green
Positive treatment
10.1 score
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979
2002
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Fred Hill
(2×)
In Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835, 837-39 (4th Cir. 1979), a case involving Article IV(e) of Virginia’s enactment of the Interstate Agreement, the Fourth Circuit held that Mauro announced a new rule of law that was not clearly foreshadowed as required to satisfy the threshold test for potential denial of retroactive application set forth in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). 8 Consequently, the decision was not to be afforded automatic retroactivity; rather, the court turned to and examined four factors governing retroactive application o…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Williams, Ronald Alfred, Ronald A. Williams
(2×)
In Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835, 837 (4th Cir. 1979), the court held that Mauro announced a new rule of law not clearly foreshadowed and that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), no automatic retroactivity should be accorded to the Mauro decision.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Hawkins-El v. Williams
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
The question therefore is presented herein as to whether the rule of Mauro applies retroactively to a state conviction which became final prior to the date of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mauro 12 Prior to Mauro , three of the five courts of appeals that had considered the issue held that transfers pursuant to writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum were not subject to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. * * * ****** With the exception of the Second Circuit’s holding in Ford [United States v. Ford, 550 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), aff’d 436 U.S. 340 , 98 S.Ct. 1834 , 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (197…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. William Bryant
(2×)
It has now been established by judicial decision that, after the lodging of a detainer, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum operates as a request under the Act for temporary custody or availability, United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 1834 , 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978); Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835, 836 (4th Cir. 1979), to the extent the writ is for "prosecution on the charge or charges . . . which form the basis of the detainer . . . or . . . aris(e) out of the same transaction," 18 U.S.C.A.
discussed
Cited "see"
No. 85-1121
See Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835, 837-39 (4th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 , 101 S.Ct. 939 , 67 L.Ed.2d 109 (1981). 18 Likewise, we conclude that the second and third Chevron factors weigh against retroactive application of Sells and Baggot.
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Under Seal
See Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835, 837-39 (4th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 , 101 S.Ct. 939 , 67 L.Ed.2d 109 (1981).
discussed
Cited "see"
Guthrie v. GENESEE CTY., NY
See City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hospital Assoc., 598 F.2d 835 (4th Cir.), on remand from 435 U.S. 992 , 98 S.Ct. 1642 , 56 L.Ed.2d 81 (1978), vacating, for reconsideration in light of City of Lafayette, 562 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1977).
discussed
Cited "see"
Joseph Herbert Mars v. United States
(2×)
See Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835, 837-38 (4th Cir. 1979). 56 In view, however, of the fact that our current case was in the appellate process when United States v. Mauro, supra, was decided, I would delay decision on the retroactivity issue until we are presented with a case which had been initiated and completed before Mauro was decided. 57 For the reasons stated above the writ should issue.
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Charles Diggs v. David Owens, Superintendent and John Daughn, Warden
See also Brown v. Mitchell, 598 F.2d 835, 837-39 (4th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1123 , 101 S.Ct. 939 , 67 L.Ed. 2d 109 (1981).
CITY OF FAIRFAX Et Al., Appellants,
v.
FAIRFAX HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION Et Al., Appellees
v.
FAIRFAX HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION Et Al., Appellees
76-1775.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Jun 13, 1978.
Hall, Wyzanski.
Published
ORDER
We are in receipt of the mandate of the Supreme Court in this case dated April 24, 1978, 435 U.S. 992, 98 S.Ct. 1642, 56 L.Ed.2d 81, and in obedience to said mandate have further considered the case in the light of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 98 S.Ct. 1123, 55 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978), and memoranda of the parties.
Mindful of the statement made by Judge Widener delivered in this case on August 22, 1977, see 562 F.2d 280 (CA 4, 1977) to the effect that
“There is not sufficient indication in the record as presently constituted here, however, that the contemplated sale-lease transaction involved here is necessarily related to any existing regulatory interest in hospital ownership on the part of the State of Virginia or Fairfax County.” (p. 287),
the court is unanimously of opinion that the case should be remanded to the district court for its further consideration in the light of both the Supreme Court’s opinion just mentioned and Judge Widener’s observation in his concurring opinion.
It is accordingly ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is vacated and the case is remanded for reconsideration in accordance with this order.