UNITED STATES of Am., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mario Alberto VALLEJO, Defendant-Appellant, 69 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 1996). · Go Syfert
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UNITED STATES of Am., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mario Alberto VALLEJO, Defendant-Appellant, 69 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
32 citation events (16 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Candylizett Ortega (ca9, 2024-03-04)
Treatment trajectory · 1996 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1996 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Candylizett Ortega
9th Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
“Without an adoption of the presentence report by the district court or an attempt to tie its sentencing decision to the Guidelines, we must vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.” United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (Jan. 29, 1996) (quoting United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520, 1522 (9th Cir.1992)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Charles Murray
3rd Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
Importantly, “[supervised release ... is not punishment in lieu of incarceration,” United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 50 , 114 S.Ct. 1259 , 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994), but rather is primarily concerned with “facilitating] the reintegration of the defendant into the community.” United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michelle Wing (2×)
9th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
By creating supervised release, Congress sought to give district courts broad authority to “protect the public and ‘to facilitate the reintegration of the defendant into the community.’ ” See United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.1 comment n.2 (1995)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Sullivan
9th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
This holding is in line with our practice to “interpret ‘[t]he statutory scheme of sentencing, including the Guidelines ... harmoniously as a whole.’ ” United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Shorthouse, 7 F.3d 149, 152 (9th Cir.1993) (interpreting § 3624(e))).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Sullivan
9th Cir. · 2007 · confidence medium
This holding is in line with our practice to “inter- pret ‘[t]he statutory scheme of sentencing, including the UNITED STATES v. SULLIVAN 13345 Guidelines . . . harmoniously as a whole.’ ” United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Shorthouse, 7 F.3d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1993) (inter- preting § 3624(e)). [4] We also look to Montana state law, which helps deter- mine the nature of Pre-Release Centers in Montana.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Margarito Murguia-Oliveros, A/K/A Margarito Oliveros Murguia
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
It is “to protect the public and to facilitate the reintegration of the defendant into the community.” United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Murguia-Oliveros
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
It is “to protect the public and to facilitate the reintegration of the defendant into the community.” United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Edward Bahe
9th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 , 113 S.Ct. 2173 , 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993)), our task is to " 'interpret the statutory scheme of sentencing, including the Guidelines ... harmoniously as a whole,' " United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Shorthouse, 7 F.3d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1993)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jaramillo
10th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
In United States v. Reider, 103 F.3d 99, 102-03 (10th Cir. 1996), we held that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (e) requires a term of supervised release to commence when the “person is released from imprisonment.” Id. (quoting § 3624(e)); see United States v. Joseph, 109 F.3d 34, 36-38 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding supervised release does not run while a person is incarcerated for a federal crime); United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 1995) 2 (holding that term of supervised release does not commence until day defendant is subject to conditions of supervised release), c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Richard T. Jaramillo
10th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
Though neither party chose to brief this important issue, our research indicates that neither the relevant statute nor case law allows us to grant such a remedy. 5 In United States v. Reider, 103 F.3d 99, 102-03 (10th Cir.1996), we held that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (e) requires a term of supervised release to commence when the "person is released from imprisonment." Id. (quoting § 3624(e)); see United States v. Joseph, 109 F.3d 34, 36-38 (1st Cir.1997) (holding supervised release does not run while a person is incarcerated for a federal crime); United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Electrodyne Systems Corp.
D.N.J. · 1998 · confidence medium
In support of this contention, the Individual Defendants cite: United States v. Gardner, 894 F.2d 708, 709-710 (5th Cir.1990) (automobiles, to circumvent environmental standards); United States v. Felsen, 648 F.2d 681, 682 (10th Cir.1981) (same); Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir.1992) (banned, non-FDA approved animal drugs); United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir.1977) (banned vitamins); United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 993 (9th Cir.1995) (firearms); United States v. Arrellano, 812 F.2d 1209, 1210 (9th Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Dodd, 43 F.3d 759, 760-6…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Luis Fernando Gonzalez, United States of America v. Ricardo Yudice-Campos, United States of America v. Enrique Avalos-Barriga
9th Cir. · 1998 · confidence medium
In this way, this case can be distinguished from United States v. Real-Hernandez, 90 F.3d 356, 360 (9th Cir.1996) and United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994-95 (9th Cir.1995), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1447 (1996). 6 The defendants nonetheless complain that the district court erred in failing to state its reasons for denying application of the "safety valve" provision.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCann v. Superintendent of Elections
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 1997 · confidence medium
In United, States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 116 S.Ct. 1447 , 134 L.Ed.2d 567 (1996), the Court stated: [T]he purpose of supervised release [is] to protect the public and ‘to facilitate the reintegration of the defendant into the community____’ United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5D1.1 comment (n. 2) (Nov.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wilmer LOMAYAOMA, Defendant-Appellant
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
We have explained that “[a] district court may ‘revoke a term of supervised release, and require the person to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release ... if the court ... finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.’ ” United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (e)(3)), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1447 , 134 L.Ed.2d 567 (1996).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Terry Davis
D.C. Cir. · 2013 · signal: accord · confidence high
No. 98-225, at 124 (1983), 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3; accord United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir.1995).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Jawad Miqbel (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See United, States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Wilson, 7 F.3d 828, 839-40 (9th Cir.1993).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Miqbel (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wilson, 7 F.3d 828, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1993). 15 Here, the court failed to note that the only sentencing factors that may be considered in sentencing for a violation of supervised release condi- tions are those provisions in § 3553(a) that are also listed in § 3583(e).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Miles
E.D. Cal. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir.1995)(stating that the purpose of supervised release is to protect the public and to facilitate the reintegration of defendants into the community).
cited Cited "see" UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Carole MALANDRINI, Defendant-Appellant
9th Cir. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See id.
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Joseph
1st Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir.1995) (purposes of supervised release are not served until the defendant is actually subject to the terms and conditions of his supervised release).
cited Cited "see" UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lonnie G. SCHMIDT, Defendant-Appellant
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir.1995) (as amended) (per curiam), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 1447 , 134 L.Ed.2d 567 (1996).
discussed Cited "see" UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Francisco REAL-HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant
9th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Vallejo, 69 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir.1995) (Vallejo) (explanation that 12-month sentence “based on all the papers” was insufficient to permit meaningful review), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1447 , 134 L.Ed.2d 567 (1996); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (c).
95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8482, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 14,631 United States of America
v.
Mario Alberto Vallejo
94-50652.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jan 29, 1996.
69 F.3d 992
John Lanahan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, San Diego, California, for defendant-appellant., Joyce Fitzpatrick, Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, California, for plaintiff-appellee.
Browning, Per Curiam, Pregerson, Tanner.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

I.

Vallejo was convicted of illegally importing a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(1)) and being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), and was sentenced to twenty-four months imprisonment and three years supervised release.

On September 15,1992, we reversed Vallejo’s firearm convictions for evidentiary errors, and remanded for retrial. On November 11, 1992, Vallejo was released on bail after serving approximately seventeen months in prison. Instead of retrying Vallejo for the firearms offenses, the government issued a superseding information, charging Vallejo with importing merchandise subject to seizure in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545, to which Vallejo pled guilty. On June 7, 1993, the district court sentenced Vallejo to “time served” plus one year of supervised release.

In February 1994, state officers arrested Vallejo for second degree burglary, felony transportation of marijuana, and possession of marijuana for sale. Based on this state arrest, the district court revoked Vallejo’s supervised release and sentenced him to a one year prison term, scheduled to begin in[*994] March, 1996, when Vallejo completed his state prison term. The court said:

It will be the sentence of the court, based on all the papers, and making a finding that I do have jurisdiction ..., the sentence will be 12 months to the state charge based on everything I’ve read, on his history. He is the one that tried to ship the stuff to the East Coast, not you, ... not me. He deserves to be punished in the federal court. He violated the order of the federal court and, therefore, it will be 12 months.

Vallejo appeals, arguing the district court (1) did not have jurisdiction because Vallejo’s term of supervised release expired before he committed the state offenses, and (2) failed to state its reasons for imposing a sentence of twelve months.

II. Jurisdiction

A district court may “revoke a term of supervised release, and require the person to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release ... if the court ... finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release....” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Whether the district court had jurisdiction to revoke Vallejo’s supervised release is a question of law we decide de novo. United States v. Neville, 985 F.2d 992, 994 (9th Cir.1993).

Vallejo argues the district court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his term of supervised release because that term had expired. According to Vallejo, the supervised release began on November 11,1992, the day he was released on bail for retrial on remand after serving seventeen months for the reversed conviction, and ended in November 1993, four months before his arrest on state charges. The government argues Vallejo’s supervised release began on June 7,1993, the day Vallejo was sentenced to “time served” on his plea of guilty to the charge in the superseding information.

Under the controlling statute, “[t]he term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment. ...” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). We interpret “[t]he statutory scheme of sentencing, including the Guidelines ... harmoniously as a whole.” United States v. Shorthouse, 7 F.3d 149, 152 (9th Cir.1993). Vallejo argues that the language “the day the person is released from imprisonment” means the day an inmate physically walks out of federal prison. Because Vallejo physically left prison only once, when he was released on bail, he argues his term began on that day.

Vallejo’s argument loses sight of the purpose of supervised release: to protect the public and “to facilitate the reintegration of the defendant into the community....” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5D1.1 comment (n.2) (Nov.1992). See also USSG § 5D1.3(b)(2) (stating that supervised release conditions may be imposed “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide the defendant with needed education or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”).

To achieve these goals, the Guidelines mandate certain conditions of supervised release, and recommend numerous others, many of which the district court imposed on Vallejo. See USSG § 5D1.3(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); USSG § 5B1.4.

Vallejo was not subject to many of these conditions while he was free on bail. Thus, the time Vallejo spent on bail did not serve the statute’s goals. It will best serve Congress’s purpose to interpret the statute as beginning the period of supervised release when the defendant becomes subject in fact to the terms and conditions of supervised release. Cf. United States v. Freeman, 922 F.2d 1393, 1397 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that a convict does not receive probation credit for time spent on bail). We hold that Vallejo’s term began the day he was sentenced to time served and first became subject to the conditions of his supervised release.

[*995] We reject Vallejo’s argument that the language of the statute is ambiguous, and therefore must be construed in his favor. This rule is reserved “for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute.” Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990) (citations omitted). Because the statute is not ambiguous in light of these factors, the rule does not apply.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s ruling that it had subject matter jurisdiction.

III. Sentence Calculation

Vallejo argues that he cannot adequately appeal the merits of his sentence because the district court failed to explain its ruling as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).

We agree. The court simply said “based on all the papers ... the sentence will be twelve months.” This is not enough to permit meaningful review. ‘Without an adoption of the presentence report by the district court or an attempt to tie its sentencing decision to the Guidelines, we must vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.” United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520, 1522 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. Lockard, 910 F.2d 542, 546 (9th Cir.1990). Accordingly, we vacate and remand for resentencing.

VACATED AND REMANDED.