United States v. Eric Cunningham, 142 F.3d 440 (7th Cir. 1998). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Eric Cunningham, 142 F.3d 440 (7th Cir. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
54 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Paul Palmer, Jr. v. Indiana University (ca7, 2022-04-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paul Palmer, Jr. v. Indiana University
7th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
This is far longer than the delayed filing period we have allowed when applying equitable tolling in prior cases, and comfortably falls outside of the meaning of a “rea- sonable time.” See, e.g., Kren v. City of Springfield, 142 F.3d 440 at *2 (7th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (waiting just over nine months to file an EEOC complaint was not “within a reason- able time”); see also Thelen, 64 F.3d at 286 and Denney v. Eaton Corp., 165 F.3d 31 at *2 (7th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (both stat- ing that waiting nearly ten months to file an administrative complaint was not “within a reasonable t…
discussed Cited "see" DuFour v. Matrisch
N.D. Ill. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Oney v. Nennig, 142 F.3d 440 , 1998 WL 123114 , at *1 (7th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (district court properly took judicial notice of documents “[b]ecause they [were] all matters of public record and [plaintiff] did not challenge the documents’ authenticity or accuracy”).
discussed Cited "see" Uwakwe v. Pelham Acad.
D.D.C. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kren v. City of Springfield , 1998 WL 152974 , at *2, 142 F.3d 440 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 1998) ("Further, under equitable tolling a court does not grant a claimant 'a fresh 300 days to file his charge once he obtains enough information to suspect discrimination; he must file his charge with the EEOC within a reasonable time.' " (quoting Thelen v. Marc's Big Boy Corp. , 64 F.3d 264 , 268 (7th Cir. 1995) )); Yuan Gao v. Mukasey , 519 F.3d 376 , 378-79 (7th Cir. 2008) ; see also McPherson v. United States , 392 Fed.Appx. 938 , 945 (3d Cir. 2010) (following the Seventh Circuit).
cited Cited "see" Nelson v. Repository Technologies, Inc. (In Re Repository Technologies, Inc.)
N.D. Ill. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Price v. CIR, 142 F.3d 440 (7th Cir.1998) (unpublished opinion) (citing Roth Steel Tube Co. v. C.I.R., 800 F.2d 625, 630-31 (6th Cir.1986)). 5 .
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Navedo
W.D.N.Y. · 2006 · signal: accord · confidence high
As the Second Circuit recently stated in United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 222 (2d Cir.2006), “a defendant’s knowledge and intent are crucial to determining whether he exercised constructive possession over an item: ‘Constructive possession exists when a person ... knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.’ ” (quoting United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir.1992) (emphasis in original)); see also United States v. Teague, 93 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir.1996) (to prove possession…
discussed Cited "see" Douglas v. Stanwick
W.D.N.Y. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Thomas v. O’Haver, 142 F.3d 440 (table), 1998 WL 171270 * 4 (7th Cir.1998) (“Physicians will disagree about whether a particular course of treatment is appropriate, or even if treatment is appropriate at all, but a disagreement in treatment alone will not support a constitutional 'violation”) (citing Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d at 586, 590 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1126 , 117 S.Ct. 980 , 136 L.Ed.2d 863 (1997)); Foote v. Nevada Dept. of Prisons, 139 F.3d 904 (table), 1998 WL 74993 *1 (9th Cir.1998) (“A difference of opinion, whether between an inmate and physician or be…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Carlton T. McIntosh (2×)
7th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Taylor, 72 F.3d 533, 549 (7th Cir. 1995), dismissal of post-conviction relief affirmed by 142 F.3d 440 (7th Cir. 1998). 11 In light of our deference to district courts, "[w]e have refrained from formulating categorical tests, preferring to leave it to the sentencing judges to apply common sense to the testimony they hear and the defendants they observe." United States v. Dvorak, 41 F.3d 1215, 1217 (7th Cir. 1994).
United States
v.
Eric Cunningham
97-1897.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
May 5, 1998.
142 F.3d 440
Unpublished

142 F.3d 440

NOTICE: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) states unpublished orders shall not be cited or used as precedent except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case in any federal court within the circuit.
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Eric CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-1897.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted April 23, 1998[*].
Decided May 5, 1998.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 96-CR-205 J.P. Stadtmueller, Chief Judge.

Before Hon. THOMAS E. FAIRCHILD, Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.

Order

1

Following a bench trial, Eric Cunningham was convicted of possessing a firearm despite a felony conviction that made such possession unlawful, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 67 months' imprisonment. His first appellate lawyer filed a brief on the merits with which Cunningham was dissatisfied. Cunningham asked us to replace his lawyer, which we did (striking the appellate brief in the process). Newly appointed appellate counsel then filed an Anders brief and motion to withdraw, concluding that there are no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal.

2

Milwaukee police encountered Cunningham during a drug investigation. He agreed to a search of a car that he said was his and gave the keys to the officers. They found a gun, which Cunningham admitted owning. At trial the parties stipulated that Cunningham had a felony conviction and that the gun was among the weapons proscribed by statute. That was enough evidence to persuade the judge to find Cunningham guilty.

3

The Anders brief explores, and deems frivolous, the two issues Cunningham's first lawyer briefed on the merits: the sufficiency of the evidence and a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice. We agree with counsel that these have no hope of success. Cunningham essentially confessed to the crime by telling an officer that the gun was his; a rational trier of fact could find the evidence sufficient. The sentencing enhancement was based on Cunningham's testimony, which the judge deemed perjurious in findings that satisfy the standard of United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993).

4

Cunningham believes that counsel should have opened an attack on the effectiveness of his first lawyer, who did not seek to have Cunningham's statements to the police suppressed, and who may have advised him to waive his right to trial by jury. But this record does not reveal whether there were any grounds for suppression, what advice about the choice between bench and jury trial was given, or any of the other details that would be vital to an assessment of counsel's litigation strategy. An ineffective-assistance argument on this record would be doomed, and would foreclose use of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to make the argument on an enlarged record. Cunningham should file a § 2255 petition if he believes that he is able to demonstrate constitutional ineffectiveness. (Cunningham should recognize, however, that he can file only one § 2255 petition, so he should investigate all potential claims before acting.)

5

The motion to withdraw is granted and the appeal is dismissed as frivolous.

*

After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary, and the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f)