Delaware Code

11 Del. C. § 306 (2026)

No conclusive presumptions; rebuttable presumptions and proof thereof

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) There are no conclusive presumptions in this Criminal Code, and all conclusive presumptions formerly existing in the criminal law of this State are hereby abolished.

(b) Rebuttable presumptions formerly existing in the criminal law of this State are preserved except to the extent that they are inconsistent with this Criminal Code.

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Criminal Code, the following rebuttable presumptions are expressly preserved:

(1) A person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of the person’s act.

(2) A person found in possession of goods acquired as a result of the commission of a recent crime is presumed to have committed the crime.

(d) Proof of a fact tending to create a rebuttable presumption not inconsistent with this Criminal Code or a presumption created by this Criminal Code constitutes prima facie evidence of the presumed conclusion.

(e) The court may tell the jury of the existence of the presumption, and if it does so the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that the presumption does not relieve the State of its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the jury may convict the defendant, despite the existence of evidence tending to rebut the presumption, if they find no reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt.

11 Del. C. 1953, §  306;  58 Del. Laws, c. 497, §  159 Del. Laws, c. 203, §  270 Del. Laws, c. 186, §  1
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1976–2025 · leading case: Pitts v. Redman, 776 F. Supp. 907 (D. Del. 1991).
Pitts v. Redman, 776 F. Supp. 907 (D. Del. 1991). “Based on the discovery, at the South Mechanic Street house and in the two cars, of stolen proper *924 ty from all of the burglaries, the jury could decide that Pitts had taken or was exercising control over the property and could further infer that he had participated in the…”
Harris v. State, 965 A.2d 691 (Del. 2009). “CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the assault second degree conviction is reversed and all remaining convictions are affirmed. This matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further action in accordance with this decision.”
Gibbs v. State, 359 A.2d 164 (Del. 1976). “as two friends left him in Dover, a man whom he had known for two or three weeks drove up and offered him $20.00 to drive the car to a club in Middletown and that he was on his way when stopped.”
State v. Church (Del. Super. Ct. 2025). · cites it 4× “§ 262 was harmless, as 11 Del. C. § 306(c)(1) provides an independent basis for the Court’s decision.”
Carlo v. State (Del. 2016). · cites it 2× “One was 11 Del. C. § 306(c)(1), which provides that “[a] person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of the person’s act.”
Diggs v. State (Del. 2021). “Second, he contends that the presumption of reliability afforded to the informant’s tip is an impermissible conclusive presumption under 11 Del. C. § 306. Third, Diggs argues that the absence of any information about the informant’s basis of knowledge—that is, how the informant…”
State v. Ford (Del. Super. Ct. 2023). “at 365 ; see also 11 Del. C. §§ 306, 307. 15 945 A.2d 1158 (Del.”
State v. Church (Del. Super. Ct. 2025). “9 11 Del. C. § 306(c)(1) permits the jury to draw an inference 24 that “a person .”
State v. Johnson (Del. Super. Ct. 2025). “1983); see also 11 Del. C. §306(c)(1). 44 See D.I. 44. 45 Id.”
— 11 Del. C. § 306(c)(1) — 5 cases
Harris v. State, 965 A.2d 691 (Del. 2009). “CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the assault second degree conviction is reversed and all remaining convictions are affirmed. This matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further action in accordance with this decision.”
State v. Church (Del. Super. Ct. 2025). “§ 262 was harmless, as 11 Del. C. § 306(c)(1) provides an independent basis for the Court’s decision.”
Carlo v. State (Del. 2016). “One was 11 Del. C. § 306(c)(1), which provides that “[a] person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of the person’s act.”
State v. Church (Del. Super. Ct. 2025). “9 11 Del. C. § 306(c)(1) permits the jury to draw an inference 24 that “a person .”
State v. Johnson (Del. Super. Ct. 2025). “1983); see also 11 Del. C. §306(c)(1). 44 See D.I. 44. 45 Id.”
— 11 Del. C. § 306(c)(2) — 2 cases
Pitts v. Redman, 776 F. Supp. 907 (D. Del. 1991). “Based on the discovery, at the South Mechanic Street house and in the two cars, of stolen proper *924 ty from all of the burglaries, the jury could decide that Pitts had taken or was exercising control over the property and could further infer that he had participated in the…”
Gibbs v. State, 359 A.2d 164 (Del. 1976). “as two friends left him in Dover, a man whom he had known for two or three weeks drove up and offered him $20.00 to drive the car to a club in Middletown and that he was on his way when stopped.”
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