In Re Sokolowski Debtor, Bankboston, N.A., Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Cynthia L. Sokolowski, Appellee-Cross-Appellant, 205 F.3d 532 (2d Cir. 2000). · Go Syfert
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In Re Sokolowski Debtor, Bankboston, N.A., Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Cynthia L. Sokolowski, Appellee-Cross-Appellant, 205 F.3d 532 (2d Cir. 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“this court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the supreme court or this court en banc.”
83 citation events (76 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Gater Assets Ltd. v. AO Moldovagaz (ca2, 2021-06-22)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 49 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Gater Assets Ltd. v. AO Moldovagaz
2d Cir. · 2021 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
his court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the supreme court or this court en banc.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Securities Investor Protection Corporation v. Bdo Seidman, Llp
2d Cir. · 2000 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
this court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the supreme court or this court en banc.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McKinney v. City of Middletown
2d Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
We are also “bound by our own precedent ‘unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc.’” Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 659 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir. 27 2000)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Tyrone Felder
2d Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sikhs for Justice Inc. ex rel. Singh v. Indian National Congress Party
S.D.N.Y. · 2014 · confidence medium
Courts have interpreted this to mean that a decision of the Second Circuit is binding “‘unless it has been called into question by an intervening Supreme Court decision or by one of [the Second Circuit] sitting in banc ’ ” or “ ‘unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court, or [the Second Circuit] court in banc.’” United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235, 269 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001) and In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir.2000)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re South African Apartheid Litigation
S.D.N.Y. · 2014 · confidence medium
United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235, 269 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001) and In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir.2000)). . " 'The presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.’ " Kiobel II, 133 S.Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 , 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2884 , 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010)) (emphasis in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Agrawal (2×)
2d Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
Regardless of Congress’s subsequent change to the statute, we are compelled to follow a decision of an earlier panel “unless it has been called into question by an intervening Supreme Court decision or by one of this Court sitting in banc,” United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001), or “unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court, or this court in banc,” In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bank v. Independence Energy Group LLC
E.D.N.Y · 2013 · confidence medium
Crediting the plaintiffs argument that “Giovanniello is no longer good law in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mims and Shady Grove," and citing several of the same out-of-Circuit district court cases referenced by Plaintiff in this action, Judge Seibel concluded, “I am persuaded that the Second Circuit will likely depart from its prior decision in Giovanniello and conclude that Mims ... supports] the contention that the TCPA should not be interpreted as requiring a federal court to follow state law.” Id. at 280, at *5. 3 The Second Circuit may depart from a prior decision whe…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Poventud v. City of New York (2×)
2d Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
The dissent also cites two cases— 13 Court may depart from a prior decision when that earlier decision’s “rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court.” In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miles v. City of Hartford
2d Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
In Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850 (2d Cir.1992), the Court explicitly held that “a dismissal pursuant to the Connecticut accelerated pretrial rehabilitation program is not a termination in favor of the accused for purposes of a civil rights suit.” Id. at 853 . “[T]his court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled.... ” In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Allah, 130 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir.1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sompo Japan Insurance Co. of America v. Union Pacific Railroad
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
However, “[t]his court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc.” In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-535 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sompo Japan Insurance Co. of America v. Union Pacific Railroad
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
However, “[t]his court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc.” In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sompo Japan Insurance Co. of America v. Union Pacific Railroad
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
However, “[t]his court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc.” In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-535 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sompo Japan Insurance Co. of America v. Union Pacific Railroad
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
However, “[t]his court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc.” In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (alteration in original and internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Davis
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Given that the Hobbs Act prohibits the specified conduct if it affects commerce “in any way or degree,” 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (a) (emphasis added), we see no reason to alter this standard, see United States v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir.2002), and even if we did, such a change is beyond the powers of this panel, see BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that this Court is “bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc” (intern…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Davis
2d Cir. · 2009 · confidence medium
Given that the Hobbs Act prohibits the specified conduct if it affects commerce “in any way or degree,” 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (a) (emphasis added), we see no reason to alter this standard, see United States v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir.2002), and even if we did, such a change is beyond the powers of this panel, see BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that this Court is “bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc” (intern…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Retained Realty, Inc. v. Estate of Spitzer (3×) also: Cited "see"
D. Conn. · 2009 · confidence medium
The debtor prevailed, but the Second Circuit refused to award the debtor attorneys’ fees under section 42-150bb on the grounds that “the litigated issues involve^] not basic contract enforcement questions, but issues peculiar’ to federal bankruptcy law.” Id. at 535 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Morgorichev v. Mukasey
2d Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
And we are bound by Rankine “unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc. ” In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Dow Corning Corp. (In Re Dow Corning Corp.) (2×) also: Cited "see"
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Dow Corning cites In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534 (2d Cir.2000), for the proposition that a creditor cannot recover attorneys' fees unless incurred while litigating the validity of the contract.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re: Dow Corning Corporation, Debtor. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, Appellants/cross-Appellees v. Dow Corning Corporation, Appellee/cross-Appellant, Dow Chemical Corporation and Corning Incorporated (2×) also: Cited "see"
6th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Nonetheless, with regard to the issue of fees and costs, the majority of its arguments are effectively the same as those of the remaining creditors (all of whom filed one consolidated brief), and thus we will treat all of these arguments together, noting BNY's one separate argument at the end of the costs section 3 Dow Corning cites In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534 (2d Cir.2000), for the proposition that a creditor cannot recover attorneys' fees unless incurred while litigating the validity of the contract.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Goord
S.D.N.Y. · 2006 · confidence medium
In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nicholas v. Goord
2d Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Of course, we are bound by our own precedent "unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc. " BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nicholas v. Goord
2d Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Of course, we are bound by our own precedent “unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc.” BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. Ugi Utilities, Inc., Docket No. 04-2409-Cv
2d Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Generally, "this court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc.” BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Valdez
Bankr. S.D. Tex. · 2005 · confidence medium
In re Nair, 320 B.R. 119, 124-25 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2004); In re Hatala, 295 B.R. 62, 68 (Bankr.D.N.J.2003); In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 535 (2nd Cir.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory
2d Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
We are compelled to follow a decision of an earlier panel "unless it has been called into question by an intervening Supreme Court decision or by one of this Court sitting in banc," United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001), or "unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court, or this court in banc." In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam). 44 Where we reach the merits, we review the district court's denial of JMOL de novo.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory
2d Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
We are compelled to . follow a decision of an earlier panel “unless it has been called into question by an intervening Supreme Court decision or by one of this Court sitting in banc,” United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001), or “unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly, or expressly, by the Supreme Court, or this court in banc.” In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per cu-riam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Biazo
Bankr. D. Kan. · 2004 · confidence medium
In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir.2000) (despite state law allowing recovery of attorney fees, debtor could not recover them because litigated issues involved only bankruptcy law); In re Fobian, 951 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied 505 U.S. 1220 , 112 S.Ct. 3031 , 120 L.Ed.2d 902 (1992) (attorney fees not recoverable despite contract provision enforceable under state law because issues litigated, proper application of § 506(a) and § 1225, were peculiar to federal bankruptcy law, not basic contract enforcement); Johnson v. Righetti (In re Johnson), 756 F.2d 738, 740-42 (…
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re: Michael B. Price Christine R. Price, Debtors Michael B. Price Christine R. Price v. Delaware State Police Federal Credit Union U.S. Trustee, Trustee
3rd Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 534 (2d Cir.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Price v. Delaware State Police Federal Credit Union (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski by the Credit Union that the liens are fully (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 534 (2d satisfied, no evidence that would compel a Cir. 2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Rybicki
2d Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
It is well settled that a panel of this court is "`bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc. '" BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) ( per curiam ) (quoting United States v. Allah, 130 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir.1997)); see also United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001). 164 Now, on en banc review, we have the freedom to revisit the larger question of the facial vagueness of § 1346, and we are no more compelled to follow the Circuit precedents di…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Rybicki
2d Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
It is well settled that a panel of this court is “ ‘bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc.’ ” BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Allah, 130 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir.1997)); see also United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Eurospark Industries, Inc.
Bankr. E.D.N.Y. · 2003 · confidence medium
Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 124.22[4] (3d ed. 1997) (“When a higher federal court has ruled on a particular point of state law, a lower court must ordinarily follow that decision *183 in the absence of an intervening, authoritative state decision.”); In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-535 (2d Cir.2000) (“ ‘[T]his court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en bane.’ ” (quoting United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir.1986) (alteration in original)…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Agassi v. Planet Hollywood International, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D. Del. · 2001 · confidence medium
In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. Don King Don King Productions, Inc. Dkp Corporation and John Does 1-10
2d Cir. · 2000 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per cu-riam) (explaining that this Court "is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. BDO Seidman, LLP
2d Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
Even if we were justified in revisiting the Redington decision, however, see In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (“This court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), we need not do so in this case, as we hold that the SIPC’s claims on behalf of Baron’s customers fail under Rule 12(b)(6).
discussed Cited "see" Xiao Dan Yang v. Holder
2d Cir. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that “this court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc ” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).
discussed Cited "see" Xiao Dan Yang v. Holder
2d Cir. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that “this court is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc ” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).
discussed Cited "see" New York v. National Service Industries, Inc.
2d Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that we are “bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc ” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
discussed Cited "see" New York v. National Service Industries, Inc.
2d Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski ( In re Sokolowski ), 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (holding that we are "bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc" (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Londono
2d Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (stating that this Court “is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc”; internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Londono
2d Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (stating that this Court “is bound by a decision of a prior panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc”; internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
cited Cited "see" H.J. Bushka Lumber & Millwork v. Boucher (In Re Boucher)
Bankr. D. Conn. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir.2000).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. David Martinez
2d Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (explaining that a panel of this Court may not overrule the holding of an earlier panel unless the earlier panel’s rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc).
discussed Cited "see" Matricia Moore v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. And John Morrill
2d Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (explaining that a panel of this Court may not overrule the holding of an earlier panel unless the earlier panel’s rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Linwood Wilkerson
2d Cir. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam); see e.g., United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.2003) (en banc) (overruling in part, United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 104-07 (2d Cir.2002)). 8 Accordingly, we find that the Government provided sufficient evidence for a rational juror to have “found the essential elements of [the § 1951 count] beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Glenn, 312 F.3d at 63 .
cited Cited "see" In Re Guarnieri
Bankr. D. Conn. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir.2000); In re Gifford, 256 B.R. 661 (Bankr.D.Conn.2000) (Krechevsky, B.J.).
discussed Cited "see" Louis Eze v. Daniel A. Senkowski, Superintendent, Clinton Correctional Facility
2d Cir. · 2003 · signal: accord · confidence high
See United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001) (instructing that we are compelled to follow the decisions of earlier panels unless they have “been called into question by an intervening Supreme Court decision or by one of this Court sitting in banc ”), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1070 , 122 S.Ct. 1946 , 152 L.Ed.2d 849 (2002); accord In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam).
discussed Cited "see" Kirk v. Readers Digest Ass'n
2d Cir. · 2003 · signal: accord · confidence high
We are bound by the decision of an earlier panel “unless it has been called into question by an intervening Supreme Court decision or by one of this Court sitting in banc.” United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001); accord In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re SOKOLOWSKI, Debtor. BankBoston, N.A., Appellant-Cross-Appellee,
v.
Cynthia L. Sokolowski, Appellee-Cross-Appellant
1999.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Mar 6, 2000.
205 F.3d 532
Matthew J. McGowan, Providence, R.I., for Appellant-Cross-Appellee,, David Flavey, Groton, CT., for Appel-lee-Cross-Appellant.
Cabranes, Per Curiam, Sack.
Cited by 59 opinions  |  Published
Pinpoint authority: bottom 53%
PER CURIAM.

BankBoston, N.A., (“BankBoston”) appeals from the April 26, 1999 judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Alfred V. Covello, Chief Judge) affirming the June 29, 1998 order of the United States Bankruptcy Court (Robert L. Krechevsky, Judge), which enjoined BankBoston from repossessing the motor-vehicle of debtor-appel-lee Cynthia L. Sokolowski (“Sokolowski”) after she had filed a petition in bankruptcy-

I.

On March 19,. 1996, Sokolowski executed an auto loan contract with BankBoston. Pursuant to the contract, Sokolowski was to begin making loan payments on May 3, 1996. The loan, totaling $13,192.20, was payable over five years. Paragraph ten of the contract included a “default upon filing” clause specifying that Sokolowski would be considered in default if she declared or was forced into bankruptcy. On May 1, 1997, Sokolowski filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy (liquidation) petition. Al[*534] though she was, and remained, current on her loan payments, Sokolowski still owed BankBoston $7,900 at the time she filed the petition. To renew her payment obligations with BankBoston, she executed a reaffirmation agreement on September 15, 1997. However, Sokolowski rescinded the reaffirmation agreement within the statutory rescission period. [1] The Chapter 7 case was closed on September 29, 1997, and, on December 2, 1997, BankBoston notified Sokolowski of its intention to repossess the car. In response, she reopened her bankruptcy action in order to seek a declaratory judgment against Bank-Boston and an order enjoining the bank from repossessing the car. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that BankBoston could not enforce the default-upon-filing clause of the loan contract solely because Sokolowski had filed a bankruptcy petition and, accordingly, entered an order enjoining the bank from repossessing the vehicle. See Sokolowski v. BankBoston (In re Sokolowski), 227 B.R. 16 (Bankr.D.Conn.1998). Relying on our decision in Capital Communications Federal Credit Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43 (2d Cir.1997), where we held that 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2) [2] permits a debtor who is current on loan obligations to retain the collateral and keep making payments under the original loan agreement, the District Court affirmed the decision of the Bankruptcy Court. See BankBoston v. Sokolowski, No. 3-98 Civ.1535 (D.Conn. April 26,1999). BankBoston now appeals, challenging the soundness of our reasoning in Boodrow, and asking us to overturn the rule enunciated in that case. Sokolowski cross-appeals from the District Court’s denial of attorney’s fees.

II.

A. Mootness

Sokolowski argues that the appeal in the instant case is moot because she no longer has possession of the vehicle and, having paid BankBoston the outstanding amount on the debt just prior to this appeal, no longer has any obligations to the bank. We conclude, however, that Sokolowski has failed to proffer competent evidence to support her claim that this particular appeal has been rendered moot. Specifically, she has not pointed to any evidence in the record of her satisfaction of the BankBoston loan or of her disposal of the vehicle in question. Accordingly, we address the merits of BankBoston’s appeal.

B. Merits

BankBoston requests that we reconsider our decision in Boodrow. It asks us to find that the case was wrongly decided, and thus to reverse the District Court’s decision in the instant case which relied on Boodrow. As we have explained, “[t]his court is bound by a decision of a prior[*535] panel unless and until its rationale is overruled, implicitly or expressly, by the Supreme Court or this court en banc.” United States v. Allah, 130 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir.1986)). Accordingly, the relief BankBoston seeks is unavailable. Because the District Court’s decision was consistent with our prior precedent, we hold that it correctly affirmed the order of the Bankruptcy Court that enjoined BankBoston from enforcing the default-upon-filing clause in the loan agreement with Sokolowski.

C. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

In her cross-appeal, Sokolowski claims that the District Court erred in denying her application for attorney’s fees under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-150bb. [3] While there is no general right to attorney’s fees in bankruptcy actions, a party may be entitled to them in accordance with state law. See Collingwood Grain, Inc. v. Coast Trading Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 744 F.2d 686, 693 (9th Cir.1984); cf. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (“[T]he prevailing litigant [in federal court] is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.”) “However, where the litigated issues involve not basic contract enforcement questions, but issues peculiar to federal bankruptcy law, attorney’s fees will not be awarded absent bad faith or harassment by the losing party.” Fobian v. Western Farm Credit Bank (In re Fobian), 951 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir.1991); see also Johnson v. Righetti (In re Johnson), 756 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir.1985) (“When ... federal and not state law governed the substantive issues involved ... the bankruptcy court should not have awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to a state statute.”); NoRton Bancruptcy Law and Practice 2d § 142:7 (1997) (“If the court is determining a state law issue, the court will look to state law to determine if it is appropriate to award attorneys’ fees. If the proceeding involves solely an issue of bankruptcy law, bankruptcy law, rather than state law will determine the propriety of awarding attorneys’ fees.”); 3 Daniel R. Cowans, Baneruptcy Law and Practice § 17.4(c) (6th ed. 1994) (“In proceedings in the bankruptcy court where state law rather than bankruptcy law provides the rule, fees may be awarded if state law allows it.”).

In our view, “the question of the applicability of the bankruptcy laws to particular contacts is not a question of the enforceability of a contract but rather involves a unique, separate area of federal law.” Coast Trading, 744 F.2d at 693. While the present case concerned the enforceability of a default-upon-filing provision in a loan contract, it turned solely on issues of federal bankruptcy law — namely, whether § 521(2) and the “fresh start” policy behind the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor who is (and continues to be) current on his loan payments to retain the loan-secured property after a discharge in bankruptcy. We therefore conclude that the state statute is inapplicable in this case, and accordingly deny the request for attorney’s fees.

However, in light of the fact that BankBoston seeks a remedy that we have made clear this Court cannot provide, and because we have entertained and denied this very request for relief made by Bank-Boston in a prior case, see BankBoston, N.A. v. Suarez, 198 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. Sept.20, 1999) (Table), we conclude that the imposition of double appellate costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1912 [4] is warrant[*536] ed. See Kaynard v. MMIC, Inc., 734 F.2d 950, 954 (2d Cir.1984) (“Pursuant to the authority of Fed.R.App.P. 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982), we have not hesitated to assess double costs and damages for frivolous appeals.”); see also, e.g., Shuffman v. Hartford Textile Corp. (In re Hartford Textile Corp.), 659 F.2d 299, 303-06 (2d Cir.1981) (double costs and $5000 damages assessed).

III.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Double costs to appellant.

1

. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(2) states that an agreement reaffirming debts that would otherwise be discharged as a result of the bankruptcy proceeding, “may be rescinded at any time prior to discharge or within sixty days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by giving notice of rescission to the holder of such claim.”

2

. Section 521(2) states:

[I]f an individual debtor’s schedule of assets and liabilities includes consumer debts which are secured by property of the estate—
(A)within thirty days after the date of the filing of a petition under chapter 7 of this title or on or before the date of the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such period fixes, the debtor shall file with the clerk a statement of his intention with respect to the retention or surrender of such property and, if applicable, specifying that such property is claimed as exempt, that the debtor intends to redeem such property, or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such property; (B) within forty-five days after the filing of a notice of intent under this section, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such forty-five day period fixes, the debtor shall perform his intention with respect to such property, as specified by subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; and (C) nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph shall alter the debtor’s or the trustee's rights with regard to such property under this title.
3

. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-150bb states in pertinent part:

Whenever any contract or lease entered into on or after October 1, 1979, to which a consumer is a party, provides for the attorney's fee of the commercial party to be paid by the consumer, an attorney’s fee shall be awarded as a matter of law to the consumer who successfully prosecutes or defends an action or a counterclaim based upon the contract or lease.
4

. Section 1912 in relevant part provides:

Where a judgment is affirmed by .... a court of appeals, the court in its discretion may adjudge to the prevailing party just[*536] damages for his delay, and single or double costs.