green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 3×
37.1 score
“no judge wants to be in the position of suggesting that a fellow professional-whom the judge may have known for years-is exercising peremptory challenges based on forbidden racial considerations.”
Treatment trajectory · 2010 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2010
2018
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 25 distinct citers.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
State of Iowa v. Peter Leroy Veal
no judge wants to be in the position of suggesting that a fellow professional-whom the judge may have known for years-is exercising peremptory challenges based on forbidden racial considerations.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Conner v. State
(4×)
also: Cited "see"
batson requires . . . an opportunity for opposing counsel to argue that the proffered reasons are pretextual . . . .
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
State of Iowa v. Kenneth L. Lilly
no judge wants to be in the position of suggesting that a fellow professional-whom the judge may have known for years-is exercising peremptory challenges based on forbidden racial considerations.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Palmer
Nevertheless, "'if Batson is to be given its full effect, trial courts must make precise and difficult inquires to determine if the proffered reasons for a peremptory strike are the race-neutral reasons they purport to be, or if they are merely a pretext for that which Batson forbids' . . . ." Id. (quoting Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2010)). ¶18 Ultimately, whether the explanation for a peremptory strike is a pretext for racial discrimination is a question of fact.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Porter
Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 . “[I]t may be uncomfortable and unpleasant for a trial judge to undertake such a difficult and subtle inquiry with the precision and persistence that may be required to determine counsel’s true reasons for striking a juror.” Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2010).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Geremy Atkins
See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 528 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2008); Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 257-58 (3d Cir. 2010).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People v. Tennille; People v. Rutledge
(2×)
We ac knowledge that “if Batson is to be given its full effect, trial courts must make precise and difficult inquiries to determine if the proffered reasons for a peremptory strike are the race-neutral reasons they purport to be, or if they are merely a pretext for that which Batson forbids.” Coombs v Diguglielmo, 616 F3d 255, 264 (CA 3, 2010).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
People of Michigan v. Lance Smalley Rogers
See, e.g., United States v McAllister, 693 F3d 572, 580 (CA 6, 2012); Coombs v Diguglielmo, 616 F3d 255, 263 (CA 3, 2010) (remanding where the trial court did not make the requisite factual findings and where it “fail[ed] to undertake a full step three analysis . . .”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Howard v. Horn
“The Equal Protection Clause ‘prohibits a prosecutor from using a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror solely on account of race.’ ” Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 719 (3d Cir.2004)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Blunt v. Lower Merion School District
In Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir.2010), in discussing the possible unconscious bias of a prosecutor in striking Black jurors we explained, “[ljike anyone else, trial attorneys possess those human frailties that make each of us far too susceptible to social conditioning and the subliminal bias that may result.” Surely, teachers in our public schools, even though they may not be acting out of racial animus or conscious bias, are no less human, and no more immune to the “frailties that make each of us far too susceptible to social conditioning and the subliminal bias that…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Adigun
Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2010).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Carlos Smith
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Smith’s appeal focuses on the third step, during which a court determines whether the Government’s proffered reasons are pretextual by consulting “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity,” Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir.2010) (quotation omitted), including the relative rates of peremptory strikes “compared to the final composition of the jury,” id. (citation omitted).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Coombs v. Diguglielmo
(4×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Coombs, 616 F.3d at 260 (internal quotations omitted). .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Rutledge
See McMath, 559 F.3d at 666 ; Taylor, 509 F.3d at 845 ; cf. Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 262-64 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying a similar rule).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Alvin Walton
LEGAL STANDARD Batson Challenges The Equal Protection Clause “prohibits a prosecutor from using a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror solely on account of race.” Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2010).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Demettris Cruse
See Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir.2010) (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 , 125 S.Ct. 2317 , 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005)).
cited
Cited "see"
Thomas D'Amico v. Karen Balicki
See Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir.2010).
cited
Cited "see"
United States v. Thomas Reyes
See Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir.2010).
cited
Cited "see"
David Danner v. Kenneth Cameron
See Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir.2010).
discussed
Cited "see"
Craig Saunders v. Franklin Tennis
If we concluded that the prosecutor never offered race-neutral justifications at step two or that the state court never conducted a step-three analysis, an “evidentiary hearing at which the prosecutor might rely upon his recollection of the voir dire and make reference to his trial notes would seem warranted.” Holloway, 355 F.3d at 725; accord, e.g., Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 263 (3d Cir.2010); Brinson, 398 F.3d at 235 (remanding for an evidentiary hearing and de novo review where the state court’s failure to proceed to step two was contrary to Batson).
cited
Cited "see"
Charles Diggs v. David Diguglielmo
See Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 260 (3d Cir.2010).
examined
Cited "see"
Lark v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
See Coombs, 616 F.3d at 260 (citing Holloway, 355 F.3d at 718 ).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
United States v. Vann
See e.g., Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255, 263-64 (3d Cir.2010) (finding that "it is clear from the record that the court effectively omitted the third step of the Bat-son inquiry by unreasonably limiting the defendant's opportunity to prove that the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking Black jurors were pretextual, thereby improperly restricting the defendant’s ability to prove discriminatory intent” and criticizing the district court’s step two acceptance of the "prosecutor’s vague and elusive explanation and the apparent concession that he was not sure why he stuck Juror …
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Shawn Higgins v. Burl Cain, Warden
See, e.g., Coombs v. Diguglielmo, 616 F.3d 255 , 261 (3d Cir.2010); Smulls v. Roper, 535 F.3d 853, 860 (8th Cir.2008). 59 .State v. Sparks, 68 So.3d 435, 474-75 (La. 2011).
Coombs
v.
DiGuglielmo
v.
DiGuglielmo
08-1945.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Dec 16, 2010.
Published
Citer courts: Supreme Court of Iowa (1)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 08-1945 ___________
WAYNE COOMBS, Appellant
v. DAVID DIGUGLIELMO; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the Judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-04-cv-01841) District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 31.1 October 2, 2009
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, CHAGARES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
ORDER AMENDING OPINION AND JUDGMENT
As it appears that the opinion and judgment entered in the above matter on July
30, 2010, contained typographical errors, it is hereby
ORDERED that the opinion and judgment are amended to reflect the correct case
number of the underlying action, and the judgment is further amended to reflect the correct date of the judgment of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. An amended mandate will issue forthwith.
For the Court, Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk
Date: December 16, 2010