Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622 (Del. 1973). · Go Syfert
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Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622 (Del. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
41 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Boykin v. State (del, 2025-12-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Boykin v. State
Del. · 2025 · confidence medium
VI. 24 Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 163 (Del. 2008) (citation omitted). 25 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 26 Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 (1972)). 5 the right of speedy trial.” 27 Rather, “courts must . . . engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.”28 (10) We first consider the length of delay.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Montgomery v. State
Del. · 2020 · confidence medium
See also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (holding that police offers with probable cause to search a car for contraband may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police to obtain a warrant to open a sack in a movable vehicle because they lack probable cause to search the entire car). 23 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (adopted by this Court in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973)). 24 Id. at 530. 25 Middlebrook v. State…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hardy
Del. Super. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
Assuming arguendo that Defendant was unaware of the State’s actions until his final case review, the Defendant has not shown that but for this alleged miscommunication he would have not pleaded guilty and instead insisted on going to trial. 28 The Court cannot identify an error 22 Key v. State, 463 A.2d 633, 636 (Del. 1983) (citing Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973)); see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 23 Commitment Order, D.I. 1 (Jan. 11, 2017). 24 Scheduling Order, D.I. 4 (Feb. 22, 2017). 25 Hill v. Lockharl', 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 , 59_60…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Land v. State
Del. · 2017 · confidence medium
A defendant’s right to a speedy trial “attaches as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through arrest or indictment whichever occurs first.”6 The length of delay is a threshold factor.7 Unless the length of delay is determined to be “presumptively prejudicial” the court does not assess the additional factors.8 This 2 Page v. State, 934 A.2d 891, 896 (Del. 2007). 3 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (adopted by this Court in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973)). 4 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . 5 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (citing Barker,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michaels v. State
Del. · 2009 · confidence medium
Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 163 (Del.2008) (citing Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 961 (Del.2006)). . 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (adopted by Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del.1973)). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brodie v. State
Del. · 2009 · confidence medium
This Court adopted the Barker analysis in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973). [8] Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31 ; accord Dabney, 953 A.2d at 163; Page v. State, 934 A.2d 891, 896 (Del. 2007); Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002); Skinner v. State, 575 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Del. 1990); Johnson, 305 A.2d at 623 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dabney v. State (2×)
Del. · 2008 · confidence medium
This Court adopted the Barker analysis in Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del.1973). 12 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Erbe v. State (2×)
Md. · 1976 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Juarez-Casares v. United States, 496 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir.1974); Brady v. Superintendent, 443 F.2d 1307, 1310 (4th Cir.1971); Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149, 1151 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872 (1970); Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 901 (1973). [3] I would hold that *569 the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right and the analogous Article 21 right both apply until, at least, a final judgment is entered upon the pronouncement of sentence.
discussed Cited "see" Sutton v. State
Del. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (adopting the Barker framework for evaluating speedy-trial claims). 36 Johnson, 305 A.2d at 623 (citing Barker). 37 Dabney v. State, 953 A.2d 159, 164 (Del. 2008). 38 McGriff v. State, 2023 WL 600118 , at *3 (Del.
cited Cited "see" Weber v. State
Del. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 624 (Del. 1973). 73 .
discussed Cited "see" Key v. State (2×)
Del. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson, 305 A.2d at 623 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Benjamin v. State
Del. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (adopting Barker test)). 5 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . 6 Id. at 533 . 5 (14) A defendant’s right to a speedy trial “attaches as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through arrest or indictment, whichever occurs first.”7 Unless the length of delay is determined to be “presumptively prejudicial,” it is not necessary to consider the additional Barker factors.8 If the delay between arrest or indictment (whichever occurs first) and the start of trial exceeds one year, this Court will generally consider the additional factors.9…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Kegler v. State
Del. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (adopting Barker test)). 11 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . 12 Id. at 533 . 13 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002). 14 Id. 15 Cooper v. State, 32 A.3d 988 , 2011 WL 6039613, at *7 (Del.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." McGriff v. State
Del. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (adopting Barker test)). 5 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . 6 Id. at 533 . 7 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002). 8 Id. 9 Cooper v. State, 2011 WL 6039613, at *7 (Del.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." McGriff v. State
Del. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (adopting Barker test)). 8 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . 9 Id. at 533 . 7 (19) A defendant’s right to a speedy trial “attaches as soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through arrest or indictment whichever occurs first.”10 Unless the length of delay is determined to be “presumptively prejudicial,” it is not necessary to consider the additional Barker factors.11 This Court has held that if the delay between arrest or indictment and trial approaches one year, then the Court will generally consider the additional factors.12 (20…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Benson v. State
Del. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (adopting Barker test)). 11 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . 12 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 )). 13 Id. 14 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . 10 delay between arrest or indictment and trial approaches one year, then the Court will generally consider the additional factors.15 (23) We will consider the additional factors here because there is more than one year between Benson’s arrest (January 3, 2018) and first trial (March 2019).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Williams v. State
Del. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson v. State, 305 A.2d 622, 623 (Del. 1973) (adopting Barker test). 9 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . 10 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 )). 11 Id. 12 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 . 13 Cooper v. State, 2011 WL 6039613, at *7 (Del.
William T. JOHNSON, Defendant Below, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee
Supreme Court of Delaware.
Jun 25, 1973.
305 A.2d 622
Angelo Falasca, Asst. Public Defender, Wilmington, for appellant., H. Murray Sawyer, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for the State.
Wolcott, Carey, Herrmann.
Cited by 27 opinions  |  Published
WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

Johnson pled guilty to a charge of assault and battery in the Superior Court on April 4, 1968, and was sentenced four years later on April 28, 1972. He now seeks to have his sentence vacated, claiming that two years of the delay (between 1968 and 1970) denied him his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

The record before us permits only a brief chronological statement of the facts. After the plea of guilty to the assault and battery charge, Johnson was returned to Virginia to serve out the remainder of a Virginia sentence. In the summer of 1968, the Superior Court notified Johnson’s attorney that he would not be sentenced until he served out his Virginia sentence. The reasons for postponing sentencing were: (1) the sentence to be imposed in Delaware was dependent on his mental health and emotional stability at the time of imposition; (2) he would gain nothing by being sentenced before he could actually start to serve the Delaware sentence; (3) the Court would want to know how long he had actually been in prison outside of Delaware; (4) the Court would like to know what rehabilitative progress he had made while in the Virginia prison.

In August, 1969, Johnson apparently served out his Virginia sentence. He asserts that he was arrested in Virginia in 1970 upon a Governor’s warrant at the instance of Delaware. As a result of this arrest, Johnson instituted habeas corpus proceedings in the Virginia Courts. The record before us is silent as to how long these proceedings took.

In January, 1972, a Delaware capias was issued for Johnson’s arrest for failure to appear for sentencing. After a postponement and decision on a motion by him, Johnson was sentenced in April, 1972.

There is no definitive decision as to whether the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial applies to the interval between conviction, or entry of a guilty plea, and sentencing. Brady v. Superintendent, Anne Arundel County Detention Center, 4th Cir., 443 F.2d 1307 (1971). Assuming, arguendo, that the guarantee applies, we think it does not require us to vacate this sentence.

Determination of the point at which delay in bringing a defendant to trial, or in this case, sentencing, is a violation of such a right, is not easy to fix. The Supreme Court, however, has suggested some criteria for making that determination. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 31 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). These are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 92 S.Ct. at 2192.

When the facts of this case are considered in this light, it is clear that Johnson has not been denied any assumed Sixth Amendment right. First, the Superior Court’s reasons for postponing the sentencing are valid. Second, although John[*624] son asserts he made some efforts to have his Delaware sentence imposed during the period 1968-1969, he abandoned these efforts in 1970. Indeed, after his release from prison in Virginia, his efforts sought to frustrate the imposition of a Delaware sentence. Third, he has failed to demonstrate in the record any appreciable prejudice resulting from the delay in his sentencing. On the other hand, the length of the delay, which we feel is longer than is normally permissible, weighs in favor of vacating the sentence. However, we do not attribute such weight to this factor so as to overcome the previous three factors. *

We conclude, therefore, that there has been no deprivation of the defendant’s assumed right to a speedy sentencing.

The sentence imposed by the Superior Court is affirmed.

*

After balancing thees four factors in Barher, supra, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction obtained after a five-year delay.