Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App'x 620 (2d Cir. 2009). · Go Syfert
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Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App'x 620 (2d Cir. 2009). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“when khalil was released from prison, he no longer had a 'continuing personal stake' in the outcome of this action, and his claims were rendered moot.”
16 citation events (16 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Shand v. Connecticut Department of Corrections (ctd, 2022-02-18)
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Shand v. Connecticut Department of Corrections
D. Conn. · 2022 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when khalil was released from prison, he no longer had a 'continuing personal stake' in the outcome of this action, and his claims were rendered moot.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Gilhooly v. Quiros
D. Conn. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when was released from prison, he no longer had a "continuing personal stake" in the outcome of this action, and his claims were rendered moot.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Concepcion v. Green
D. Conn. · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
when khalil was released from prison, he no longer had a 'continuing personal stake' in the outcome of this action, and his claims were rendered moot.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lucero v. Coppinger
D. Mass. · 2023 · confidence medium
Mincy v. Deparlos, 497 F. App'x 234, 238, n. 3 (3d Cir. 2012); Johnson v. Brown, 581 F. App'x 777, 781 (11th Cir. 2014); Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App'x 620, 621 (2d Cir. 2009).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Graham v. Lovett
N.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
See Thompson v. Choinski, 525 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that where petitioner "has since been transferred from the Connecticut facility to the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg . . . [his] claims [as to his conditions of confinement while incarcerated] are . . . moot."); Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App'x 620, 621 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that when an inmate is "released from prison, he no longer has a continuing personal stake in the outcome of th[e] action, and his claims [a]re rendered moot.") (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Gilhooly v. Quiros, No. 3:21-CV-0140…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Paxton
D. Conn. · 2021 · confidence medium
See Booker v. Graham, 974 F.3d 101 , 107–08 (2d Cir. 2020) (“‘In this circuit, an inmate's transfer from a prison facility generally moots claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against officials of that facility.’”) (quoting Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 2006)); Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App'x 620, 621 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (“When Khalil was released from prison, he no longer had a “continuing personal stake” in the outcome of this action, and his claims [for declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of his constitutional rights] w…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davies v. Hickley
D. Conn. · 2021 · confidence medium
See Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603, 610 (2d Cir. 2011) (“In this circuit, an inmate’s transfer from a prison facility generally moots claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App'x 620, 621 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary 9 order) (“When Khalil was released from prison, he no longer had a “continuing personal stake” in the outcome of this action, and his claims [for declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of his constitutional rights] were rendered moot.”); Pugh v. Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crosby v. Petermann
S.D.N.Y. · 2020 · confidence medium
See Muhammad v. City of New York Dep’t of Corr., 126 F.3d 119 , 123 (2d Cir. 1997); Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App'x 620, 621 (2d Cir. 2009) (pro se prisoner’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief moot after he was released during the pendency of the action).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Amaker v. Gerbing
N.D.N.Y. · 2020 · confidence medium
Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App’x 620, 621 (2d Cir. 2009) (“When Khalil was released from prison, he no longer had a ‘continuing personal stake’ in the outcome of this action, and his claims were rendered moot.” (quoting Muhammad v. City of N.Y.
cited Cited "see" Cato v. Reardon
N.D.N.Y. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See Khalil v. Laird, 353 Fed.
cited Cited "see" Torres-Acevedo v. Blair
N.D.N.Y. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App’x 620, 621 (2d Cir. 2009). brought in the New York Court of Claims as a claim against the state.
cited Cited "see" Cooper v. Doe
D. Conn. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App’x 620 (2d Cir. 2009).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Allah v. Yildiz
S.D.N.Y. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Pugh v. Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“The Court finds that, given that plaintiff . . . was released from prison . . . , [plaintiff’s] claims for injunctive and/or declaratory relief against DOCS are moot.”); see also Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App’x 620, 621 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming holding that pro se prisoner’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot after he was released during the pendency of the action); Leckie v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-6719, 2023 WL 3168699 , at *17 (S.D.N.Y.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cabrera v. Brann
S.D.N.Y. · 2021 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App’x 620, 621 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (noting that “[w]hen [the plaintiff] was released from prison, he no longer had a ‘continuing personal stake’ in the outcome of this action, and his claims were rendered moot” (quoting Muhammed, 126 F.3d at 123)); Lopez v. Cipolini, 136 F. Supp. 3d 570, 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that “because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, to the extent Plaintiff requests any injunctive relief, th[e] request is moot”).” Here, Plaintiff lacks in interest in the safety protocols at VCBC because he is no long…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Cheatham v. City of New York
E.D.N.Y · 2020 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Khalil v. Laird, 353 F. App’x 620, 621 (2d Cir. 2009) (pro se prisoner’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief in constitutional challenge to conditions of confinement at the federal Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn were moot after he was released during the pendency of the action).
Muhammad KHALIL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Mr. Paul M. LAIRD, Warden, Mr. Justin Andrews, Associate Warden, Mr. R. Schoenfelder, Captain, Mr. J. McDevitt, Chaplain, Mr. Hoenig, Rabbi, Mr. Gagliardi, Miss J. Anderson, Counselor Unit H52, Ex-Unit Manager, Mr. v. Alcoser, W. Laundry Ex-Supervisor, Mr. S. Benett, Defendants-Appellees
08-3644-pr.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Nov 19, 2009.
353 F. App'x 620
Muhammad Khalil, pro se, Brooklyn, NY., Benton J. Campbell, United States Attorney, and Margaret Kolbe and Tiana A. Demás, Assistant United States Attorneys, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellees.
Kearse, Cabranes, Straub.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Unpublished

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Muhammad Khalil, pro se, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York entered after the District Court dismissed this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Khalil brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of his constitutional rights and those of other Muslim inmates at the federal Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn, New York. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of this action, and the issues raised on appeal.

[*621] Khalil was released from prison while this action was pending in the District Court. The District Court determined that, because Khalil was no longer housed in the MDC, Khalil’s claims were moot and the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We agree. When Khalil was released from prison, he no longer had a “continuing personal stake” in the outcome of this action, and his claims were rendered moot. Muhammad v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr., 126 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir.1997). Although a prisoner who has been released from a prison facility might, under some circumstances, be able to assert claims in a representative capacity on behalf of other inmates still housed in the facility, see id. at 124, Khalil may not do so here because Khalil is proceeding pro se and a “pro se litigant ... is not empowered to proceed on behalf of anyone other than himself.” McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321, 322 (2d Cir.2000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654); see also Berrios v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir.2009). Accordingly, Khalil’s claims are moot and the District Court correctly dismissed this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

We have considered all of Khalil’s remaining arguments on appeal and find them to be without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the July 17, 2008 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.