Howard A. Scott v. Katherine Ortega, Medtech at C.U.C.F. & Michelle Marhal, Medtech at C.U.C.F., 30 F.3d 142 (10th Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
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Howard A. Scott v. Katherine Ortega, Medtech at C.U.C.F. & Michelle Marhal, Medtech at C.U.C.F., 30 F.3d 142 (10th Cir. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 2 distinct cases · “Since review of the merits at the 60(b) stage is purely for purposes of judicial efficiency, it need not be done if the movant has not established an otherwise valid basis for relief (i.e., excusable neglect) under Rule 60(b).”
67 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Schnuelle v. C & C Auto Sales, Inc. (ksd, 2000-06-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Schnuelle v. C & C Auto Sales, Inc.
D. Kan. · 2000 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
since review of the merits at the 60(b) stage is purely for purposes of judicial efficiency, it need not be done if the movant has not established an otherwise valid basis for relief (i.e., excusable neglect) under rule 60(b).
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Nolan v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London
D. Kan. · 1999 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
since review of the merits at the 60(b) stage is purely for purposes of judicial efficiency, it need not be done if the movant has not established an otherwise valid basis for relief (i.e., excusable neglect) under rule 60(b).
discussed Cited "see" Tenly
W.D. Okla. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. Dorsey, 30 F.3d 142 , 1994 WL 396069, at *3 (10th Cir. July 29, 1994) (noting no due process concerns with the magistrate judge raising an issue sua sponte where the petitioner could “address the matter by objecting” to the report and recommendation).
discussed Cited "see" Charlton v. Harding
W.D. Okla. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. Dorsey, 30 F.3d 142 , 1994 WL 396069, at *3 (10th Cir. July 29, 1994) (noting no due process concerns with the magistrate judge raising an issue sua sponte where the petitioner could “address the matter by objecting” to the report and recommendation).
discussed Cited "see" Loveless v. Grady County District Court
W.D. Okla. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. Dorsey, 30 F.3d 142 , 1994 WL 396069, at *3 (10th Cir. July 29, 1994) (noting no due process concerns with the magistrate judge raising an issue sua sponte where the petitioner could “address the matter by objecting” to the report and recommendation).
discussed Cited "see" Wellington v. Profolio Home Mortgage Corporation
D.N.M. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. Dorsey, 30 F.3d 142 , 1994 WL 396069, at *3 (10th Cir. 1994)(unpublished table decision)(“Although the magistrate judge raised the issue sua sponte, there is no due process problem here, as petitioner had an opportunity to address the matter by objecting to the magistrate judge’s recommendation prior to the district court’s adoption thereof.”).
cited Cited "see" Munn v. Ward
10th Cir. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. Dorsey, 30 F.3d 142 (10th Cir.1994) (Table).
cited Cited "see" Northington v. Furlong
10th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Thomas v. Turner, 30 F.3d 142 (Table), 1994 WL 363540 (10th Cir. 1994).
discussed Cited "see" Northington v. Furlong
10th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Thomas v. Turner, 30 F.3d 142 (Table), 1994 WL 363540 (10th Cir.1994). 24 Northington and Montoya additionally contend that the magistrate and district judges failed to consider their argument that the drug tests were in and of themselves violations of their constitutional rights, regardless of whether they satisfied Lucero 's "truly random" requirement.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Campos v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurace Company
D. Colo. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where a complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and granting leave to amend would be futile.”); see also Ostler v. Buhler, 30 F.3d 142 , 1994 WL 408124 , at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 3, 1994) (unpublished) (“The filing of a motion to dismiss gives the plaintiff notice that his complaint is potentially deficient and the opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the alleged deficiencies.”); Mason v. Miro Jewelers, Inc., No. 19-cv-02459- LTB-KLM, 2020 WL 6828014 , …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Roberts v. Diggins
D. Colo. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence low
The Tenth Circuit has also held that “various health problems, . . . significant delay in the district court [] . . . , and [being] on the verge of being 10 transferred from prison to a halfway house” do not “constitute exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Palermo, 191 F. App’x 812, 813 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished); see also Stow v. Perrill, 30 F.3d 142 , 1994 WL 377629, at *1 (10th Cir. July 20, 1994) (unpublished table decision) (finding petitioner’s “contention that he has served his full sentence is not enough to demonstrate special circumstances” for release pend…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Carpenter
10th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
As this Court and other courts have previously explained, a petitioner is considered “in custody” under § 2255 for any sentence he is currently serving or for any sentence that “has been ordered to run consecutively to another sentence under which the defendant is in custody at the time of filing the chaEenge.” United States v. Bustillos, 31 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir.1994); see also United States v. James, 30 F.3d 142 , 1994 WL 408131, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug.l, 1994) (explaining that “the Supreme Court has read the ‘in custody’ requirement to aEow a prisoner to seek habeas rehef fro…
Howard A. Scott
v.
Katherine Ortega, Medtech at C.U.C.F. And Michelle Marhal, Medtech at C.U.C.F.
93-4182.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Jul 14, 1994.
30 F.3d 142
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: #45,073 of 633,719
Citer courts: D. Kansas (2)

30 F.3d 142

NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored, unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or further order.

Howard A. SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Katherine ORTEGA, Medtech at C.U.C.F. and Michelle Marhal,
Medtech at C.U.C.F., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-4182.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

July 14, 1994.

Before TACHA, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT[1]

EBEL

1

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered submitted without oral argument.

2

Plaintiff-Appellant Howard A. Scott ("Scott"), an inmate at the Central Utah Correctional Facility ("CUCF"), filed suit for punitive damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.1983. He alleges that Defendants-Appellees Katherine Ortega and Michelle Marhal, individually and in their official capacities as medical technicians at CUCF, violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment by denying him medical treatment. The district court dismissed Scott's complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.1915(d). Scott appeals the dismissal.

3

We review the court's dismissal for an abuse of discretion. Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1734 (1992). Because Scott appears pro se, we construe his complaint liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).

4

Scott alleged that, on the evening of May 7, 1993, he experienced chest pain and requested that the officer in the control center inform the Appellees of his condition. According to Scott, Appellees never came to examine him. Prior to this incident, Scott had been prescribed medication for high blood pressure, heart ailments, and chest pain, which could be taken as needed to alleviate pain.

5

The district court held that Appellees' alleged failure to provide follow-up medical care on the night in question did not amount to deliberate indifference. Moreover, to have a cognizable claim, Scott had to allege lasting or serious injury resulting from the lack of care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Scott failed to allege a lasting or serious injury. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Scott's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.1915(d) as lacking any arguable basis in law or fact.

6

For the reasons set forth in the district court's opinion, we AFFIRM.

1

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of the court's General Order filed November 29, 1993. 151 F.R.D. 470