Orlando Napolitano v. United States of Am., John F. Diraffaele v. United States, 340 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1965). · Go Syfert
Search
Orlando Napolitano v. United States of Am., John F. Diraffaele v. United States, 340 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1965). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“taking of fingerprints . . . is universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights.”
40 citation events (16 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State Of Washington v. Bryan Dorsey (washctapp, 2013-07-08)
Treatment trajectory · 1966 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1966 1996 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#18 18 U.S.C. § 1953 cited 1× in this case · 115 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 21 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State Of Washington v. Bryan Dorsey
Wash. Ct. App. · 2013 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
taking of fingerprints is universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Elizabeth Haskell v. Edmund Brown, Jr. (4×) also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2012 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
taking of fingerprints . . . is universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. Pool (2×)
9th Cir. · 2010 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
is universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Of Washington v. Steven Nickolas Vandesteeg
Wash. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 1 (2013) (quoting Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (C.A.D.C.1963)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 411 (3d Cir. 2011) (“it is ‘elementary’ that blanket fingerprinting of individuals who have been lawfully arrested or charged with a crime does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.”); Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965) (stating that the taking of fingerprints in connection to bail for use by an expert witness was “universally standard procedure,” and not a “violation of constitutional rights.”). 16 No. 79802-2-I/17 a…
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re the Welfare of M.L.M.
Minn. · 2012 · confidence medium
“Taking of fingerprints in such circumstances is universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights.” Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mitchell
W.D. Pa. · 2009 · confidence medium
Probable cause has long been the standard which allowed an arrestee to be photographed, fingerprinted and otherwise be compelled to give information which can later be used for identification purposes.” United States v. Pool, 645 F.Supp.2d at 910 (citing Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.1965)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Pool
E.D. Cal. · 2009 · confidence medium
Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Stone
E.D. Tenn. · 2004 · confidence medium
In Napolitano v. United States, the First Circuit remarked “the failure to specify any particular piece of conduct as an overt act does not prevent proof thereof .... ” 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Thomas Cameron Kincade (2×)
9th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Fingerprints taken pursuant to an arrest are part of so-called "booking" procedures, designed to ensure that the person who is arrested is in fact the person law enforcement officials believe they have in custody. 18 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C.Cir.1963) ("[I]t is elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to photographing and fingerprinting as part of routine identification processes." (internal citations omitted)); Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.1965) (stating that taking of fingerprints upon admission to bail i…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rise v. State of Oregon
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
See Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C.Cir.1963) (Burger, J.) ("it is elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to ... fingerprinting ... as part of the routine identification processes"); Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.1965) ("Taking fingerprints [prior to bail] is universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights.").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rise v. Oregon
9th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
See Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C.Cir.1963) (Burger, J.) (“it is elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to ... fingerprinting ... as part of the routine identification processes”); Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.1965) (“Taking fingerprints [pri- or to bad] is universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. St. Onge
D. Mont. · 1987 · confidence medium
Krapf, 285 F.2d at 651 ; Beightol v. Kunowski, 486 F.2d 293, 294 (3d Cir.1973); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C.Cir.1963), cert. denied sub nom., Bowden v. United States, 377 U.S. 954 , 84 S.Ct. 1632 , 12 L.Ed.2d 498 (1964); Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.1965); United States v. De Palma, 414 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir.1969), ce rt. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 , 90 S.Ct. 697 , 24 L.Ed.2d 690 (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Collier
cma · 1983 · confidence medium
Eg., United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 , 96 S.Ct. 356 , 46 L.Ed.2d 277 (1975); United States v. Clay, 495 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 937 , 95 S.Ct. 207 , 42 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974); Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.1965); Marcus v. United States, 20 F.2d 454, 456 (3d Cir.1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 565 , 48 S.Ct. 122 , 72 L.Ed. 429 (1927).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Taylor
Kan. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
E.g., United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th Cir. 1975), U. S. appeal pending; United States v. Clay, 495 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 937 , 95 S.Ct. 207 , 42 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974); Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965); Marcus v. United States, 20 F.2d 454, 456 (3rd Cir. 1927).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Peter Adamo Appeal of Vincent Kearney (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
E. g., United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043, 1046 (5th Cir. 1975) U.S. appeal pending; United States v. Clay, 495 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 937 , 95 S.Ct. 207 , 42 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974); Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965); Marcus v. United States, 20 F.2d 454, 456 (3d Cir. 1927).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Inman
Me. · 1973 · confidence medium
In Smith v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 1 , 324 F.2d 879, 882 (1963), Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger stated in holding a post arrest palm print admissible, that ". . .it is elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to photographing . . . and fingerprinting as part of routine identification processes.” Chief Judge Aldrich, speaking for the Court in Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965), declared that fingerprints taken before defendant was admitted to bail were admissible.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Cordell Cassell
7th Cir. · 1971 · confidence medium
Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jesse James Gilbert v. United States (2×)
9th Cir. · 1966 · confidence medium
United States v. Thompson, 356 F.2d 216 , 224 n. 7 (2d Cir. 1965); Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965); Smith v. United States, supra, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 1 , 324 F.2d at 882; United States v. Iacullo, 226 F.2d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1932); 1 Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 144, p. 270 (5th ed. 1956); Inbau, supra, 32-38.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Joseph Armone, Stephen Grammauta, Vincent Pacelli, and Nicholas Viscardi
2d Cir. · 1966 · confidence medium
As to Pacelli’s frontal attack on Negro , the rule of that case has also been accepted by three other courts of appeals, Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965); Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d 93, 100 (8th Cir. 1942); Worthington v. United States, 1 F.2d 154, 155 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 626 , 45 S.Ct. 125 , 69 L.Ed. 475 (1924), although there is authority to the contrary, Fredericks v. United States, 292 Fed. 856 (9th Cir. 1923), and we see no reason not to adhere to the rule in this circuit. 15 Moreover, the essence of the charge against appellants is a cr…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Mitchell (2×)
3rd Cir. · 2011 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir.1965) (“Taking of fingerprints [before releasing an arrestee on bail] is universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights.”); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C.Cir.1963) ("[I]t is elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to photographing and fingerprinting as part of routine identification processes.”); United States v. Iacullo, 226 F.2d 788, 792-93 (7th Cir.1955). .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Roberto Louis Bosch Morales
1st Cir. · 1982 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965); United States v. Sellers, 603 F.2d 53, 56 (8th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 447 U.S. 932 , 100 S.Ct. 3033 , 65 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1980); United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385, 400-01 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957 , 87 S.Ct. 391 , 17 L.Ed.2d 303 (1966).
Orlando NAPOLITANO, Defendant, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee; John F. DiRAFFAELE, Defendant, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
6389, 6414.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Jan 8, 1965.
340 F.2d 313
Joseph J. Balliro, Boston, Mass., for Orlando Napolitano, appellant., Richard M. Dray, Hyde Park, Mass., for John F. DiRaffaele, appellant., Paul F. Markham, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., U. S. Atty., was on brief, for appellee.
Woodbury, Aldrich, Wyzanski.
Cited by 38 opinions  |  Published
ALDRICH, Chief Judge.

The defendants were convicted on a three-count indictment. Count 1 charged that defendant Napolitano on January 13, 1964 sent in interstate commerce from Portland, Maine to Boston, Massachusetts certain records, slips, etc. for use in a numbers or similar game, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1953. Count 2 charged that defendant DiRaffaele, on the same occasion, transported the records and slips, in violation of the same statute. Count 3 charged that the defendants jointly conspired, between the dates of December 16, 1963 and January 13, 1964 to carry and send such records and slips in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. They appeal from concurrent sentences.

The evidence, all of which was introduced by the government, was as follows. Napolitano was a resident of Portland, Maine. DiRaffaele was a truck driver employed by Railway Express Agency to drive its route between Portland and Boston. “On seven different days between December 16, 1963 and January 13, 1964 an automobile either driven by Napolitano or in which he was a passenger was approached by DiRaffaele in the vicinity of the Railway Express Agency yard in[*314] Portland, Maine.” [1] On the last day, January 13, Napolitano drove his car into the Portland yard. A passenger handed DiRaffaele a brown envelope. On four previous days DiRaffaele had also received an envelope or packet from Napolitano’s car. On the 13th, on DiRaffaele’s arrival in Boston, a brown envelope was found in his possession. It contained 45 betting slips. One bore Napolitano’s fingerprints, On this evidence a conviction of both defendants was amply warranted. [2]

The defendants moved to suppress the envelope and its contents on the ground that the warrant pursuant to which it was seized was obtained on an insufficient affidavit. This case is one of a series recently coming before us in which defendants have had exaggerated notions of what was required to constitute a showing of probable cause. What we have said before need not be repeated. The only new point suggested by these defendants is that it was improper for affiant to endorse an informant on the basis of statements by other government investigators, and hence hearsay. This point has no possible merit when, in addition, affiant asserted corroborating personal experience attesting the informant’s reliability. Rugendorf v. United States, 1964, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887.

Defendants make a number of contentions about the overt acts alleged in the conspiracy count. We find them without merit. At the same time we remark that since the failure to specify any particular piece of conduct as an overt act does not prevent proof thereof, Finley v. United States, 5 Cir.,1959, 271 F.2d 777, cert. den. 362 U.S. 979, 80 S.Ct. 1065, 4 L.Ed.2d 1014; United States v. Negro, 2 Cir.,1947, 164 F.2d 168; Culp v. United States, 8 Cir.,1942, 131 F.2d 93, 100, the government might have avoided some of the arguments which have been advanced here and below by taking care not to allege marginal acts in the indictment.

Of the defendants’ remaining contentions, only one calls for comment. Napolitano asserts that the government had no right, in connection with his being admitted to bail, [3] to take his fingerprints and thereafter use such prints as a standard for expert testimony identifying his prints on one of the number slips. This is without merit. Taking of fingerprints in such circumstances is universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights. United States v. Krapf, 3 Cir., 1961, 285 F.2d 647; United States v. Iacullo, 7 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 788, cert. den. 350 U.S. 966, 76 S.Ct. 435, 100 L.Ed. 839. Defendant’s cases, where the fingerprints were taken during a period of illegal detention, are obviously distinguishable.

Judgment will be entered in each case affirming the judgment of the District Court.

1

. Quotation taken from defendants’ brief. Exposition of the details is unnecessary.

2

. With respect to the substantive count against Napolitano the court apparently directed the jury to consider only the evidence relating to January 13. The defendant argues this evidence was insufficient to convict. A similar limitation was not applied to the conspiracy count. In view of the concurrency of the two sentences special consideration of the substantive count is unnecessary. O’Malley v. United States, 1 Cir., 1955, 227 F.2d 332, cert. den. 350 U.S. 966, 76 S.Ct. 434, 100 L.Ed. 838; Deacon v. United States, 1 Cir., 1941, 124 F.2d 352.

3

. Napolitano, properly, does not rely upon tlie circumstance that bis fingerprints were taken by the marshal immediately after he was bailed rather than immediately before. The timing was a mere matter of administrative convenience.