Delaware Code homeSearch Delaware
Del. C.Title 11 — Crimes and Criminal ProcedureDelaware Criminal CodeChapter 2. General Provisions Concerning Offenses

11 Del. C. § 222 (2026)

General definitions

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026) ACTIVE · 17 IN 5Y cited 1974–2025 48citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 48 opinions since 1974, 17 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (5) (12 cases).

When used in this Criminal Code:

(1) “Building,” in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any structure, vehicle or watercraft. Where a building consists of 2 or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed a separate building.

(2) “Controlled substance” or “counterfeit substance” shall have the same meaning as used in Chapter 47 of Title 16.

(3) “Conviction” means a verdict of guilty by the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, or a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere accepted by the court.

(4) “Covert firearm” means any firearm that is constructed in a shape or configuration such that it does not resemble a firearm.

(5) “Dangerous instrument” means all of the following:

a. Any instrument, article, or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.

b. Any disabling chemical spray.

c. Any electronic control device, including a neuromuscular incapacitation device designed to incapacitate a person.

(6) a. “Deadly weapon” includes any of the following:

1. A firearm.

2. A bomb.

3. A knife of any sort, other than an ordinary pocketknife carried in a closed position.

4. A switchblade knife.

5. A billy.

6. A blackjack.

7. A bludgeon.

8. Metal knuckles.

9. A slingshot.

10. A razor.

11. A bicycle chain.

12. An ice pick.

13. A dangerous instrument, which is used, or attempted to be used, to cause death or serious physical injury.

14. A projectile weapon.

b. For the purpose of this definition, “ordinary pocketknife” means a knife having a blade not more than 3.75 inches in length.

(7) “Defraud” means to acquire a gain or advantage by fraud.

(8) “Disabling chemical spray” includes mace, tear gas, pepper spray or any other mixture containing quantities thereof, or any other aerosol spray or any liquid, gaseous or solid substance capable of producing temporary physical discomfort, disability or injury through being vaporized or otherwise dispersed in the air, or any canister, container or device designed or intended to carry, store or disperse such aerosol spray or such gas or solid.

(9) “Drug” means any substance or preparation capable of producing any alteration of the physical, mental or emotional condition of a person.

(10) “Elderly person” means any person who is 62 years of age or older. Thus, the terms “elderly person” and “person who is 62 years of age or older” shall have the same meaning as used in this Code or in any action brought pursuant to this Code.

(11) “Electronic control device” is a device designed to incapacitate a person, including but not limited to a neuromuscular incapacitation device.

(12) “Female” means a person of the female sex.

(13) “Firearm” means all of the following:

a. A weapon from which a shot, projectile, or other object is designed or may readily be converted to be discharged by force of an explosive, whether operable or inoperable, loaded or unloaded.

b. A firearm frame or receiver.

(14) “Firearm frame or receiver” means the part of the firearm that provides housing for the firearm’s internal components, and includes the hammer, bolt or breechblock, action, and firing mechanism.

(15) “Fraud” means an intentional perversion, misrepresentation or concealment of truth.

(16) “Gender identity” means a gender-related identity, appearance, expression, or behavior of a person, regardless of the person’s assigned sex at birth.

(17) “Law” includes statutes and ordinances. Unless the context otherwise clearly requires, “law” also includes settled principles of the common law of Delaware governing areas other than substantive criminal law.

(18) “Law-enforcement officer” includes police officers, the Attorney General and the Attorney General’s deputies, officers of the State Division of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Marijuana Enforcement, agents employed by a state, county or municipal law-enforcement agency engaged in monitoring sex offenders, correctional officers, probation and parole officers, state fire marshals, municipal fire marshals that are graduates of a Delaware Police Academy which is accredited/authorized by the Police Officer Standards and Training Commission, sworn members of the City of Wilmington Fire Department who have graduated from a Delaware Police Academy which is authorized/accredited by the Police Officer Standards and Training Commission, environmental protection officers, enforcement agents of the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control, and constables. A sheriff or deputy sheriff shall be considered a “law-enforcement officer” when acting upon a specific order of a judge or commissioner of Superior Court. Sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall not have any arrest authority. However, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs may take into custody and transport a person when specifically so ordered by a judge or commissioner of Superior Court.

(19) “Lawful” means in accordance with law or, where the context so requires, not prohibited by law.

(20) “Major component of a firearm” means the slide, barrel, cylinder, trigger group, or receiver of a firearm.

(21) “Male” means a person of the male sex.

(22) “Mental illness” means any condition of the brain or nervous system recognized as a mental disease by a substantial part of the medical profession.

(23) “Narcotic drug” shall have the same definition as contained in § 4701 of Title 16.

(24) “Oath or affirmation,” for the purpose of warrants, can be made via videophone, telephone, secure electronic means or in person.

(25) “Permanently inoperable” means rendered incapable of discharging a projectile by means of an explosive and incapable of being readily restored to a functional state. Cosmetic damage, partial disassembly, removal of parts, or temporary disabling does not constitute permanent inoperability. A firearm or unfinished firearm frame or receiver is permanently inoperable only if the alteration is irreversible and not susceptible to restoration through ordinary tools or commonly available equipment and at least 1 of the following apply:

a. The frame or receiver has been welded, filled, or otherwise permanently altered so that it cannot accept or house fire control components.

b. The barrel has been permanently welded closed or permanently obstructed.

c. The frame or receiver has been cut, torch-cut, or otherwise destroyed in a manner consistent with federal standards for firearm destruction under 27 C.F.R. § 478.92 or guidance issued by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

(26) “Person” means a human being who has been born and is alive, and, where appropriate, a public or private corporation, a trust, a firm, a joint stock company, a union, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a governmental instrumentality.

(27) “Physical force” means any application of force upon or toward the body of another person.

(28) “Physical injury” means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.

(29) “Projectile weapon” means any of the following:

a. A bow.

b. A crossbow.

c. An airbow.

d. A weapon designed to discharge or project an arrow, crossbow bolt, or spear.

e. An airgun that discharges or projects a pellet, slug, or bullet larger than .177 caliber.

(30) “Public transit operator” means a person in control or in charge of a transportation vehicle for public use, in exchange for a fee or charge, offered by any railroad, street railway, traction railway, motor bus, or trolley coach. Specifically excluded are:

a. Transportation to and from any school or school-sponsored event when such transportation is under the regulation of the Department of Education; and

b. Transportation to and from a church, synagogue or other place of worship;

c. Shuttle-type transportation provided by business establishments without charge to customers of the businesses offering such shuttle transportation between fixed termini; and

d. Limousine services.

(31) “Security exemplar” means an object, to be fabricated at the direction of the United States Attorney General, that is all of the following:

a. Constructed of 3.7 ounces of material type 17-4 PH stainless steel in a shape resembling a handgun.

b. Suitable for testing and calibrating metal detectors.

(32) “Serious mental disorder” means any condition of the brain or nervous system recognized as defective, as compared with an average or normal condition, by a substantial part of the medical profession.

(33) “Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ, or which causes the unlawful termination of a pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant female.

(34) “Sexual orientation” includes heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, asexuality, or pansexuality.

(35) “Telephone,” in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any computer (as defined in § 931 of this title) or any other electronic device which is actually used to engage in a wire communication (as defined in § 2401(20) of this title) with any other telephone, computer or electronic device.

(36) “Therapeutic abortion” means an abortion performed pursuant to subchapter IX of Chapter 17 of Title 24.

(37) “Three-dimensional printer” means a computer or computer-driven machine of device capable of producing a 3-dimensional object from a digital model.

(38) “Undetectable firearm” means a firearm constructed entirely of nonmetal substances, or a firearm that after removal of all of the major components of a firearm, is not detectable by walk-through metal detectors calibrated and operated to detect the security exemplar, or firearm which includes a major component of a firearm, which, if subject to the types of detection devices commonly used at airports for security screening, would not generate an image that accurately depicts the shape of the component. It does not include a firearm subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(p)(3) through (6).

(39) “Unfinished firearm frame or receiver” means a firearm frame or receiver that requires further machining or molding in order to be used as part of a functional firearm, and which is designed and intended to be used in the assembly of a functional firearm.

(40) “Unlawful” means contrary to law or, where the context so requires, not permitted by law. It does not mean wrongful or immoral.

(41) “Untraceable firearm” means a firearm for which the sale or distribution chain from a licensed retailer to the point of its first retail sale cannot be traced by law-enforcement officials. “Untraceable firearm” does not include any of the following:

a. Firearms manufactured prior to 1968.

b. Muzzle-loading firearms designed to use black powder or its equivalent.

c. Firearms which are designed as replicas of antique firearms originally manufactured prior to 1898.

(42) “Vehicle” includes any means in or by which someone travels or something is carried or conveyed or a means of conveyance or transport, whether or not propelled by its own power.

(43) “Virtual currency” means a digital representation of value that is used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, or store of value; and is not money, whether or not denominated in money; and does not include any of the following:

a. A transaction in which a merchant grants, as part of an affinity or rewards program, value that cannot be taken from or exchanged with the merchant for money, bank credit, or virtual currency.

b. A digital representation of value issued by or on behalf of a publisher and used solely within an online game, game platform, or family of games sold by the same publisher or offered on the same game platform.

11 Del. C. 1953, §  222;  58 Del. Laws, c. 497, §  1;  59 Del. Laws, c. 203, §  1;  63 Del. Laws, c. 92, §  1;  64 Del. Laws, c. 17, §  1;  68 Del. Laws, c. 378, §§  1-3;  69 Del. Laws, c. 24, §  1;  70 Del. Laws, c. 186, §  1;  70 Del. Laws, c. 383, §  1;  71 Del. Laws, c. 374, §§  1-3;  72 Del. Laws, c. 34, §  8;  72 Del. Laws, c. 43, §  2;  72 Del. Laws, c. 50, §  1;  72 Del. Laws, c. 371, §  1;  72 Del. Laws, c. 379, §  1;  73 Del. Laws, c. 126, §  1;  73 Del. Laws, c. 249, §  1;  73 Del. Laws, c. 413, §  1;  74 Del. Laws, c. 71, §  4;  74 Del. Laws, c. 250, §  2;  76 Del. Laws, c. 270, §§  1, 2;  77 Del. Laws, c. 64, §  3;  78 Del. Laws, c. 13, §  3;  78 Del. Laws, c. 224, §  1;  78 Del. Laws, c. 266, §  1;  78 Del. Laws, c. 325, §  3;  79 Del. Laws, c. 200, §  1;  79 Del. Laws, c. 341, §  1;  80 Del. Laws, c. 264, § 1;  83 Del. Laws, c. 246, § 1;  84 Del. Laws, c. 149, § 2;  84 Del. Laws, c. 215, § 1;  84 Del. Laws, c. 525, § 1;  84 Del. Laws, c. 530, § 3;  85 Del. Laws, c. 119, § 1;  85 Del. Laws, c. 469, § 1;  85 Del. Laws, c. 510, § 1;  85 Del. Laws, c. 518, § 17;
The 20 cases that cite 11 Del. C. § 222 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
cites § 222 1×cited by 173 cases
Where it cites § 222
“Code § 215 (1995); 11 Del.C. § 222 (1994); D.C.Code § 22-2903 (1994); Fla.”
The case’s holding
Congress may regulate intrastate criminal activity under the Commerce Clause if it rationally believes the activity serves as a conduit for a nationwide pipeline of illegal activity.
Later courts cite it for
“if a criminal activity is rationally believed to be one of the conduits of a nationwide and international pipeline of illegal activity, congress may justifiably step in and regulate that activity although it is wholly intrastate.” · 5 citing courts
2
GREENJenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83 (Del. 1979).
cites § 222 1×subsections: (5)cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 222
“11 Del.C. § 222(5) in pertinent part provides: “Deadly weapon” includes any weapon from which a shot may be discharged”
3
GREENHarris v. State, 965 A.2d 691 (Del. 2009).
cites § 222 1×subsections: (23)cited by 6 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
4
REDState v. Holden, 54 A.3d 1123 (Del. Super. Ct. 2010).
cites § 222 1×subsections: (16)cited by 6 cases
Reversed by State v. Holden (2013): the Supreme Court of Delaware's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 222
“11 Del. C. § 222(16) (emphasis added). . Biddle, 2006 WL 1148663 , at *2 ("[S]tate courts have [] found that persons have an expectation of privacy with respect to the tracking of their vehicles.”
5
GREENState v. Flowers, 330 A.2d 146 (Del. 1974).
cites § 222 1×subsections: (3)cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 222
“2d 746 (1974); 11 Del.C. § 222(3). And we see no reason in law or logic to create a special status between conviction and its consequences, that is, the imposition of sentence.”
6
GREENSmall v. Pierce, 226 F. Supp. 3d 299 (D. Del. 2016).
cites § 222 1×subsections: (11)cited by 1 case
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
7
GREENSimon v. State, 985 A.2d 391 (Del. 2009).
cites § 222 1×subsections: (12)cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 222
“[15] "Firearm," as defined under 11 Del. C. § 222(12), "includes any weapon from which a shot, projectile or other object may be discharged by force of combustion, explosive, gas and/or mechanical means.”
8
NO FLAGRigby v. Carney, No. 1:21-cv-01523 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2022).
cites § 222 9×subsections: (4) (13) (14) (19)cited by 0 casesunknown
Where it cites § 222
“2021) (codified at 11 Del. C. §§ 222, 1459, 1459A, 1462, 1463).”
9
NO FLAGState v. Frost, No. 1810006157 (Del. Super. Ct. May 28, 2019).
cites § 222 3×subsections: (5) 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 222
“Holl that he had a “knife,”” the record is void of any sufficient articulation as to whether the seized knife was a “deadly weapon” pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 222 or an “ordinary pocket knife.”
10
NO FLAGJones v. State, No. 429, 2018 (Del. Jan. 7, 2020).
cites § 222 3×subsections: (4) (5)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 222
“1998) (discussing the history of 11 Del. C. § 222 regarding the definitions of “deadly weapon” and “dangerous instrument”).”
11
NO FLAGAustin v. State, No. 185, 2016 (Del. Aug. 1, 2016).
cites § 222 2×subsections: (5) 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 222
“Under 11 Del. C. § 222(5), a “deadly weapon” includes “any „dangerous instrument,‟ as defined in paragraph (4) of this section, which is used, or attempted to be used, to cause death or serious physical injury.”
12
NO FLAGCarlo v. State, No. 209, 2016 (Del. Nov. 30, 2016).
cites § 222 2×subsections: (23)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 222
“” Carlo concedes that the injuries to Officer Smith’s fingers do constitute physical injuries as defined in 11 Del. C. § 222, but argues that the evidence presented at trial did not support a finding that he intended to cause physical injury to Officer Smith’s hand.”
13
NO FLAGBradley v. Rite Aid, No. N16A-02-003 ALR (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2017).
cites § 222 2×subsections: (4) (5)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 222
“17 11 Del. C. § 222(4). 18 See § 222(4)–(5).”
14
NEUTRALClark v. State, 224 A.3d 997 (Del. 2020).
cites § 222 2×subsections: (26)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 222
“’ And third, if, as Clark urges, the attempted assault of Kyle is truly a lesser 39 11 Del. C. § 222 (23). 40 11 Del. C. § 531(1).”
15
NO FLAGState v. Pinkston, No. 1701018345 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2020).
cites § 222 2×subsections: (4)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 222
“” A “deadly weapon” as used in the Robbery 1* degree statute is defined by 11 Del. C. § 222 as a knife of any sort (other than an ordinary pocketknife carried in a closed position), switchblade knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, metal knuckles, slingshot, razor, bicycle chain or…”
16
NO FLAGState v. Destafney, No. 2201008017 (Del. Super. Ct. May 22, 2024).
cites § 222 2×subsections: (6) (13)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 222
“60 11 Del. C. § 222(13) (emphasis added). 61 Somerville v.”
17
NO FLAGWilson v. May, No. 1:19-cv-00326 (D. Del. Mar. 18, 2022).
cites § 222 2×subsections: (5) (26)cited by 0 casesunknown
Where it cites § 222
“” 11 Del. Code § 222(26). “Dangerous instrument” is defined, in relevant part, as “any instrument, article or substance which, under the 4 The Delaware Supreme Court cited its prior decision in Tilden v.”
18
NO FLAGMai v. Troxler, No. 1:20-cv-00526 (D. Del. Apr. 7, 2022).
cites § 222 2×subsections: (26) 2×cited by 0 casesunknown
Where it cites § 222
“§ 8903; and, (11) malpractice. A liberal reading of the Complaint indicates the claims are: (1) denial of medical care such as electrolysis/hair removal and sex reassignment surgery; (2) failure to address suicide risk; (3) failure to transfer Plaintiff to Bailor Women’s…”
19
NO FLAGState v. Church, No. 2403005415 (Del. Super. Ct. May 15, 2025).
cites § 222 2×subsections: (32) 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 222
“Defendant is over six feet tall and of heavy build. Witnesses and Defendant’s driver’s license both put his weight at 300 pounds.”
20
NO FLAGState v. Smith, No. 2105010115 (Del. Super. Ct. June 10, 2025).
cites § 222 2×subsections: (5)(a) (6)(a)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 222
“18 11 Del. C. § 222(5)(a). 9 assaults have been committed with common objects such as bowling balls,[19] baseball bats,[20] ratchet bars from tire jacks,[ 21] and cast-iron kitchen sinks[22].”

Show all 48 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197419992025

One bar per year. Tallest: 7 cases in 2016. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Del.21Del. Super. Ct.18D. Del.53rd Cir.2Del. Ch.1Del. Ct. Com. Pl.1
By subsection
(1)2 cases
Ross v. State, 339 A.3d 749 (Del. 2025).
United States v. Bell, 288 F. App'x 810 (3d Cir. 2008).
(3)3 cases
State v. Flowers, 330 A.2d 146 (Del. 1974).“2d 746 (1974); 11 Del.C. § 222(3). And we see no reason in law or logic to create a special status between conviction and its consequences, that is, the imposition of sentence.”
Mitchell v. State, No. 609, 2015 (Del. June 15, 2016).
Walls v. State, 223 A.3d 882 (Del. 2019).
(4)5 cases
Bradley v. Rite Aid, No. N16A-02-003 ALR (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2017).“17 11 Del. C. § 222(4). 18 See § 222(4)–(5).”
Jones v. State, No. 429, 2018 (Del. Jan. 7, 2020).“1998) (discussing the history of 11 Del. C. § 222 regarding the definitions of “deadly weapon” and “dangerous instrument”).”
State v. Pinkston, No. 1701018345 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2020).“” A “deadly weapon” as used in the Robbery 1* degree statute is defined by 11 Del. C. § 222 as a knife of any sort (other than an ordinary pocketknife carried in a closed position), switchblade knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, metal knuckles, slingshot, razor, bicycle chain or…”
Rigby v. Carney, No. 1:21-cv-01523 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2022).“2021) (codified at 11 Del. C. §§ 222, 1459, 1459A, 1462, 1463).”
Blunt v. State, No. 305, 2014 (Del. Mar. 24, 2015).
(5)12 cases
Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83 (Del. 1979).“11 Del.C. § 222(5) in pertinent part provides: “Deadly weapon” includes any weapon from which a shot may be discharged”
Austin v. State, No. 185, 2016 (Del. Aug. 1, 2016).“Under 11 Del. C. § 222(5), a “deadly weapon” includes “any „dangerous instrument,‟ as defined in paragraph (4) of this section, which is used, or attempted to be used, to cause death or serious physical injury.”
State v. Frost, No. 1810006157 (Del. Super. Ct. May 28, 2019).“Holl that he had a “knife,”” the record is void of any sufficient articulation as to whether the seized knife was a “deadly weapon” pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 222 or an “ordinary pocket knife.”
Mundell v. State, No. 648, 2015 (Del. May 6, 2016).
Bradley v. Rite Aid, No. N16A-02-003 ALR (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2017).
Showing the top 5 of 12. More in the list view →
(5)(a)1 case
State v. Smith, No. 2105010115 (Del. Super. Ct. June 10, 2025).“18 11 Del. C. § 222(5)(a). 9 assaults have been committed with common objects such as bowling balls,[19] baseball bats,[20] ratchet bars from tire jacks,[ 21] and cast-iron kitchen sinks[22].”
(6)3 cases
State v. Register, No. 2209010456 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2023).
State v. Destafney, No. 2201008017 (Del. Super. Ct. May 22, 2024).“60 11 Del. C. § 222(13) (emphasis added). 61 Somerville v.”
State v. Williams, No. 2211005272; 2207003702 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 2024).
(6)(a)1 case
State v. Smith, No. 2105010115 (Del. Super. Ct. June 10, 2025).
(8)1 case
State of Delaware v. Diane Leone, No. 1506005389 (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. June 13, 2016).
(11)1 case
Small v. Pierce, 226 F. Supp. 3d 299 (D. Del. 2016).
(12)5 cases
Simon v. State, 985 A.2d 391 (Del. 2009).“[15] "Firearm," as defined under 11 Del. C. § 222(12), "includes any weapon from which a shot, projectile or other object may be discharged by force of combustion, explosive, gas and/or mechanical means.”
State v. Jones, No. 2203006971 (Del. Super. Ct. May 6, 2025).
Elmore v. State, No. 597, 2014 (Del. June 9, 2015).
State of Delaware v. Van Vliet., No. 1406008729 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2015).
State of Delaware v. Van Vliet., No. 1406008729 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2015).
(13)4 cases
State v. Lambert, 278 A.3d 71 (Del. Super. Ct. 2022).
State v. Destafney, No. 2201008017 (Del. Super. Ct. May 22, 2024).
Rigby v. Carney, No. 1:21-cv-01523 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2022).
Kegler v. State, 326 A.3d 706 (Del. 2024).
(14)1 case
Rigby v. Carney, No. 1:21-cv-01523 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2022).
(16)1 case
State v. Holden, 54 A.3d 1123 (Del. Super. Ct. 2010).“11 Del. C. § 222(16) (emphasis added). . Biddle, 2006 WL 1148663 , at *2 ("[S]tate courts have [] found that persons have an expectation of privacy with respect to the tracking of their vehicles.”
(19)1 case
Rigby v. Carney, No. 1:21-cv-01523 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2022).
(21)2 cases
Evans v. State, No. 1705000032 (Del. Super. Ct. June 5, 2019).
IMO Simmons, No. 184, 2020 (Del. July 10, 2020).
(23)3 cases
Harris v. State, 965 A.2d 691 (Del. 2009).
Carlo v. State, No. 209, 2016 (Del. Nov. 30, 2016).“” Carlo concedes that the injuries to Officer Smith’s fingers do constitute physical injuries as defined in 11 Del. C. § 222, but argues that the evidence presented at trial did not support a finding that he intended to cause physical injury to Officer Smith’s hand.”
State v. Salaberrios, No. 1710001749 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020).
(26)4 cases
Mai v. Troxler, No. 1:20-cv-00526 (D. Del. Apr. 7, 2022).“§ 8903; and, (11) malpractice. A liberal reading of the Complaint indicates the claims are: (1) denial of medical care such as electrolysis/hair removal and sex reassignment surgery; (2) failure to address suicide risk; (3) failure to transfer Plaintiff to Bailor Women’s…”
Clark v. State, 224 A.3d 997 (Del. 2020).“’ And third, if, as Clark urges, the attempted assault of Kyle is truly a lesser 39 11 Del. C. § 222 (23). 40 11 Del. C. § 531(1).”
Wilson v. May, No. 1:19-cv-00326 (D. Del. Mar. 18, 2022).“” 11 Del. Code § 222(26). “Dangerous instrument” is defined, in relevant part, as “any instrument, article or substance which, under the 4 The Delaware Supreme Court cited its prior decision in Tilden v.”
Blunt v. State, No. 305, 2014 (Del. Mar. 24, 2015).
(32)1 case
State v. Church, No. 2403005415 (Del. Super. Ct. May 15, 2025).“Defendant is over six feet tall and of heavy build. Witnesses and Defendant’s driver’s license both put his weight at 300 pounds.”
(33)1 case
Rigby v. Carney, No. 1:21-cv-01523 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2022).
(34)1 case
Rigby v. Carney, No. 1:21-cv-01523 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2022).
(35)1 case
Rigby v. Carney, No. 1:21-cv-01523 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2022).
(37)1 case
Rigby v. Carney, No. 1:21-cv-01523 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 2022).

Show all 48 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025-26 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

Delaware Code Home  |  Search Delaware  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com