(1) The right to the compensation
provided for in articles 40 to 47 of this title, in lieu of any other liability to any person for any
personal injury or death resulting therefrom, shall obtain in all cases where the following
conditions occur:
(a) Where, at the time of the injury, both employer and employee are subject to the
provisions of said articles and where the employer has complied with the provisions thereof
regarding insurance;
(b) Where, at the time of the injury, the employee is performing service arising out of
and in the course of the employee's employment;
(c) Where the injury or death is proximately caused by an injury or occupational disease
arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment and is not intentionally self-
inflicted.
(2) (a) A claim of mental impairment must be proven by evidence supported by the
testimony of a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist. A mental impairment shall not be
considered to arise out of and in the course of employment if it results from a disciplinary action,
work evaluation, job transfer, lay-off, demotion, promotion, termination, retirement, or similar
action taken in good faith by the employer. The mental impairment that is the basis of the claim
must have arisen primarily from the claimant's then occupation and place of employment in
order to be compensable.
(a.5) Repealed.
(b) (I) Notwithstanding any other provision of articles 40 to 47 of this title 8, where a
claim is by reason of mental impairment, a claimant is limited to thirty-six weeks of medical
impairment benefits, which shall be in an amount not less than one hundred fifty dollars per
week and not more than fifty percent of the state average weekly wage, inclusive of any
temporary disability benefits; except that this limitation shall not apply to any victim of a crime
of violence, without regard to the intent of the perpetrator of the crime, nor to the victim of a
physical injury or occupational disease that causes neurological brain damage.
(II) Nothing in this section limits the determination of the percentage of impairment
pursuant to section 8-42-107 (8) for the purposes of establishing the applicable cap on benefits
pursuant to section 8-42-107.5.
(c) The claim of mental impairment cannot be based, in whole or in part, upon facts and
circumstances that are common to all fields of employment.
(d) The mental impairment which is the basis of the claim must be, in and of itself, either
sufficient to render the employee temporarily or permanently disabled from pursuing the
occupation from which the claim arose or to require medical or psychological treatment.
(3) As used in this section:
(a) "Mental impairment" means a recognized, permanent disability arising from an
accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment when the accidental injury
involves no physical injury and consists of a psychologically traumatic event. "Mental
impairment" also includes a disability arising from an accidental physical injury that leads to a
recognized permanent psychological disability.
(b) (I) "Psychologically traumatic event" means an event that is generally outside of a
worker's usual experience and would evoke significant symptoms of distress in a worker in
similar circumstances.
(II) "Psychologically traumatic event" also includes an event that is within a worker's
usual experience only when the worker is diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder by a
licensed psychiatrist or psychologist after the worker experienced exposure to one or more of the
following events:
(A) The worker is the subject of an attempt by another person to cause the worker
serious bodily injury or death through the use of deadly force, and the worker reasonably
believes the worker is the subject of the attempt;
(B) The worker visually or audibly, or both visually and audibly, witnesses a death, or
the immediate aftermath of the death, of one or more people as the result of a violent event; or
(C) The worker repeatedly and either visually or audibly, or both visually and audibly,
witnesses the serious bodily injury, or the immediate aftermath of the serious bodily injury, of
one or more people as the result of the intentional act of another person or an accident.
(c) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that, either at the time of the actual
injury or a later time, involves a substantial risk of death, a substantial risk of serious permanent
disfigurement, or a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or
organ of the body.
Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 479, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: (2) amended, p.
1294, § 7, effective July 1. L. 99: (2)(a) and (2)(b) amended and (2)(a.5) added, p. 299, § 2,
effective July 1. L. 2006: (2)(b) amended, p. 98, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2009: (2)(b) amended,
(SB 09-243), ch. 269, p. 1222, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2017: (2)(a) amended and (3) added, (HB
17-1229), ch. 328, p. 1756, § 1, effective July 1, 2018; (2)(a.5)(II) added by revision, (HB 17-
1229), pp. 1756, 1757, §§ 1, 2. L. 2020: (3)(b)(II)(B) and (3)(b)(II)(C) amended, (SB 20-026),
ch. 142, p. 619, § 1, effective September 14. L. 2023: (2)(b) amended, (HB 23-1076), ch. 370, p.
2222, § 1, effective August 7.
Editor's note: (1) This section is similar to former § 8-52-102 as it existed prior to 1990.
(2) Subsection (2)(a.5)(II) provided for the repeal of subsection (2)(a.5), effective July 1,
2018. (See L. 2017, pp. 1756, 1757.)
Notes of Decisions
Davison v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 84 P.3d 1023 (Colo. 2004).
· cites it 66× “It states in relevant part: A claim of mental impairment must be proven by evidence supported by the testimony of a licensed physician or psychologist.”
City of Thornton v. Replogle, 888 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1995).
· cites it 69× “By the express terms of section 8-41-301, mental impairment is a condition eligible for medical impairment benefits.”
Colorado Dep't of Labor & Emp. v. Esser, 30 P.3d 189 (Colo. 2001).
· cites it 17× “We granted certiorari to determine the meaning of the requirement of section 8-41-301(2)(@a), 3 C.R.S. (2000), that any request for workers' compensation arising from a claim of mental impairment be "proven by evidence supported by the testimony of a licensed physician or…”
Dillard v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 134 P.3d 407 (Colo. 2006).
· cites it 31× “Section 8-41-301(2), C.R.S. (2005), was added by the legislature in 1991, the same year as the benefits cap statute, and allows a worker to recover both temporary and permanent disability benefits upon a finding of mental impairment.”
City of Brighton v. Rodriguez, 318 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2014).
· cites it 11× “Consequently, the City had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Rodriguez's injuries were not compensable because her claim failed to meet one or more of the requirements in section 8-41-301(1). The City's contention that it met its burden to modify its…”
PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, 898 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1995).
· cites it 8× “Section 8-41-301(1) establishes the conditions of recovery as follows: Conditions of recovery.”
Leprino Foods Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 134 P.3d 475 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 4× “1993)(§ 8-41-301(2)(b), C.R.S.2005, which provides that benefits for mental impairment, which are limited to twelve weeks in an amount not less than $150 per week and not more than fifty percent of the state AWW, is an offset, rather than a cap), aff'd, 888 P.”
Dillard v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 121 P.3d 301 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 6× “It determined that a rating for mental impairment may not be joined or merged with a nonscheduled impairment rating but is, instead, a distinct type of impairment that must be compensated separately under § 8-41-301(2), C.R.S.2004. The Panel also concluded that the plain…”
Triad Painting Co. v. Blair, 812 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1991).
· cites it 7× “§ 8-41-301(1), 3B C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). Prior to 1990 essentially identical statutory language was codified as § 8-52-102(1), 3B C.”
Tomsha v. City of Colorado Springs, 856 P.2d 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 14× “62, § 8-41-301(2) at 479, as well as the final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel denying and dismissing his claim for benefits based on work-related stress.”
Archer v. Farmer Bros. Co., 70 P.3d 495 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 6× “" Section 8-41-301(1)(b), C.R.S.2001 (emphasis supplied); see § 8-41-102, C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(1) — 6 cases
PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, 898 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1995).
“Section 8-41-301(1) establishes the conditions of recovery as follows: Conditions of recovery.”
City of Brighton v. Rodriguez, 318 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2014).
“Consequently, the City had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Rodriguez's injuries were not compensable because her claim failed to meet one or more of the requirements in section 8-41-301(1). The City's contention that it met its burden to modify its…”
Triad Painting Co. v. Blair, 812 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1991).
“§ 8-41-301(1), 3B C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). Prior to 1990 essentially identical statutory language was codified as § 8-52-102(1), 3B C.”
City of Thornton v. Replogle, 888 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1995).
“By the express terms of section 8-41-301, mental impairment is a condition eligible for medical impairment benefits.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(1)(a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(1)(b) — 4 cases
Archer v. Farmer Bros. Co., 70 P.3d 495 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
“" Section 8-41-301(1)(b), C.R.S.2001 (emphasis supplied); see § 8-41-102, C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(1)(c) — 13 cases
City of Brighton v. Rodriguez, 318 P.3d 496 (Colo. 2014).
“Consequently, the City had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Rodriguez's injuries were not compensable because her claim failed to meet one or more of the requirements in section 8-41-301(1). The City's contention that it met its burden to modify its…”
Triad Painting Co. v. Blair, 812 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1991).
“§ 8-41-301(1), 3B C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). Prior to 1990 essentially identical statutory language was codified as § 8-52-102(1), 3B C.”
v. Icao, 2020 COA 131 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(1)(e) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(2) — 14 cases
Dillard v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 134 P.3d 407 (Colo. 2006).
“Section 8-41-301(2), C.R.S. (2005), was added by the legislature in 1991, the same year as the benefits cap statute, and allows a worker to recover both temporary and permanent disability benefits upon a finding of mental impairment.”
Colorado Dep't of Labor & Emp. v. Esser, 30 P.3d 189 (Colo. 2001).
“We granted certiorari to determine the meaning of the requirement of section 8-41-301(2)(@a), 3 C.R.S. (2000), that any request for workers' compensation arising from a claim of mental impairment be "proven by evidence supported by the testimony of a licensed physician or…”
Davison v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 84 P.3d 1023 (Colo. 2004).
“It states in relevant part: A claim of mental impairment must be proven by evidence supported by the testimony of a licensed physician or psychologist.”
Dillard v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 121 P.3d 301 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
“It determined that a rating for mental impairment may not be joined or merged with a nonscheduled impairment rating but is, instead, a distinct type of impairment that must be compensated separately under § 8-41-301(2), C.R.S.2004. The Panel also concluded that the plain…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(2)(a) — 23 cases
Davison v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 84 P.3d 1023 (Colo. 2004).
“It states in relevant part: A claim of mental impairment must be proven by evidence supported by the testimony of a licensed physician or psychologist.”
Colorado Dep't of Labor & Emp. v. Esser, 30 P.3d 189 (Colo. 2001).
“We granted certiorari to determine the meaning of the requirement of section 8-41-301(2)(@a), 3 C.R.S. (2000), that any request for workers' compensation arising from a claim of mental impairment be "proven by evidence supported by the testimony of a licensed physician or…”
Tomsha v. City of Colorado Springs, 856 P.2d 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
“62, § 8-41-301(2) at 479, as well as the final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel denying and dismissing his claim for benefits based on work-related stress.”
Dillard v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 134 P.3d 407 (Colo. 2006).
“Section 8-41-301(2), C.R.S. (2005), was added by the legislature in 1991, the same year as the benefits cap statute, and allows a worker to recover both temporary and permanent disability benefits upon a finding of mental impairment.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(2)(b) — 10 cases
City of Thornton v. Replogle, 888 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1995).
“By the express terms of section 8-41-301, mental impairment is a condition eligible for medical impairment benefits.”
Leprino Foods Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 134 P.3d 475 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
“1993)(§ 8-41-301(2)(b), C.R.S.2005, which provides that benefits for mental impairment, which are limited to twelve weeks in an amount not less than $150 per week and not more than fifty percent of the state AWW, is an offset, rather than a cap), aff'd, 888 P.”
Dillard v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 134 P.3d 407 (Colo. 2006).
“Section 8-41-301(2), C.R.S. (2005), was added by the legislature in 1991, the same year as the benefits cap statute, and allows a worker to recover both temporary and permanent disability benefits upon a finding of mental impairment.”
Dillard v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 121 P.3d 301 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
“It determined that a rating for mental impairment may not be joined or merged with a nonscheduled impairment rating but is, instead, a distinct type of impairment that must be compensated separately under § 8-41-301(2), C.R.S.2004. The Panel also concluded that the plain…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(2)(c) — 3 cases
Tomsha v. City of Colorado Springs, 856 P.2d 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
“62, § 8-41-301(2) at 479, as well as the final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel denying and dismissing his claim for benefits based on work-related stress.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(2)(d) — 1 case
Dillard v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 134 P.3d 407 (Colo. 2006).
“Section 8-41-301(2), C.R.S. (2005), was added by the legislature in 1991, the same year as the benefits cap statute, and allows a worker to recover both temporary and permanent disability benefits upon a finding of mental impairment.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(3)(a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(3)(b)(II)(C) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(l)(a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(l)(b) — 6 cases
Triad Painting Co. v. Blair, 812 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1991).
“§ 8-41-301(1), 3B C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). Prior to 1990 essentially identical statutory language was codified as § 8-52-102(1), 3B C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(l)(c) — 5 cases
Triad Painting Co. v. Blair, 812 P.2d 638 (Colo. 1991).
“§ 8-41-301(1), 3B C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). Prior to 1990 essentially identical statutory language was codified as § 8-52-102(1), 3B C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-301(l)(e) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.