. 2016). “Code § 1201 (b)(l 0); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201 (b)(10); Del. Code tit.”
Midland Bean Co. v. Farmers State Bank, 552 P.2d 317 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976). · cites it 8× “DRAFTS AS DOCUMENTS OF TITLE Midland's claim of ownership rights in the beans is based solely on 44 drafts it issued and addressed to Brush Elevator which it contends are nonnegotiable "documents of title" under § 4-1-201(15), C.R.S. 1973, of the Uniform Commercial Code.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(1) — 1 case
Integra Fin., Inc. v. Grynberg Petroleum Co., 74 P.3d 347 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(10) — 3 cases
Richard O'Brien Companies v. Challenge-Cook Bros., 672 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1987).
O'NEIL v. Int'l Harvester Co., 575 P.2d 862 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(12) — 1 case
Cinocco Realty, Inc. v. J.L.J., Ltd., 736 P.2d 421 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(14) — 4 cases
Keybank Nat'l Ass'n v. Mascarenas, 17 P.3d 209 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
Suncor Energy (USA), Inc. v. Aspen Petroleum Prods., Inc., 178 P.3d 1263 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
La Junta State Bank v. Travis, 727 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1986).
First Nat'l Bank of Windsor v. Gilbert Marshall & Co., 780 P.2d 73 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(15) — 1 case
Midland Bean Co. v. Farmers State Bank, 552 P.2d 317 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976). “DRAFTS AS DOCUMENTS OF TITLE Midland's claim of ownership rights in the beans is based solely on 44 drafts it issued and addressed to Brush Elevator which it contends are nonnegotiable "documents of title" under § 4-1-201(15), C.R.S. 1973, of the Uniform Commercial Code.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(19) — 9 cases
West v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037 (Colo. 2006). “" § 4-1-201(19), C.R.S. A purchaser is one who "takes by purchase.”
Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding, Inc. v. Uioli, Inc., 872 P.2d 1359 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). “See also § 4-1-203 and § 4-1-201(19), C.R.S. (1992 Repl.Vol. 2) (imposing obligation of good faith in performance or enforcement of contracts under Uniform Commercial Code).”
Knappenberger v. Shea, 874 P.2d 498 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). “The general definitions contained in § 4-1-201, C.R.S. (1992 Repl.Vol. 2) are applicable to § 4-8-302.”
Young v. Golden State Bank, 560 P.2d 855 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). “Section 4-1-201(19), C.R.S.1973. The knowledge that plaintiffs had an interest in the collateral is not in itself evidence of bad faith, as the foreclosing parties' security interest here was superior to that of plaintiffs.”
Money Mart Check Cashing Ctr., Inc. v. Epicycle Corp., 667 P.2d 1372 (Colo. 1983). “” Section 4-1-201(19), C.R.S.1973. The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended that this standard be a subjective one.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(2) — 1 case
Farmers & Stockmens Bank of Clayton v. Stafford, 738 P.2d 60 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(20) — 6 cases
Lamson v. Com. Credit Corp., 531 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1975). “” Section 4-1-201(20) defines a holder as “a person who is in possession of.”
Kelly v. Cent. Bank & Trust Co. of Denver, 794 P.2d 1037 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). “See §§ 4-1-201(20), 4-3-201(3) and Comment 8, and 4-3-307(2) and Comment 2, C.”
Pierce v. DeZeeuw, 824 P.2d 97 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
La Junta State Bank v. Travis, 727 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1986).
Cole v. Farner, 749 P.2d 970 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(23) — 1 case
In Re Storage Tech. Corp., 48 B.R. 862 (D. Colo. 1985).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(25) — 3 cases
Money Mart Check Cashing Ctr., Inc. v. Epicycle Corp., 667 P.2d 1372 (Colo. 1983). “” Section 4-1-201(19), C.R.S.1973. The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended that this standard be a subjective one.”
Salter v. Vanotti, 599 P.2d 962 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
First Nat'l Bank of Tribune v. Lohman, 827 P.2d 583 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(25)(c) — 2 cases
Money Mart Check Cashing Ctr., Inc. v. Epicycle Corp., 667 P.2d 1372 (Colo. 1983). “” Section 4-1-201(19), C.R.S.1973. The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code intended that this standard be a subjective one.”
Merchants Mortg. & Trust Corp. v. Dawe, 754 P.2d 418 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(26) — 3 cases
Palmer v. AH Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984). “" The process of "notification" or "giving notice" is described, in pertinent part, in section 4-1-201(26) as follows: "A person `notifies' or `gives' a notice or notification to another by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to *206 inform the other in ordinary…”
Hawkinson v. AH Robins Co., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984).
Knappenberger v. Shea, 874 P.2d 498 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). “The general definitions contained in § 4-1-201, C.R.S. (1992 Repl.Vol. 2) are applicable to § 4-8-302.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(28) — 1 case
Green v. Green, 32 P.3d 643 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(29) — 2 cases
West v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037 (Colo. 2006). “" § 4-1-201(19), C.R.S. A purchaser is one who "takes by purchase.”
Budget Sys., Inc. v. Seifert Pontiac, Inc., 579 P.2d 87 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(3) — 4 cases
Compass Bank v. Kone, 134 P.3d 500 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
Great W. Sugar Co. v. N. Nat. Gas Co., 661 P.2d 684 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
First Nat'l Bank of Tribune v. Lohman, 827 P.2d 583 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(30) — 1 case
West v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037 (Colo. 2006). “" § 4-1-201(19), C.R.S. A purchaser is one who "takes by purchase.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(32) — 1 case
Knappenberger v. Shea, 874 P.2d 498 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). “The general definitions contained in § 4-1-201, C.R.S. (1992 Repl.Vol. 2) are applicable to § 4-8-302.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(33) — 1 case
Knappenberger v. Shea, 874 P.2d 498 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). “The general definitions contained in § 4-1-201, C.R.S. (1992 Repl.Vol. 2) are applicable to § 4-8-302.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(37) — 12 cases
People v. Armijo, 589 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1979). “” Section 4-1-201(37), C.R.S. 1973. The statutes under which defendant was charged in Counts II and III do not require that the security interest be perfected and we hold that they apply to any valid security interest, perfected or not.”
Lease Fin., Inc. v. Burger, 575 P.2d 857 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). “Whether a transaction is characterized as a lease or sale is not conclusive, but rather it is the intention of the parties which is controlling, that intention to be determined by the facts of each case.”
Young v. Golden State Bank, 560 P.2d 855 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). “Section 4-1-201(19), C.R.S.1973. The knowledge that plaintiffs had an interest in the collateral is not in itself evidence of bad faith, as the foreclosing parties' security interest here was superior to that of plaintiffs.”
Compass Bank v. Kone, 134 P.3d 500 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
W. Grp. Nurseries, Inc. v. Pomeranz, 867 P.2d 12 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(39) — 2 cases
First Nat'l Bank v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 748 F. Supp. 1464 (D. Colo. 1990).
NCR Corp. v. Robert A. McNeil Corp., 746 P.2d 1361 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(43) — 2 cases
Kelly v. Cent. Bank & Trust Co. of Denver, 794 P.2d 1037 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). “See §§ 4-1-201(20), 4-3-201(3) and Comment 8, and 4-3-307(2) and Comment 2, C.”
Willey v. Mayer, 876 P.2d 1260 (Colo. 1994).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(44) — 1 case
State, DNR, Div. of Wildlife v. Benjamin, 587 P.2d 1207 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(44)(d) — 1 case
State Dep't of Revenue v. Adolph Coors Co., 724 P.2d 1341 (Colo. 1986).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(5) — 1 case
Lamson v. Com. Credit Corp., 531 P.2d 966 (Colo. 1975). “” Section 4-1-201(20) defines a holder as “a person who is in possession of.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(87) — 1 case
Lewis v. Columbus Investments, 36 P.3d 75 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(9) — 6 cases
West v. Roberts, 143 P.3d 1037 (Colo. 2006). “" § 4-1-201(19), C.R.S. A purchaser is one who "takes by purchase.”
W. Nat. Bank of Casper v. ABC DRILL., 599 P.2d 942 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
Cugnini v. Reynolds Cattle Co., 687 P.2d 962 (Colo. 1984).
Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Holyoke Cmty. Fed. Credit Union, 121 P.3d 358 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
Morgan Cnty. Feeders, Inc. v. McCormick, 836 P.2d 1051 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(b)(1) — 1 case
Hernandez v. Downing, 154 P.3d 1068 (Colo. 2007).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(b)(20) — 1 case
Georg v. Metro Fixtures Contractors, Inc., 178 P.3d 1209 (Colo. 2008).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 4-1-201(b)(41) — 1 case
Liberty Mortg. Corp. v. Fiscus, 2016 CO 31 (Colo. 2016).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.