United States v. Miguel Longoria, 259 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2001). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Miguel Longoria, 259 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
28 citation events (28 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Davila v. United States (nvd, 2022-12-02)
Treatment trajectory · 2001 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2001 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davila v. United States (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Nev. · 2022 · confidence medium
If a federal 26 grand jury returns an indictment charging a defendant with a violation of federal law 18 U.S.C. § 27 28 1 Petitioner previously defines “cause” as “proof that an offense actually occurred.” (ECF No. 94 at 4). 1 3231 grants federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear the case and impose sentence. 2 United States v. Longoria, 259 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 2001). 3 Here, the grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging him with a violation of 18 4 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Trinh
D. Mass. · 2009 · confidence medium
"The grand jury's issuance of an indictment is what gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear a criminal case and impose a sentence.” United States v. Longoria, 259 F.3d 363, 364 (5th Cir.2001). 2 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Prieto-Romero
9th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
In United States v. Longoria, meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit again held that the district court lacked jurisdiction, reasoning that the indictment not only failed to allege a drug quantity but also specifically referred to 18 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(D), the statutory provision under which the defendant had to be sentenced. 259 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir.2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Moreno (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
5th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
See Gonzalez, 259 F.3d at n.3; Longorio, 259 F.3d at 365.
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Clifford Baptiste, Christopher Frank, Leshawn Parker, Garion McCoy Brian Anthony Jones, Percy Franklin and Rico Schexnayder (4×)
5th Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
United States v. Garcia, 242 F.3d 593 , 599 n.5 (5th Cir.2001); United States v. Vasquez-Zamora, 253 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir.2001); United States v. Gonzalez, 259 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir.2001); United States v. Longoria, 259 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir.2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Price
D. Maryland · 2001 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Hall & Co., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 99, 100 (N.D.Ill.1986) (explaining that “federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and subject-matter-jurisdictional questions are non-waivable”); cf., e.g., United States v. Longoria, 259 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir.2001), reh’g en banc granted, 262 F.3d 455 (5th Cir.2001) (citing the general rule that parties cannot confer federal jurisdiction by consent or waiver).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Gonzalez
5th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Longoria, 259 F.3d at 365 ; Gonzalez, 259 F.3d at 359-61.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Longoria
5th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Longoria, 259 F.3d at 365 ; Gonzalez, 259 F.3d at 359-61 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ward v. Walker
D. Maryland · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence medium
In Johnson , this Court held that it would not “allow [an indispensable party] to determine, merely by choosing whether or not to execute a waiver, whether the court has diversity jurisdiction.” 191 F.Supp.2d at 630 ; see also United States v. Longoria, 259 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir.2001) (stating the rule that a party cannot manufacture federal jurisdiction by waiver); Bankston v. Burch, 27 F.3d 164, 168 (5th Cir.1994) (“[P]arties may not manufacture diversity jurisdiction by failing to join a non-diverse indispensable party.”); Mahan v. Mahan, 320 Md. 262 , 577 A.2d 70, 75 (1990) (“Fa…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States of America v. Juan Adrian Gonzalez (2×)
5th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Longoria, 259 F.3d 363 , (5th Cir. 2001)(reaching the same conclusion as to Longoria, Gonzalez's codefendant prosecuted under the same indictment). 19 An indictment, the right to which is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, serves three purposes: (1) to ensure that the grand jury finds probable cause to believe that Gonzalez committed each element of the offense; (2) to protect against double jeopardy; and (3) to give notice of the offense charged.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Miguel LONGORIA, Defendant-Appellant
00-50405.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jul 19, 2001.
259 F.3d 363
Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Ellen A. Lockwood, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee., Henry Joseph Bemporad, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
Jones, Demoss, Benavides.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Miguel Longoria appeals his sentence under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Persuaded that his sentence was beyond the jurisdiction of the district court to impose, we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

Longoria' pled guilty to the charge of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. The indictment charging Longoria did not specify a quantity, but rather said only that the conspirators[*365] agreed to “possess with intent to distribute a quantity of MARIJUANA.” Longoria was sentenced to 69 months imprisonment and five years supervised release.

The Apprendi rule is now familiar: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. In United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160 (5th Cir.2000), we held that Apprendi applies to charges under 21 U.S.C. § 841, and requires that the quantity of drugs be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be within that statutory provision establishing the possible punishment. Id. at 162. When a defendant is charged and convicted only of an unstated quantity, that defendant may only be sentenced under the applicable default provisions of § 841. For marijuana, § 841(b)(1)(D) states the default. See United States v. Salazar-Flores, 238 F.3d 672 (5th Cir.2001). It provides that for less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, an offender faces a maximum sentence of five years, or ten years if a recidivist. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). Longoria’s sentence of 69 months is 5.75 years, which exceeds the amount permitted by § 841(b)(1)(D).

Longoria, however, pled guilty. His guilty plea was not conditional, and did not reserve the right to appeal this issue. We must, therefore, confront the question of how, if at all, we review the deficiency in Longoria’s indictment in light of his guilty plea. Failure to charge an offense in the indictment is a jurisdictional error. See United States v. Richards, 204 F.3d 177 (5th Cir.2000); United States v. Cabrera-Teran, 168 F.3d 141 (5th Cir.1999). The grand jury’s issuance of an indictment is what gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear a criminal case and impose a sentence. We hold that the failure of Longo-ria’s indictment to charge a drug quantity and its specific reference to § 841(b)(1)(D) deprived the district court of jurisdiction to sentence Longoria under any provision other than § 841(b)(1)(D). Criminal cases are no exception to the rule that parties cannot, by consent or waiver, manufacture federal jurisdiction. As we have repeatedly held, a guilty plea does not waive jurisdictional defects. See United States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 628 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Harper, 901 F.2d 471, 472 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503, 510 (5th Cir.1980).

We, therefore, VACATE Longoria’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing in a manner consistent with this opinion.