Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c (2026)

Educational support orders

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) For purposes of this section, an educational support order is an order entered by a court requiring a parent to provide support for a child or children to attend for up to a total of four full academic years an institution of higher education or a private career school for the purpose of attaining a bachelor's or other undergraduate degree, or other appropriate vocational instruction. An educational support order may be entered with respect to any child who has not attained twenty-three years of age and shall terminate not later than the date on which the child attains twenty-three years of age.

(b) (1) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entry of a decree of dissolution, legal separation or annulment, and no educational support order may be entered thereafter unless the decree explicitly provides that a motion or petition for an educational support order may be filed by either parent at a subsequent date. If no educational support order is entered at the time of entry of a decree of dissolution, legal separation or annulment, and the parents have a child who has not attained twenty-three years of age, the court shall inform the parents that no educational support order may be entered thereafter. The court may accept a parent's waiver of the right to file a motion or petition for an educational support order upon a finding that the parent fully understands the consequences of such waiver.

(2) A waiver of the right to file a motion or petition for an educational support order may be made in writing by either parent and accepted by the court, provided the parent making the writing attests, under oath, that the parent fully understands the consequences of such waiver, and that no restraining order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-38c, between the parties is in effect or pending before the court. The provisions of this subdivision shall not preclude the court from requiring that the parties attend a hearing and that findings be made on the record.

(3) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entry of an order for support pendente lite pursuant to section 46b-83.

(4) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entering an order of support pursuant to section 46b-61 or 46b-569, or similar section of the general statutes, or at any time thereafter.

(5) On motion or petition of a parent, the court may enter an educational support order at the time of entering an order pursuant to any other provision of the general statutes authorizing the court to make an order of support for a child, subject to the provisions of sections 46b-301 to 46b-425, inclusive.

(c) The court may not enter an educational support order pursuant to this section unless the court finds as a matter of fact that it is more likely than not that the parents would have provided support to the child for higher education or private career school if the family were intact. After making such finding, the court, in determining whether to enter an educational support order, shall consider all relevant circumstances, including: (1) The parents' income, assets and other obligations, including obligations to other dependents; (2) the child's need for support to attend an institution of higher education or private career school considering the child's assets and the child's ability to earn income; (3) the availability of financial aid from other sources, including grants and loans; (4) the reasonableness of the higher education to be funded considering the child's academic record and the financial resources available; (5) the child's preparation for, aptitude for and commitment to higher education; and (6) evidence, if any, of the institution of higher education or private career school the child would attend.

(d) Any finding required to be made by the court, pursuant to this section may be made on the basis of an affidavit, made under oath, by either party, provided that the party making the affidavit attests that no restraining order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or protective order, issued pursuant to section 46b-38c, between the parties is in effect or pending before the court. Nothing in this subsection shall preclude the court from requiring that the parties attend a hearing and that findings be made on the record.

(e) At the appropriate time, both parents shall participate in, and agree upon, the decision as to which institution of higher education or private career school the child will attend. The court may make an order resolving the matter if the parents fail to reach an agreement.

(f) To qualify for payments due under an educational support order, the child must (1) enroll in an accredited institution of higher education or private career school, as defined in section 10a-22a, (2) actively pursue a course of study commensurate with the child's vocational goals that constitutes at least one-half the course load determined by that institution or school to constitute full-time enrollment, (3) maintain good academic standing in accordance with the rules of the institution or school, and (4) make available all academic records to both parents during the term of the order. The order shall be suspended after any academic period during which the child fails to comply with these conditions.

(g) The educational support order may include support for any necessary educational expense, including room, board, dues, tuition, fees, registration and application costs, but such expenses shall not be more than the amount charged by The University of Connecticut for a full-time in-state student at the time the child for whom educational support is being ordered matriculates, except this limit may be exceeded by agreement of the parents. An educational support order may also include the cost of books and medical insurance for such child.

(h) The court may direct that payments under an educational support order be made (1) to a parent to be forwarded to the institution of higher education or private career school, (2) directly to the institution or school, or (3) otherwise as the court determines to be appropriate.

(i) On motion or petition of a parent, an educational support order may be modified or enforced in the same manner as is provided by law for any support order.

(j) This section does not create a right of action by a child for parental support for higher education.

(k) An educational support order under this section does not include support for graduate or postgraduate education beyond a bachelor's degree.

(l) The provisions of this section shall apply only in cases when the initial order for parental support of the child is entered on or after October 1, 2002.

(P.A. 02-128, S. 1; P.A. 11-214, S. 6; P.A. 15-71, S. 80; P.A. 21-104, S. 19; P.A. 22-123, S. 40.)

History: P.A. 11-214 amended Subsec. (b)(4) to substitute reference to Sec. 46b-213w for reference to Sec. 46b-213v; P.A. 15-71 amended Subsec. (b)(4) by replacing references to Secs. 46b-212 to 46b-213w with references to Secs. 46b-301 to 46b-425, effective July 1, 2015; P.A. 21-104 added new Subsec. (b)(2) re waiver of right to file motion or petition in writing, redesignated existing Subsecs. (b)(2) to (b)(4) as Subsecs. (b)(3) to (b)(5), added new Subsec. (d) re finding of court based on affidavit and redesignated existing Subsecs. (d) to (k) as Subsecs. (e) to (l), effective June 28, 2021; P.A. 22-123 changed “private occupational school” to “private career school” throughout, effective July 1, 2022.

Although trial court failed to make necessary finding that it was more likely than not that parties would have provided support for their daughter's college education had the family remained intact, its failure to comply with section was harmless, given ample evidence in the record to support such a finding, and given plaintiff's failure to meet his burden of demonstrating that court's failure to make the finding was harmful. 96 CA 102. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing financial order that would secure any educational support order that might be entered in future; however, portion of trial court order, that potentially would have required defendant to maintain life insurance to secure support for child who had reached age of majority and who was not beneficiary of an educational support order, reversed and remanded for clarification. 107 CA 279.

Subsec. (b):

Subdiv. (1): Use of “shall” means it is mandatory that court inform parents that if no educational support order is entered at the time of dissolution, neither party may obtain such an order in future. 86 CA 719.

Subsec. (d):

The word “shall” in subsection creates a mandatory duty on both parents to both participate in and reach an agreement upon the college their child will attend but the statute does not permit a party to evade responsibility for contributing to a child's education by engaging in acts or omissions that violate his statutory obligation. 211 CA 357.

Subsec. (f):

Expenses of relocating child from one state to another, including travel, restaurant meals, lodging or costs of furnishing dorm room and other living expenses, are not within scope of “necessary educational expenses”. 156 CA 383. Trial court abused its discretion by entering an educational support order that required defendant to pay expenses in excess of the amount charged by University of Connecticut for a full-time in-state student when the court made no finding that parents entered into an agreement to exceed the limit imposed by Subsec. 163 CA 517.

Subsec. (h):

Contrary to plaintiff's claims, because pursuant to Subsec. an educational support order may be enforced in same manner as provided by law for any support order, trial court had authority to enforce the order by requiring that security be given, it acted within its discretion and authority in establishing a trust as means of securing the order, and did not abuse its discretion in funding the order with proceeds from sale of Vermont property. 96 CA 102.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 57 cases (16 in the last 5 years), 2004–2026 · leading case: Crews v. Crews, 945 A.2d 502 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
Crews v. Crews, 945 A.2d 502 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). · cites it 44× “The forgoing notwithstanding, upon the termination of the [defendant's] alimony obligation to the [plaintiff], he may reduce his life insurance to $1 million, naming each child as equal beneficiary thereof for so long as he has a child support obligation to either one and/or so…”
Sander v. Sander, 899 A.2d 670 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 21× “because it (a) incorrectly valued his business and the salary he drew therefrom, (b) incorrectly considered a third party’s income when awarding alimony and (c) failed to comply with the child support guidelines; (2) ordered the sale of the parties’ Vermont property; and (3)…”
Leonova v. Leonov, 201 Conn. App. 285 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020). · cites it 12× “The defendant also argues that, to the extent that the court intended its order to constitute a form of postsecondary educational support, the court’s order violates General Statutes § 46b-56c (c)18 because the court expressly stated that it was reserving jurisdiction to enter…”
Robinson v. Robinson, 862 A.2d 326 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). · cites it 22× “In this appeal, the issue to be determined is whether General Statutes § 46b-56c 1 requires *721 the trial court that renders a judgment of dissolution to inform parties who are parents of children who have not attained twenty-three years of age that if no educational support…”
Digiuseppe v. Digiuseppe, 167 A.3d 411 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). · cites it 16× “The defendant claims that the court erred in (1) not finding a latent ambiguity in the provision of the parties' separation agreement (agreement) regarding college expenses when examining it in conjunction with another document signed by the parties entitled "Education Support…”
Kelman v. Kelman, 860 A.2d 292 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). · cites it 9× “On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) improperly relied on the parties’ gross incomes rather than on their net incomes in fashioning its financial orders and (2) exceeded its authority pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c in fashioning its educational support…”
McKeon v. Lennon, 27 A.3d 436 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). · cites it 6× “General Statutes § 46b-56c. "Notwithstanding the foregoing, and for [their daughter] only, the [defendant] shall receive a credit towards his share each year for the amount of $3,500, which [daughter] will pay for through student loans.”
Thunelius v. Posacki, 193 Conn. App. 666 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019). · cites it 5× “21 General Statutes § 46b-56c (c) provides: ‘‘The court may not enter an educational support order pursuant to this section unless the court finds as a matter of fact that it is more likely than not that the parents would have provided support to the child for higher education…”
Histen v. Histen, 911 A.2d 348 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 5× “intiffs contention, pressed throughout his appellate brief, that the educational support provision of the parties’ separation agreement must be construed with reference to language contained in General Statutes § 46b-56c, a fairly recent enactment authorizing courts to enter…”
Hughes v. Hughes, 895 A.2d 274 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 4× “General Statutes § 46b-84 allows for postmajority support for children who are still in high school, and General Statutes § 46b-56c authorizes the court, at the time of the marital dissolution, to frame postmajority education orders.”
Lesueur v. Lesueur, 199 A.3d 1082 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018). · cites it 6× “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly ordered the parties to pay their children's tuition *457 at their respective colleges because the court did not find that the parties had agreed to exceed the limit imposed by General Statutes § 46b-56c(f). 18 The…”
Lederle v. Spivey, 965 A.2d 621 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009). · cites it 4× “” The defendant’s claim implicates General Statutes §§ 46b-56c, 46b-82 and 46b-84.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c(a) — 1 case
David P. Allen v. Kimberly W. Allen, 54 N.E.3d 344 (Ind. 2016).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c(b) — 1 case
Crews v. Crews, 945 A.2d 502 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). “The forgoing notwithstanding, upon the termination of the [defendant's] alimony obligation to the [plaintiff], he may reduce his life insurance to $1 million, naming each child as equal beneficiary thereof for so long as he has a child support obligation to either one and/or so…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c(b)(1) — 3 cases
In re Marriage of Edelman, 2015 IL App (2d) 140847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
In re Marriage of Edelman, 2015 IL App (2d) 140847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
In re Marriage of Edelman, 2015 IL App (2d) 140847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c(b)(4) — 1 case
Digiuseppe v. Digiuseppe, 167 A.3d 411 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). “The defendant claims that the court erred in (1) not finding a latent ambiguity in the provision of the parties' separation agreement (agreement) regarding college expenses when examining it in conjunction with another document signed by the parties entitled "Education Support…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c(c) — 2 cases
Digiuseppe v. Digiuseppe, 167 A.3d 411 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). “The defendant claims that the court erred in (1) not finding a latent ambiguity in the provision of the parties' separation agreement (agreement) regarding college expenses when examining it in conjunction with another document signed by the parties entitled "Education Support…”
Crews v. Crews, 945 A.2d 502 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). “The forgoing notwithstanding, upon the termination of the [defendant's] alimony obligation to the [plaintiff], he may reduce his life insurance to $1 million, naming each child as equal beneficiary thereof for so long as he has a child support obligation to either one and/or so…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c(f) — 2 cases
Lesueur v. Lesueur, 199 A.3d 1082 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018). “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly ordered the parties to pay their children's tuition *457 at their respective colleges because the court did not find that the parties had agreed to exceed the limit imposed by General Statutes § 46b-56c(f). 18 The…”
Digiuseppe v. Digiuseppe, 167 A.3d 411 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). “The defendant claims that the court erred in (1) not finding a latent ambiguity in the provision of the parties' separation agreement (agreement) regarding college expenses when examining it in conjunction with another document signed by the parties entitled "Education Support…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c(g) — 1 case
Crews v. Crews, 945 A.2d 502 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). “The forgoing notwithstanding, upon the termination of the [defendant's] alimony obligation to the [plaintiff], he may reduce his life insurance to $1 million, naming each child as equal beneficiary thereof for so long as he has a child support obligation to either one and/or so…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c(g)(3) — 1 case
Crews v. Crews, 945 A.2d 502 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). “The forgoing notwithstanding, upon the termination of the [defendant's] alimony obligation to the [plaintiff], he may reduce his life insurance to $1 million, naming each child as equal beneficiary thereof for so long as he has a child support obligation to either one and/or so…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c(h) — 1 case
Crews v. Crews, 945 A.2d 502 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). “The forgoing notwithstanding, upon the termination of the [defendant's] alimony obligation to the [plaintiff], he may reduce his life insurance to $1 million, naming each child as equal beneficiary thereof for so long as he has a child support obligation to either one and/or so…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-56c(k) — 3 cases
In re Marriage of Edelman, 2015 IL App (2d) 140847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
In re Marriage of Edelman, 2015 IL App (2d) 140847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
In re Marriage of Edelman, 2015 IL App (2d) 140847 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
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