United States v. Richard E. Ewing, 446 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1971). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Richard E. Ewing, 446 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1971). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
1 citation event across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: United States v. Moses Lewis (ca3, 1972-03-07)
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discussed Cited "see" United States v. Moses Lewis
3rd Cir. · 1972 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Ewing, 446 F.2d 60, 61 (9th Cir. 1971). 3 The court held: In this case the Government’s agents instructed the identifying witnesses that they should write on a pad given them with a pencil the numbers of the persons whom they identified, if indeed they made any positive identification.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Richard E. EWING, Appellant
71-1652.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Aug 2, 1971.
446 F.2d 60
Frank O. Bell, Jr., Legal Aid Society, San Francisco, Cal., for appellant., James L. Browning, Jr., U. S. Atty., F. Steele Langford, Chief, Crim. Div., James L. Hazard, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
Duniway, Hufstedler, Per Curiam, Wright.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Ewing appeals from his conviction for bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)).

He contends that the line-up in which he was identified as the robber did not meet the standards of United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, because the two public defenders attending the lineup did not actively participate in those[*61] proceedings. Wade does not require any such activity. There is no indication that the line-up was unfair in any respect.

He also says that the court erred in refusing to strike the testimony of a police officer concerning the substance of a tip that he had received from an anonymous informant.

If the testimony were used for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted by the informant, an assumption that is doubtful in the context in which the testimony was offered, we are nevertheless convinced that error in refusing to strike it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The informant’s oblique reference to Ewing was a repetition of earlier testimony that had been received without objection. The direct evidence of Ewing’s guilt was unusually strong. The error, if any, could not have affected the outcome of the trial.

The judgment is affirmed.