Nathan Agar & Christina Edith Agar v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961). · Go Syfert
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Nathan Agar & Christina Edith Agar v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
123 citation events (29 in the last 25 years) across 18 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: YERKES v. WEISS (njd, 2023-02-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1965 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1965 1995 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#17 26 U. S. C. § 22 cited 1× in this case · 134 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 42 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) YERKES v. WEISS
D.N.J. · 2023 · confidence medium
Agar v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue., 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961); Seay v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 58 T.C. 32, 37 (1972). 19.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Francisco v. United States
3rd Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1965); Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961); Ray v. United States, 25 Cl.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles Francisco Cecilia Francisco v. United States
3rd Cir. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir.1965); Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir.1961); Ray v. United States, 25 Cl.Ct. 535, 540 (1992), aff'd, 989 F.2d 1204 (Fed.Cir.1993) (table); Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 847 , 1987 WL 49302 (1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir.1988) (table); Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236, 244 , 1986 WL 22165 (1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir.1987); Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116, 120 , 1981 WL 11320 (1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 682 (table) (1st Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) St. Louis Cardinals LP v. United States
E.D. Mo. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir.1965); Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir.1961).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Abbott v. United States
N.D.N.Y. · 1999 · confidence medium
Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir.1961).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Elpi v. United States
D. Conn. · 1997 · confidence medium
Although the plaintiff may have believed that United paid him to avoid imminent and pending litigation, his belief is not supported by the evidence. “[T]he ultimate inquiry is into the ‘basic reason’ for the company’s payment.” Agar v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 290 F.2d 283, 283 (2d Cir.1961) (citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 , 80 S.Ct. 1190, 1197 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Delaney v. Commissioner
1st Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Ct. 535, 540 (1992), aff'd, 989 F.2d 1204 (Table) (Fed.Cir.1993); Stocks v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 1, 10 , 1992 WL 189 (1992); Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir.1961), affg per curiam 19 T.C.M.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Delaney v. IRS
1st Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Cir. 1993); Stocks v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 1, 10 (1992); ______ ____________ Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'g per ____ ____________ _____ ___ curiam 19 T.C.M.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lane v. United States
W.D. Okla. · 1995 · confidence medium
(CCH) 9, 12 (March 26, 1980) (citing Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir.1965); Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir.1961); Seay v. Commissioner [ 1972 WL 2542 ], 58 T.C. 31 (1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robinson v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1994 · confidence medium
Knuckles v. Commissioner, supra at 613; Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961), affg. per curiam T.C.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Glatthorn v. United States
S.D. Fla. · 1993 · confidence medium
(CCH) 9, 12 (March 26, 1980) (citing Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir.1965); Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir.1961); Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32 (1972)). 3 5.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Emerick v. Teaneck Board of Education
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1987 · confidence medium
Knuckles v. C.I.R., 349 F.2d 610, 612-613 (10th Cir.1965); Agar v. C.I.R., 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir.1961); Villaume v. United States, 616 F.Supp. 185, 187-188 (D.Minn.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fono v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1982 · confidence medium
Section 104(a)(2) allows the exclusion only for damages received, whether by suit or agreement, "on account of personal injuries.” In Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961), affg. per curiam a Memorandum Opinion of this Court, the court stated that the taxpayer’s belief as to the reasons for the payment was only evidence of its character and that "the ultimate inquiry is into the 'basic reason’ for the company’s payment.” In Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32, 37 (1972), the Court held that "the determination of whether a settlement payment is exempt from taxation depen…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Seay v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1972 · confidence medium
Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F. 2d 610, 613 (C.A. 10, 1965), affirming a Memorandum Opinion of this Court; Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F. 2d 283, 284 (C.A. 2, 1961), affirming per curiam a Memorandum Opinion of this Court.
discussed Cited "see" Smith v. Comm'r (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tax Ct. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar v. Commissioner , 290 F.2d at 284 ; Fono v. Commissioner , 79 T.C. 680 , 696 (1982) , aff'd without published opinion , 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984) .
discussed Cited "see" Joshua Smith v. Commissioner (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Tax Ct. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d at 284 ; Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680, 696 (1982), aff’d without published opinion, 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984).
cited Cited "see" Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
2d Cir. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar, 290 F.2d at 284 . 2.
discussed Cited "see" Tamberella v. Commissioner
2d Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar v. Comm’r, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir.1961) (per curiam) (“[T]he ultimate inquiry is into the ‘basic reason’ for the company’s payment.”); Madison Recycling Assoc, v. Comm’r, 295 F.3d 280 , 285 (2d Cir.2002).
cited Cited "see" Banks v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d at 284 ; Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680 (1982) , affd. without opinion 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984) .
cited Cited "see" Jacobs v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg.
cited Cited "see" Abrahamsen v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar, 290 F.2d at 284 .
discussed Cited "see" Reynolds v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
Ed. 2d 1218 , 80 S. Ct. 1190 (1960) ; see Agar v. Commissioner, supra 290 F.2d at 298 ; Fono v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 680 (1982) , affd. without published opinion 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984) . [10] The settlement agreement indicates that Mr. Kent paid the disputed amount to petitioner in surrender of her rights in most of the property purchased during their relationship. 5 Respondent *83 agrees with this characterization, but extrapolates therefrom that Mr. Kent paid petitioner the disputed amount to compensate her for past services that she rendered to him.
cited Cited "see" LeFleur v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
Memo. 1995-264 ; see Agar v. Commissioner , 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg.
cited Cited "see" Paul F. Roemer, Jr. And Marcia E. Roemer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
9th Cir. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir.1961); Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir.1965).
cited Cited "see" Evans v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar v. Commissioner , 290 F.2d 283 (2nd Cir. 1961) .
cited Cited "see" Anderson v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar v. Commissioner, T.C.Memo. 1960-21 , affd. 290 F.2d 283 ↩ (2d Cir. 1961) . 6.
cited Cited "see" WOLFSON v. COMMISSIONER
Tax Ct. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961) ; cf. also Kleinschmidt v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 921 (1949) with Draper v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 201 ↩ (1956) . 11.
cited Cited "see" BROEDEL
unknown court · Rob · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg. per curiam T.C.
cited Cited "see" MUMY
unknown court · Joh · signal: accord · confidence high
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 , 286 (1960) ; accord Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg. per curiam T.C.
cited Cited "see" Connolly
unknown court · Joh · signal: accord · confidence high
Ed. 2d 1218 (1960) ; accord Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg. per curiam T.C.
discussed Cited "see" Longoria (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
unknown court · Dav · signal: see · confidence high
See Agar v. Commissioner , 290 F.2d at 284 ; Fono v. Commissioner , 79 T.C. 680 , 696 (1982) , affd. without published opinion 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984) .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Molina v. Comm'r
Tax Ct. · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence low
Knuckles v. Commissioner , 349 F.2d at 613 ; see also Agar v. Commissioner , 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , aff'g per curiam T.C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Jose B. & Virna N. Molina v. Commissioner
Tax Ct. · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d at 613 ; see also Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961), aff’g per curiam T.C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Ahmed v. Comm'r
Tax Ct. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence low
Knuckles v. Commissioner, supra at 613 ; see also Agar v. Commissioner , 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg. per curiam T.C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Crane v. Comm'r
Tax Ct. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Knuckles v. Commissioner, supra at 613 ; see also Agar v. Commissioner , 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg. per curiam T.C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." CSX Corp. v. United States
Fed. Cir. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Abrahamsen, 228 F.3d at 1361, 1364 ; see also Agar v. Comm’r, 290 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir.1961).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Comm'r
unknown court · Dav · signal: see also · confidence low
Knuckles v. Commissioner , supra at 613 ; see also Agar v. Commissioner , 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg. per curiam T.C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Ndirika
unknown court · Car · signal: see also · confidence low
Knuckles v. Commissioner, supra ; see also Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg. per curiam T.C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Amos
unknown court · Car · signal: see also · confidence low
Knuckles v. Commissioner, supra ; see also Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg. per curiam T.C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Phelps
unknown court · Car · signal: see also · confidence low
Knuckles v. Commissioner , supra at 613 ; see also Agar v. Commissioner , 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg. per curiam T.C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Hansen
unknown court · Car · signal: see also · confidence low
Knuckles v. Commissioner , supra at 613 ; see also Agar v. Commissioner , 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg. per curiam T.C.
cited Cited "see, e.g." NIELD
unknown court · Car · signal: see also · confidence low
Knuckles v. Commissioner, supra ; see also Agar v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 283 , 284 (2d Cir. 1961) , affg. per curiam T.C.
Nathan AGAR and Christina Edith Agar, Petitioners,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
26549_1.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
May 16, 1961.
290 F.2d 283
Jerome Kamerman, New York City (Leonard Eisenberg, New York City, on the brief), for petitioners., John A. Bailey, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (Louis F. Ober-dorfer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Robert N. Anderson, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.
Lumbard, Moore, Per Curiam, Steel.
Cited by 96 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Nathan Agar, seeks review of the Tax Court’s decision that payments made to him by McGregor-Doni-ger, Inc., after he had resigned as its treasurer should have been declared as income since the payments were not, as petitioner claimed, exempt from taxation as “damages received * * * on account of [personal] injuries.” 26 U.S.C. § 22(b) (5) (1939 Code); 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2) (1954 Code). We affirm since the Tax Court’s finding that the payments were made “as ‘extra’ compensation for services rendered by petitioner over his years of service to Doniger” was not clearly erroneous.

Agar, a certified public accountant, was retained as the company’s accountant, and also performed the duties of a treasurer from 1938 until the latter part of 1950. He then was replaced as accountant and hired, at the age of 63 or 64, for a five-year term as treasurer; he also was made a director.

Despite this long association and the company’s recent demonstration of its trust in him, Agar, soon after commencing his duties as treasurer, found that the company had lost confidence in him. This he claimed was exceedingly galling[*284] to him and resulted in damage to his health as did the hectic and tense pace of the office. Accordingly, on February 13, 1952, Agar advised Harry Doniger, the company president, that he was resigning and that he intended to institute a damage suit against the company for injuries received as a result of abuse from company personnel. Told by Doni-ger to discuss the matter with Bernard Lang, the company’s attorney, now deceased, Agar, after some negotiation, obtained $45,000 payable in three equal yearly installments, though Doniger had originally instructed Lang to “settle” for $10,000 or $30,000.

Attached to the joint return filed by Agar and his wife for each of the three years in which he received a $15,000 payment from the company was a note stating that the payment was tax exempt, since received “in settlement of a claim of libel.” [1]

The commissioner’s rejection of this position was upheld by the Tax Court on two grounds: first, that the payments were in the nature of severance pay or extra compensation and not in settlement of a possible tort action; second, that even if in settlement of a tort claim the gravamen of that claim was an injury to business reputation and thus the taxpayer could not rely on the statutory exemption of payments on account of “personal injuries.” Since we affirm upon the first ground, we do not have to decide whether whatever tort claim Agar may have asserted was based upon damage to his personal as well as his business reputation, assuming that the dichotomy is realistic, and whether all payments or a portion of them would therefore be tax exempt. Cf. Note, Taxation of Damage Recoveries from Litigation, 40 Corn.L. Q. 345 (1955).

Though petitioner may have believed that the company paid him to avoid litigation, the Tax Court properly held that his belief was only evidence of the character of the payment; the ultimate inquiry is into the “basic reason” for the company’s payment. Cf. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, at page 286, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218; Jackson v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1106, 1110-1111; Bogardus v. Commissioner, 1937, 302 U.S. 34, 44-45, 58 S.Ct. 61, 82 L.Ed. 32 (dissenting opinion).

In reaching the conclusion that the company intended payments to be extra compensation, the Tax Court relied principally upon the testimony of President Doniger regarding his recollection of the purpose of the payments. He stated that: a

“He left his private practice. He joined our company * * * We felt we owed Mr. Agar something * * * I would say it is severance. I. would say it was paying Mr. Agar for that year of unhappiness he had with us * * * and for the years that he worked with us, and we were saying good-bye.”

Though it was unfortunate for plaintiff that attorney Lang, who had been most intimately associated with the payment, was unable to testify, the Tax Court was certainly justified in relying upon the recollection of Doniger particularly since the termination agreement between the parties did not clearly set forth the reason for the payments.

The decision of the Tax Court is affirmed.

1

. Petitioner’s claim was of course for slander rather than libel since any statements made by the company’s employees were oral.