Colo. Rev. Stat. § 5-12-103

Greater rate may be stipulated

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(1) The parties to any bond, bill, promissory note, or other instrument of writing may stipulate therein for the payment of a greater or higher rate of interest than eight percent per annum, but not exceeding forty-five percent per annum, and any such stipulation may be enforced in any court of competent jurisdiction in the state, except as otherwise provided in articles 1 to 6 of this title. The rate of interest shall be deemed to be excessive of the limit under this section only if it could have been determined at the time of the stipulation by mathematical computation that such rate would exceed an annual rate of forty-five percent when the rate of interest was calculated on the unpaid balances of the debt on the assumption that the debt is to be paid according to its terms and will not be paid before the end of the agreed term. (2) The term "interest" as used in this section means the sum of all charges payable directly or indirectly by a debtor and imposed directly or indirectly by a lender as an incident to or as a condition of the extension of credit to the debtor, whether paid or payable by the debtor, the lender, or any other person on behalf of the debtor to the lender or to a third party. (3) The public policy of this state does not limit or prohibit contracting, agreeing, or stipulating in advance for the payment of interest on interest or compound interest. (4) No law or public policy of this state limiting interest on interest, the adding of deferred interest to principal, or the compounding of interest shall apply to any promissory note secured by any mortgage or deed of trust or to one secured by a mortgage or deed of trust where periodic disbursement of part of the loan proceeds is made by a lender over a period of time as established by the mortgage or deed of trust, or over an expressed period of time, or ending with the death of the debtor, including, but not limited to, promissory notes secured by mortgages or deeds of trust having provisions for adding deferred interest to principal or otherwise providing for the charging of interest on interest. (5) This section shall not apply to a commercial credit plan as defined in section 5-12- 107 (8) and extensions of credit made pursuant thereto, unless the bond, bill, promissory note, instrument, or other written agreement evidencing the plan expressly states that it is subject to this section.

Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 852, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 73-12-103. L. 72: p. 292, § 6. L. 75: (1) amended, p. 257, § 3, effective July 1. L. 79: (2) amended and (3) and (4) added, p. 317, § 1, effective July 1. L. 81: (4) amended, p. 396, § 33, effective June 8. L. 96: (5) added, p. 407, § 12, effective July 1.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 16 cases, 1981–2019 · leading case: Dikeou v. Dikeou

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Dikeou v. Dikeou (1996) colo · cites it 162× “Because we now conclude that the late charges in this case are properly characterized as "default interest" and are reasonable as analyzed under the nonconsumer loan usury statute at section 5-12-103, 2 C.R.S. (1992), we reverse.”

Terrace No. 1, LLC v. KH Blake Street, LLC—Statutory Interpretation (2019) colo · cites it 18× “Such includable interest must then be combined with any interest that continued to accrue pursuant to the original loan terms to determine the effective rate of interest subject to the 45% ceiling set by Colorado's usury statute, section 5-12-103, C.R.S. (2018). I. Facts and…”

Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd. v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC (In re Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd.) (2019) cob · cites it 11× “In the First Claim for Relief, the Debtor sought a declaration that "the interest charged under [the Promissory Note] is usurious under C.R.S. § 5-12-103." 36 The Second Claim for Relief is very similar.”

Concord Realty Co. v. Continental Funding Corp. (1989) colo · cites it 11× “Continental first alleges that the foreclosure bid could not be used as the basis for a usury computation pursuant to section 5-12-103, 2 C.R.S. (1973). We agree.”

96 Blooming Terrace No. 1, LLC (2017) coloctapp · cites it 8× “¶5 Borrower sued Lender claiming the fees, interest, costs, and expenses payable “for the forbearance period and the amended forbearance period” exceeded the forty-five percent per annum interest allowable under Colorado’s usury law, section 5-12-103, C.R.S. 2016. However,…”

Betancourt v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2004) cod · cites it 3× “Section 5-12-103(1), C.R.S. The evidence establishes that the interest rate charged to the plaintiffs was not usurious, and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment to the extent the Complaint asserts a claim for usury.”

In Re Wood Family Interests, Ltd. (1989) cob · cites it 2× “See, C.R.S. § 5-12-103 and C.R.S. § 18-15-104.”

Jobin v. McKay (In Re M & L Business MacHine Co.) (1993) cob · cites it 2× “See, C.R.S. § 5-12-103, wherein 45% rate of interest is fixed as a maximum permissible, enforceable rate of interest.”

Friedman v. Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc. (2017) cod · cites it 2× “Plaintiffs argue in response that Friedman has standing despite the refund because he was not paid prejudgment interest on the amount contested as required by Colo. Rev. Stat. § 5-12-103 . Thus, they claim that it remains possible for the Court to grant relief to Friedman,…”

Brooks v. Bank of Boulder (1996) cod · cites it 2× “Colo.Rev.Stat. § 5-12-103 (1992); Colo.Rev.”

Becker v. Marketing & Research Consultants, Inc. (1981) cod · cites it 2× “C.R.S. § 5-12-103. If a note has a higher interest rate, it will be invalid to the extent that the interest rate is usurious, but will still be enforced at the maximum allowable rate.”

Rios v. Mireles (1996) coloctapp · cites it 2× “See § 5-12-103, C.R.S. (1992 Repl.Vol. 2). The parties contest only the interest due on the remaining amount in dispute on appeal, $13,744.”

Show all 16 citing cases →

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 5-12-103(1) — 6 cases

Dikeou v. Dikeou (1996) colo “Because we now conclude that the late charges in this case are properly characterized as "default interest" and are reasonable as analyzed under the nonconsumer loan usury statute at section 5-12-103, 2 C.R.S. (1992), we reverse.”

Terrace No. 1, LLC v. KH Blake Street, LLC—Statutory Interpretation (2019) colo “Such includable interest must then be combined with any interest that continued to accrue pursuant to the original loan terms to determine the effective rate of interest subject to the 45% ceiling set by Colorado's usury statute, section 5-12-103, C.R.S. (2018). I. Facts and…”

Betancourt v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2004) cod “Section 5-12-103(1), C.R.S. The evidence establishes that the interest rate charged to the plaintiffs was not usurious, and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment to the extent the Complaint asserts a claim for usury.”

96 Blooming Terrace No. 1, LLC (2017) coloctapp “¶5 Borrower sued Lender claiming the fees, interest, costs, and expenses payable “for the forbearance period and the amended forbearance period” exceeded the forty-five percent per annum interest allowable under Colorado’s usury law, section 5-12-103, C.R.S. 2016. However,…”

Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd. v. World Bus. Lenders, LLC (In re Rent-Rite Superkegs W., Ltd.) (2019) cob “In the First Claim for Relief, the Debtor sought a declaration that "the interest charged under [the Promissory Note] is usurious under C.R.S. § 5-12-103." 36 The Second Claim for Relief is very similar.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 5-12-103(2) — 4 cases

Concord Realty Co. v. Continental Funding Corp. (1989) colo “Continental first alleges that the foreclosure bid could not be used as the basis for a usury computation pursuant to section 5-12-103, 2 C.R.S. (1973). We agree.”

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