Ocasio-Aponte v. Nazario, 70 F.3d 1252 (1st Cir. 1995). · Go Syfert
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Ocasio-Aponte v. Nazario, 70 F.3d 1252 (1st Cir. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
42 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bain v. Federal Bureau of Prisons (ctd, 2022-08-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bain v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
D. Conn. · 2022 · confidence medium
Senior United States District Judge 1 Cf. United States v. Martin, 974 F.3d 124 , at 137–40 (2d Cir. 2020) (“The First Step Act does not authorize district courts to reduce sentences for covered offenses where those offenses have been fully served.”); Simon v. United States, 70 F.3d 1252, at *1 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding petition for time credit moot where petitioner has since been released from prison); Fendler v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 846 F.2d 550 , 555–56 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Fendler’s habeas corpus petition is moot because Fendler has been released from custody and because he did …
discussed Cited "see" Langan v. Smith
D.D.C. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gabovitch v. Shear , 70 F.3d 1252 (1st Cir. 1995) (unpublished per curiam) (joining "[n]umerous courts [that] have held that the filing of litigation-no matter how lacking in merit-does not constitute a predicate racketeering act of extortion").
discussed Cited "see" Langan v. Smith
D. Mass. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gabovitch v. Shear, 70 F.3d 1252 (1st Cir. 1995) (unpublished per curiam) (joining “[n]umerous courts [that] have held that the filing of litigation -- no matter how lacking in merit -- does not constitute a predicate racketeering act of extortion”). fear” for purposes of the extortion statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 .
discussed Cited "see" Britton v. Maloney
D. Mass. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Guay v. Kappelle, 70 F.3d 1252 (1st Cir.1995) (holding doctor could not show underlying prosecution had terminated in his favor; though original plaintiff had lost on the negligence claim, he had still prevailed on a lack of informed consent theory).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." nysd 2025
S.D.N.Y. · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id. (cleaned up); see also Gabovitch v. Shear, 70 F.3d 1252 (table), 1995 WL 697319, at *2 (1st Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“In essence, simply by alleging that defendants' litigation stance in the state court case was ‘fraudulent,’ plaintiff is insisting upon a right to relitigate that entire case in federal court. . . .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Devol Pond Association v. Chris Capone
D. Mass. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence low
Mass. 2018) (collecting cases); see also Gabovitch v. Shear, 70 F.3d 1252 (Table), 1995 WL 697319, at *2 (1st Cir. 1995) (unpublished per curiam) (concluding that “proffering false affidavits and testimony to [a] state court” does not constitute a predicate act of extortion or mail fraud).26 Such Inc., 393 F.3d 36, 51 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Sanchez v. Triple-S Mgmt., Corp., 492 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2007) (“The plaintiffs cannot press a RICO claim based on attempts at extortion that did not succeed in harming them.”). 26 See also Dias v. Bogins, 134 F.3d 361 (Table), 1998 WL 13089 , …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sebago, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc.
D. Mass. · 1998 · signal: see also · confidence low
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 , 112 S.Ct. 1311 , 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992); see also Gabovitch v. Shear, 70 F.3d 1252 , 1995 WL 697319, *1 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1175 , 116 S.Ct. 1269 , 134 L.Ed.2d 216 (1996).
Ocasio-Aponte
v.
Nazario
95-1365.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Nov 20, 1995.
70 F.3d 1252
Unpublished

70 F.3d 1252

NOTICE: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(b)6 states unpublished opinions may be cited only in related cases.
Edwin OCASIO-APONTE, Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
Jose Ariel NAZARIO, et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 95-1365.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Nov. 20, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico [Hon. Salvador E. Casellas, U.S. District Judge].

Francisco J. Rodriguez Juarbe on brief for appellant.

Carlos Lugo-Fiol, Solicitor General, Jacqueline Novas-Debien, Deputy Solicitor General, Lorraine J. Riefkohl, Assistant Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Jose Carlos Garcia-Selva and Sigrid Lopez-Gonzalez Law Offices, on brief for appellees.

D. Puerto Rico.

AFFIRMED.

Before LYNCH, Circuit Judge, WATSON,[*] Senior Judge, and CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

1

Appellant Ocasio-Aponte appeals the dismissal of his action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, by the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, on the ground that his complaint was time barred because it had not been filed within the applicable one year statute of limitations period. We affirm.

2

Ocasio-Aponte's action arising out of the termination of his government employment was filed in federal court on April 23, 1992. Although his alleged injury occurred in 1988, the parties agree that the statute of limitations had been tolled by an action filed in the Commonwealth Supreme Court in 1989. This action was dismissed by the Commonwealth Superior Court for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico subsequently denied Aponte-Ocasio's petition for review and motion for reconsideration. The parties were notified of the court's denial of the motion for reconsideration on April 22, 1991. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico issued its mandate to the Superior Court on May 1, 1991.

3

The sole question in this case is when the tolling period ended. According to Ocasio-Aponte the tolling period lasted until mandate issued; according to appellees, the period lasted only until the parties were notified on April 22, 1992, of the court's denial of Aponte-Ocasio's motion for reconsideration. Both parties agree that the instant action is time barred if, but only if, the tolling period ended on or before April 22, 1991.

4

State law, here the law of Puerto Rico, controls the question of the duration of the tolling period. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 (1985); Gonsalves v. Flynn, 981 F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir.1992). As the district court held, under Puerto Rico law, the tolling period ends when the court enters a final judgment. Duran Cepeda v. Morales Lebron, 112 D.P.R. 623, 12 Official Translations 776, 785 (1982); Fresh-O-Baking Co. v. Molinos de Puerto Rico, 103 P.R.R. 707, 717 (1975). A judgment is final, at the latest, when it has been "rendered and notified with the proper legal formality," Sanchez v. Municipality of Cayey, 94 P.R.R. 89, 96 (1967). Finality is not dependent on the date on which mandate issues to the lower court. See Dominguez v. Fabian, 36 P.R.R. 509, 511 (1927) (judgment final, for purposes of taking appeal, from date rendered and filed with court not from date on which mandate issues).

5

Under Puerto Rico law, a final judgment in the instant case was rendered, at the latest, on April 22, 1991; for, on that date, the parties received formal notification from the Puerto Rico Supreme Court that Ocasio-Aponte's motion for reconsideration had been denied. As of April 22, 1991, therefore, the tolling period was at an end and the statute of limitations began to run anew. Rodriguez Narvaez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir.1990). Since the present action was filed more than one year from this date, the district court was correct in finding it time barred.

6

Affirmed.

*

Of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation