Brown v. State, 310 A.2d 870 (Del. 1973). · Go Syfert
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Brown v. State, 310 A.2d 870 (Del. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
15 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Cooke (delch, 2006-11-01)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cooke
Del. Ch. · 2006 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, 310 A.2d 870, 871 (Del. 1973). 46 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Caldwell v. State
Del. · 2001 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Brown v. State, Del.Supr., 310 A.2d 870, 871 (1973) (‘‘We believe that the three counts which were of the same general character and involved a similar course of con *1056 duct and which were alleged to have occurred within a relatively brief period of time were properly tried together.”); Skinner v. State, Del.Supr., 575 A.2d 1108, 1118 (1990) (permitting joinder of charges relating to "three incidents which occurred during a 1014 hour time span” that involved different victims); Fortt v. State, Del.Supr., 767 A.2d 799, 803-04 (2001) ("Severance is not required ipso facto, simply …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Younger v. State
Del. · 1985 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, Del.Supr., 310 A.2d 870, 871 (1973).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Matheson
Me. · 1976 · signal: contra · confidence medium
Contra, Brown v. State, Del., 310 A.2d 870, 871 (1973); State v. Gilman , 110 R.I. 207, 222 , 291 A.2d 425, 434 (1972). 5 .
examined Cited "see" Wood v. State (3×)
Del. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 310 A.2d 870 (Del.1973) (where the offenses charged are of the same general nature and give evidence of a modus operandi, severance has been denied, even in the face of obvious prejudice to the defendant). 4 .
cited Cited "see" Garden v. State
Del. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Skinner, 575 A.2d at 1118 , citing Brown v. State, 310 A.2d 870, 871 (Del.1973).
cited Cited "see" Skinner v. State
Del. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, Del.Supr., 310 A.2d 870, 871 (1973).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Rosario
Del. Super. Ct. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence low
R. 8. 8 See Lampkins v. State, 465 A.2d 785 (Del. 1983); Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546 (Del. 1985). 9 See Burton v. Sate, 149 A.2d 337 (Del. 1959). 10 See Mayer v. State, 320 A.2d 713 (Del. 1974). 11 Younger v. State, 496 A.2d at 550 ; see also State v. Ellis, 375 A.2d 473, 474 (Del. 1977). 12 Brown v. State, 310 A.2d 870 (Del. 1973). 6 In Skinner v. State,13 the Supreme Court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying a motion to sever various counts of robbery and murder occurring at three different times.
Diane Johnson BROWN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Delaware, Appellee
Supreme Court of Delaware.
Sep 5, 1973.
310 A.2d 870
Henry A. Wise, Jr., of Booker, Green, Shaffer, Berl & Wise, Wilmington, for appellant., Jeffrey M. Weiner, and Joseph A. Hurley, Deputy Attys. Gen., Wilmington, for the State.
Herrmann, Carey, Wright.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published
WRIGHT, Judge:

The defendant appeals from her conviction, after a jury trial, of two charges of selling illegal drugs. See State v. Brown, Del.Super., 287 A.2d 400 (1972).

The indictment returned against the defendant contained three counts charging her with three separate sales alleged to have occurred on three different days at three different places. The time lapse between the first alleged sale and the third was eight days.

During the trial the State abandoned Count III of the indictment after having offered some evidence in support of it.

The defendant first contends that her cases as to Counts I and II of the indictment were prejudiced by the State’s action as to Count III.

This contention has no logical foundation. The fundamental question here is whether or not the three counts were properly tried together. If they were it is of no consequence that one failed either by action of the Trial Court, abandonment by the State, or ultimate jury verdict.

We believe that the three counts which were of the same general character and involved a similar course of conduct and which were alleged to have occurred within a relatively brief period of time were properly tried together. Denial by the Trial Judge of defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground of improper joinder is clearly supported by Rule 8(a), Del.C.Ann., Superior Court Rules — Criminal. See also State v. Porter, Del.Super., 8 Terry 211, 47 Del. 211, 89 A. 2d 545 (1952).

Two further contentions raised by the defendant merit only passing mention since they have been settled by past decisions of this Court.

It is urged that the definition of the term “marijuana” which was in effect at the time the defendant was indicted is so vague and indefinite so as to make the statute under which she was indicted unconstitutional. [1] This Court expressly ruled to the contrary in Miller v. State, Del.Supr., 11 Terry 579, 50 Del. 579, 137 A.2d 388 (1958).

Finally the defendant asks that we adopt the Federal Rule with respect to the defense of entrapment requiring the State to rebut this defense when it is raised and prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime charged. This matter was raised and rejected by this Court in Crosby v. State, Del.Supr., 295 A.2d 708 (1972).

The judgment below is affirmed.

1

. The definition is found in former 16 Del.C. § 4701, since amended.