Carrie Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. & First Nat'l Bank of South Carolina, 713 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
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Carrie Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. & First Nat'l Bank of South Carolina, 713 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the district court held that these violations were only technical and because sustained no actual injury as a result of them, no liability on the part of the creditors arose. we disagree and reverse the judgment of the lower court.”
86 citation events (58 in the last 25 years) across 26 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Schnall v. Amboy Natl Bank (ca3, 2002-01-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#1 C.F.R. § 226.6-226.8 cited 1× in this case · 3 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 45 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Schnall v. Amboy Natl Bank
3rd Cir. · 2002 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the district court held that these violations were only technical and because sustained no actual injury as a result of them, no liability on the part of the creditors arose. we disagree and reverse the judgment of the lower court.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Schnall v. Amboy Natl Bank
3rd Cir. · 2002 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the district court held that these violations were only technical and because sustained no actual injury as a result of them, no liability on the part of the creditors arose. we disagree and reverse the judgment of the lower court.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dillard v. Thomasville Auto Sales, LLC
M.D.N.C. · 2016 · confidence medium
Dillard relies on Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983), in which the court found liability for a technical error in the use of the term “total time balance” instead of “total of payments.” In doing so, the court stated that to ensure “that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of [TILA] and the regulations implementing it be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.” Id. at 67 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Abubo v. Bank of New York Mellon
D. Haw. · 2013 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 701-02 (9th Cir.1986)). “‘To insure that the consumer is protected ... [TILA and accompanying regulations must] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.’ ” Semar, 791 F.2d at 704 (quoting Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983)); see also, e.g., Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.2010) (“In applying TILA and its implementing regulations, we ‘require absolute compliance by creditors,’ and ‘[e]ven technical or minor violations of the TILA impose liability on the creditor[.]’ �…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Canterbury v. J.P. Morgan Acquisition Corp.
W.D. Va. · 2013 · confidence medium
Instead, citing Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983), Plaintiff argues that creditors should be strictly liable under TILA.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Watkins v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc. (4×)
4th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
This Court has held that “to insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of the Act and the regulations implementing it be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.” Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) (holding that technical violation, even if merely a “minor variation in language and type size” from Truth in Lending Act requirements, imposes liability), superseded on other grounds by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (a)(2)(A), Pub.L. 104-12, May 18, 1995, 109 Stat. 161 ; see also Huff v. Stewart-G…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stanton v. Bank of America, N.A.
D. Haw. · 2011 · confidence medium
“To insure that the consumer is protected ... [TILA and Reg Z must] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.” Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) (holding that technical violation, even if merely a “minor variation in language and type size” from TILA requirements, imposes liability); see also Huff v. Stewart-Gwinn Furniture Co., 713 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir.1983) (minor violations of TILA and Reg Z impose liability even if, as creditor alleged, consumer “was not misled and was given a meaningful and correct disclosure of crucial credit t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barnes v. Chase Home Finance, LLC
D. Or. · 2011 · confidence medium
“To insure that the consumer is protected ... [TILA and Reg Z must] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.” Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983)(holding that technical violation, even if merely a “minor variation in language and type size” from TILA requirements, imposes liability); see also Huff v. Stewart-Gwinn Furniture Co., 713 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir.1983)(minor violations of TILA and Reg Z impose liability even if, as creditor alleged, consumer “was not misled and was given a meaningful and correct disclosure of crucial credit ter…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Conrad v. FARMERS AND MERCHANTS BANK
W.D. Va. · 2011 · confidence medium
Although “the provisions of [TILA] and the regulations implementing it [must] be absolutely complied with and strictly ehforced[,]” Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983), TILA’s requirements should also be "reasonably construed and equitably applied.” Am.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Velazquez v. GMAC Mortgage Corp.
C.D. Cal. · 2008 · confidence medium
Semar v. Platte Valley Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir.1986)(quoting Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cornerstone Mortgage, Inc. v. Ponzar
Mo. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
“To insure that the consumer is protected ... [TILA and Regulation Z must] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.” Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that technical violation, even if merely a “minor variation in language and type size” from TILA requirements, imposes liability); see also Huff v. Stewart-Gwinn Furniture Co., 713 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir.1983) (minor violations of TILA and Regulation Z impose liability even if, as creditor alleged, consumer “was not misled and was given a meaningful and correct disclosure of c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McDonald v. Checks-N-Advance, Inc. (In Re Ferrell)
9th Cir. BAP · 2006 · confidence medium
TILA and Regulation Z are liberally construed in favor of the consumer, and must “be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.” Jackson v. Grant, 890 F.2d 118, 120 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983)). 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Comer v. PERSON AUTO SALES, INC.
M.D.N.C. · 2005 · confidence medium
The Fourth Circuit has held that “[t]o insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of [TILA] and the regulations implementing it be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.” Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh (4×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 2004 · confidence medium
See, e. g., Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91 F. 3d 797, 800 (CA6 1996); Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., FSB, 70 F. 3d 937 , 941 (CA7 1995); Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F. 2d 65, 67 (CA4 1983); Dryden v. Lou Budke’s Arrow Finance Co., 661 F. 2d 1186, 1191, n. 7 (CA8 1981) (per curiam); Williams v. Public Finance Corp., 598 F. 2d 349, 358, 359, n. 17 (CA5 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kittrell v. RRR, L.L.C.
E.D. Va. · 2003 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir.1996) ("A plaintiff in a TILA case need not prove that he or she suffered actual or monetary damages in order to recover the statutory damages and attorney’s fees.”); Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, 70 F.3d 937 , 940 (7th Cir.1995); Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) ("Although we agree with the district court that Mars sustained no actual injuries, § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) permits statutory damages....”); Baker v. G.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Armstrong v. Nationwide Mortgage Plan/Trust (In Re Armstrong)
Bankr. E.D. Pa. · 2003 · confidence medium
“To insure that the consumer is protected ... [TILA and Reg Z must] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.” Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that technical violation, even if merely a “minor variation in language and type size” from TILA requirements, imposes liability); see also Huff v. Stewart-Gwinn Furniture Co., 713 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir.1983) (minor violations of TILA and Reg Z impose liability even if, as creditor alleged, consumer “was not misled and was given a meaningful and correct disclosure of crucial credit …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rodrigues v. U.S. Bank (In Re Rodrigues)
Bankr. D.R.I. · 2002 · confidence medium
Courts impose such strict liability even where such violations are “merely technical” or “minor.” See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983); Jenkins v. Landmark Mortgage Corp., 696 F.Supp. 1089, 1095 (W.D.Va.1988); Solis v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 58 B.R. 983, 986 (E.D.Pa.1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Noel v. Fleet Finance, Inc.
E.D. Mich. · 1997 · confidence medium
Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1144 ; Jackson v. Grant, 890 F.2d 118, 120 (9th Cir.1989); Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. First Government Mortgage & Investors Corp.
D.D.C. · 1997 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 791 F.2d 699 , 704 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that technical violations of TILA impose liability on creditors); Mars v. Spartanburg Chysler Plymouth Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) (same).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hill v. Allright Mortgage Co. (In Re Hill)
Bankr. D. Md. · 1996 · confidence medium
Id. at 1144-45; Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gaydos v. Huntington National Bank
N.D. Ohio · 1996 · confidence medium
Sav. and Loan Assoc., 791 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1986); Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983); Jackson v. Grant, 890 F.2d 118, 121-122 (5th Cir.1983); Bizier v. Globe Fin.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reynolds v. D & N BANK
E.D. Mich. · 1992 · confidence medium
Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983); Kotrba v. Burlingame Co., no.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) New Maine National Bank v. Gendron
D. Me. · 1991 · confidence medium
Courts impose such strict liability even where such violations are “merely technical” or “minor.” See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983); Jenkins v. Landmark Mortgage Corp., 696 F.Supp. 1089, 1095 (W.D.Va.1988); Solis v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 58 B.R. 983, 986 (E.D.Pa.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Edna Jackson v. Syd Grant, Belle G. Grant (2×)
9th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 791 F.2d 699 , 704 (9th Cir.1986). " 'To insure that the consumer is protected ... [the TILA and accompanying regulations must] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.' " Id. (quoting Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983)). 14 Section 125(a) of the TILA, 15 U.S.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Edna Jackson v. Syd Grant, Belle G. Grant (2×)
9th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 791 F.2d 699 , 704 (9th Cir.1986). " 'To insure that the consumer is protected ... [the TILA and accompanying regulations must] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.' " Id. (quoting Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983)). 14 Section 125(a) of the TILA, 15 U.S.C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Semar v. Platte Valley Federal Savings & Loan Association (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
"To insure that the consumer is protected ... [TILA and Reg Z must] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced." Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) (holding that technical violation, even if merely a "minor variation in language and type size" from TILA requirements, imposes liability); see also Huff v. Stewart-Gwinn Furniture Co., 713 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir.1983) (minor violations of TILA and Reg Z impose liability even if, as creditor alleged, consumer "was not misled and was given a meaningful and correct disclosure of crucial credit terms"). 18…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Semar v. Platte Valley Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (2×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
“To insure that the consumer is protected ... [TILA and Reg Z must] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.” Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) (holding that technical violation, even if merely a “minor variation in language and type size” from TILA requirements, imposes liability); see also Huff v. Stewart-Gwinn Furniture Co., 713 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir.1983) (minor violations of TILA and Reg Z impose liability even if, as creditor alleged, consumer “was not misled and was given a meaningful and correct disclosure of crucial credit t…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kadlec Motors, Inc. v. Knudson
Minn. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited "see" Little v. Bank of America, N.A.
E.D. Va. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) (“To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of the Act and the regulations implementing it be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced .... [Thus] ‘a technical violation of the Act [is] sufficient to subject [the creditor] to civil liability under § 1640.’ ”).
discussed Cited "see" Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. (2×)
4th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983).
cited Cited "see" ca4 2003
4th Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited "see" Rucker v. Sheehy Alexandria, Inc.
E.D. Va. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) (holding that TILA should be “absolutely complied with and strictly enforced,” and finding a violation for improper type size and minor variations in required language).
cited Cited "see" Hodges v. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.
E.D. Va. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65 (4th Cir.1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Danger v. Nextep Funding, LLC
D. Minnesota · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding that a procedural violation of the TILA—the use of the term “total time balance” instead of “total of payments”—created a sufficient injury-in-fact to support standing); Clement v. Am.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Danger v. Nextep Funding, LLC
D. Me. · 2019 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. , 713 F.2d 65 , 67 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding that a procedural violation of the TILA-the use of the term "total time balance" instead of "total of payments"-created a sufficient injury-in-fact to support standing); Clement v. Am.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Siver v. CitiMortgage, Inc.
W.D. Wash. · 2011 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) (“To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of [the TILA and Regulation Z] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." White v. Centex Home Equity Co., L.L.C. (In Re White)
Bankr. D. Kan. · 2007 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) ("To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of [the TILA and Reg. Z] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.”). 7 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ramirez v. Household Finance Corp. III (In Re Ramirez)
Bankr. D. Kan. · 2005 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) ("To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of [the TILA and Regulation Z] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced”). 12 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Merriman v. Beneficial Mortgage Co. of Kansas (In Re Merriman)
Bankr. D. Kan. · 2005 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) ("To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of [the TILA and Regulation Z] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced”). 13 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Stanley v. Household Finance Corp. III (In Re Stanley)
Bankr. D. Kan. · 2004 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) (“To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of [the TILA and Reg. Z] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.”). 16 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jones v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. (In Re Jones)
Bankr. D. Kan. · 2003 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) ("To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of [the TILA and Regulation Z] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced”). 28 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bilal v. Household Finance Corp. (In Re Bilal)
Bankr. D. Kan. · 2003 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) (‘To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of [the TILA and Regulation Z] be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.”). 12 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Martin Schnall, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated v. Amboy National Bank
3rd Cir. · 2002 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 66 (4th Cir.1983) (“The district court held that these violations were only technical and because [plaintiff] sustained no actual injury as a result of them, no liability on the part of the creditors arose.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Belmont v. Associates National Bank (Delaware)
E.D.N.Y · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (a); see also Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) (holding that although plaintiff suffered no actual injuries, § 1640 permits recovery of a statutory penalty equal to twice the amount of any finance charge in connection with the transaction); Clausen v. Beneficial Fin.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jeffrey Strange v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Georgia
7th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir.1983) (plaintiffs recovery under § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) capped at statutory limit of $1,000 where doubled finance charges totaled $2,348.70); Pendleton v. American Title Brokers, Inc., 754 F.Supp. 860, 864 (S.D.Ala.1991) (plaintiffs recovery under § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) boosted to statutory minimum of $100 where doubled finance charges were less than that amount).
Carrie MARS, Appellant,
v.
SPARTANBURG CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH, INC. and First National Bank of South Carolina, Appellees
82-1877.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Aug 1, 1983.
713 F.2d 65
Edward L. Bailey, Spartanburg, S.C., for appellant., Stanley T. Case, Spartanburg, S.C., for appellees.
Winter, Hall, Knapp.
Cited by 62 opinions  |  Published
K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge:

Carrie Mars appeals from a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of the First National Bank of South Carolina and Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., appellees. On appeal, Mars contends that the appellees’ disclosure statement contained certain violations of the Federal Truth in Lending Act (Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. and the original Federal Reserve Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. 226. [1] The district court held that these violations were only technical and because Mars sustamed no actual injury as a result of them, no liability on the part of the creditors arose. We disagree and reverse the judgment of the lower court.

I.

Both in the district court and on appeal, Mars argues that the appellees’ disclosure form specifically violated § 226.8(c)(5) of Regulation Z. This section required that the term “unpaid balance” be used on a consumer credit sale disclosure form when referring to the “unpaid balance of cash price,” plus, all other charges included in the amount financed, but which are not part of the finance charge. [2] In the present case, appellees used the term “amount financed” on their disclosure statement as opposed to the term “unpaid balance.” Further, Mars asserts that appellees’ disclosure statement violated § 226.6(a) of original Regulation Z [3] because certain numerical amounts in the paragraphs labelled “Late Payment” and “Prepayment” were disclosed in eight point type rather than the required ten point type.

Appellees concede that the disclosure form in question contains technical variations from Regulation Z. However, they[*67] contend that the minor variation in language and type size should not give rise to liability because Mars was given sufficient disclosure of information to make a meaningful comparison of credit terms, thereby meeting the objective of the Act.

The district court agreed with the appellees, and held that the technical violations asserted by Mars could not have influenced her choice of credit. Hence, the district court concluded that the purpose of the Act was achieved through the disclosure form utilized and that Mars sustained no actual injury. [4] Therefore, the district court found that Mars’ complaint was meritless and entered summary judgment in favor of appellees. From this order Mars appeals.

II.

We disagree with the district court’s analysis that a technical violation of the Act without actual harm imposes no liability. Congress declared that the purpose of the Act was:

to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing ....

15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned, requires that the provisions of the Act and the regulations implementing it be absolutely complied with and strictly enforced. As we noted in Barber v. Kimbrell’s Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 220 (1978), where the term “total time balance” was used in a truth and lending disclosure form as opposed to the term “total of payments” as required by Regulation Z, “a technical violation of the Act [is] sufficient to subject [the creditor] to civil liability under § 1640. [5] We conclude, therefore, that appellees are liable to Mars for the technical violations found in their disclosure form.

Although we agree with the district court that Mars sustained no actual injuries, § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) permits statutory damages twice the amount of any finance charge in connection with the transaction. The damages awarded shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1,000. [6] As the record reveals that Mars’ finance charge was $1,174.35, she is entitled to statutory damages in the amount of $1,000.

Further, § 1640(a)(3) permits a successful plaintiff to recover the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court. [7] Because in the instant case, the district court did not consider the amount of costs and attorney’s fee to which Mars is entitled, we remand the case for such a determination.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1

. The Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z were amended on March 31, 1980 and April 7, 1981, respectively. Compliance with those amendments was optional with the creditors until October 1, 1982. During the transition period, as a general rule, all disclosures were to be made either in accordance with the previous regulation or in accordance with the revised regulation, but a creditor could not mix the regulatory requirements. 46 Fed.Reg. 50290.

Because the creditors, appellees, in the instant case elected not to exercise their option to operate under the new amendments and revisions on the date of the contract, this case must be decided under the statute and regulation which existed before the 1980-81 amendment.

2

. The term “unpaid balance” was defined by several subsections of 12 C.F.R. 226.8(c) which stated:

(1) The cash price of the property or service purchased, using the term “cash price.”
(2) the amount of the downpayment itemized, as applicable, as downpayment in money, using the term “cash downpayment,” downpayment in property, using the term “trade-in,” and the sum, using the term “total downpayment.”
(3) The difference between the amounts described in subparagraphs (1) and (2) of this paragraph, using the term “unpaid balance of cash price.”
(4) All other charges, individually itemized, which are included in the amount financed but which are not part of the finance charge.
(5) The sum of the amounts determined under subparagraphs (3) and (4) of this paragraph, using the term “unpaid balance.”
3

. The Federal Reserve Board set forth in Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6-226.8 disclosure requirements imposed upon creditors in consumer credit transactions. Section 226.6(a), in pertinent part, stated:

Disclosures; General rule. ... all numerical amounts and percentages shall be stated in figures and shall be printed in not less than the equivalent of 10 point type, .075 inch computer type or elite size typewritten numerals, or shall be legibly handwritten.
4

. In its holding, the district court relied entirely upon the South Carolina district court case of Sanders v. Auto Associates, Inc., 450 F.Supp. 900 (D.S.C.1978). This Court has not had the opportunity to decide that case because it was never appealed. Nevertheless, by our holding in this case, we indicate our disapproval of Sanders.

5

. Section 1640 imposes civil liability upon any creditor who fails to comply with the Act.

6

. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i).